55 Mass. 177 | Mass. | 1848
This is an action of assumpsit; but the foundation of the plaintiffs’ claim is the alleged negligence of the defendants, in not collecting certain bills left with them for collection by the plaintiffs.
The defendants proved that they placed these bills in the hands of the Commonwealth Bank for collection, the same being payable in the city of Washington, where the defendants had no correspondents. This, the plaintiffs’ counsel contend, the defendants had no right to do, on the ground, that an agent has no right to delegate his authority to a sub-agent, without the assent of his. principal. This, no doubt, is generally true; but when, from the nature of the agency, a sub-agent or sub-agents must necessarily be employed, the assent of the principal is implied. Such was the nature of the agency in the present case. It could not have been expected, that the defendants would employ one of their own officers to proceed to Washington to obtain payment of the bills. The bills undoubtedly were intended to be transmitted to Washington for collection, and if the defendants employed suitable sub-agents for that purpose, in good faith, they are not liable for the neglect or default of the sub-agents. This was so decided in Fabens v. Mercantile Bank, 23 Pick. 330. The chief justice, in delivering the opinion of the court, says, “ It is well settled, that when a note is deposited with a bank for collection, which is payable at another place, the whole duty of the bank so receiving the note, in the first instance, is seasonably to transmit the same to a suitable bank or other agent at the place of payment. And as a part of the same doctrine, it is well settled, that if the acceptor of a bill or promisor of a note has his residence in another place, it shall be presumed to have been intended and understood between the depositor for collection and the bank, that it was to be transmitted to the place of the resi
In our opinion, the defendants’ responsibility was limited to good faith and due discretion in the choice of an agent to transmit the bills, and to procure a remittance of the money when paid. This case is not distinguishable from the case of Fabens v. Mercantile Bank, and the cases there cited.
_ We do not think that the proof of any usage is necessary to support these decisions ; but in the present case, the usage is well proved to have been uniform, in similar cases, ever since the year 1833 or 1834, three or four years before these bills were deposited in the defendant bank.
It was also proved that one bill had been transmitted in like manner, by the defendants, for the plaintiffs, and returned to them with protest, and without objection by them. This was in 1836, more than a year before the bills in this case were deposited. This would be sufficient notice of the usage or manner in which the defendant transacted such business, if any such notice were required. It seems, however, that the usage of a bank is binding on all persons dealing with the bank, whether they know of the usage or not. Lincoln and Kennebeck Bank v. Page, 9 Mass. 155; Bank of Washington v. Triplett, 1 Pet. 25. That is a point, however, not necessary to be decided in this case.
Plaintiffs nonsuit.
The chief justice did not sit in this case.