175 Mass. 145 | Mass. | 1900
This is an action to recover back taxes that were assessed by the respondents on certain parcels of real estate be
The case was heard by a justice of the Superior Court, without a jury, on what are called agreed facts, but which we interpret as authorizing him to draw such inferences as he thought warranted ; he held that the property was exempt, and found for the petitioner for the entire amount, and reported the case to this court in such a manner as to present the question of the assessability of each of the parcels.
We think that the ruling of the Superior Court was right, and that all of the property was exempt from taxation. Many of the principles and considerations and authorities applicable to this case have been stated and referred to somewhat at length in Phillips Academy v. Andover, ante, 118, and we do not deem it necessary to repeat them here.
The history of Harvard College and of like institutions shows, we think, that from the beginning dormitories and dining-halls have been furnished by the college for the use of the students, and have been regarded as devoted to college purposes.- In addition to this, the effect of the decisions in Wesleyan Academy v. Wilbraham, 99 Mass. 599, and Mount Hermon Boys' School v. Gill, 145 Mass. 139, is plainly to exempt property applied to such uses. See also Yale University v. New Haven, 71 Conn. 316, and State v. Ross, 4 Zabr. 497. We do not think that it makes any difference in principle that the-college, instead of furnishing board itself, provides a place, without rent or compensation in ■any form, or a lease or any agreement for a fixed term, for the ■use of students who club together for the purpose of obtaining for themselves, with the assistance of the college, food at cost. The property so used is occupied, it seems to us, for the purposes for which the college was incorporated. Many particulars are stated in the agreed facts in regard to No. 17 Kirkland Street, which is the parcel that we are now considering, which we do not think it necessary to refer to, as it seems to us plain that the property is exempt from taxation.
The history of the college and of the legislation relating to it also shows, we think, that the president’s house, during the earlier years of the college at any rate, was regarded as almost, if not
It seems to us that on these facts the judge who heard the case was justified in finding that the dominant or principal purpose of the occupancy by the president was that for which the college was incorporated. His occupation, it could be fairly said, was, so far as the university was concerned, official, as the head of the university, just as, for instance, the President occupies the White House, and not in any just sense primarily or principally for his own private benefit.
The remaining six houses are occupied by professors, three of whom are deans, each charged with a portion of the administra
This case is distinguishable, we think, from Williams College v.
The respondents rely on Third Congregational Society v. Springfield, 147 Mass. 396, which was a case where a parsonage was declared to be unexempt. The court held that religious societies did not come within the clause that we have been considering, but within the seventh clause, and that the exemption was limited to houses of religious worship only. That case is not applicable to this.
We think that the judgment of the Superior Court should be affirmed.
So ordered.