116 Wis. 647 | Wis. | 1903
Tbe evidence leaves no doubt of tbe grossly fraudulent character of tbe operations of Fryer. By means thereof be succeeded in obtaining from tbe defendants apparent obligations aggregating $4,000 for tbe purchase of property not exceeding $2,000 in value. Indeed, tbe fraud is not controverted in this case, and tbe only questions really in •dispute were whether tbe plaintiff was entitled to protection as a bona fide bolder of commercial paper, and, if so, whether tbe defendants were guilty of negligence in signing that which was in reality a negotiable note, but which tbey sup
Tbe appellant also claims error in tbe admission of evi- ■ dence of tbe defendants to tbe effect that tbey laid tbe matter before tbe district attorney of tbe county, and that Eryer •finally admitted tbe fraud, and sent a man to settle with tbe defendants. Tbe supposed erroneous evidence came into tbe .case in tbe following manner: Upon cross-examination of L. K. Strand, tbe plaintiff proved by him that be signed a receipt acknowledging payment to him by Fryer July 6, 1892, ■of $102.50, with tbe statement that it was for services in assisting in tbe sale of tbe borse. This receipt was then put in evidence by tbe plaintiff. Upon re-examination tbe defendant’s counsel asked Mr. Strand to state tbe circumstances under which be signed tbe receipt, and be answered, against ■ objection for incompetency, that “it was an indorsement that this man [Fryer] bad beat us out of. I think it was a little •over $1,000. We were down to Galesville to tbe district at■torney, and bad him attend to it, and be wrote to him if be would not come back and pay that money.” This answer was ■objected to, and tbe court said that it was not an answer to the question, but no motion was made to strike it out. It is always competent to explain a mere receipt for money, so -■that there appears to be no serious ground of objection to tbe
It is claimed that there was error resulting from the fact that question 4 and the following questions of the special verdict to the jury assume that the supposed note was in the same condition when all the defendants signed it, whereas in fact they all signed at different times and places, and they do not all testify that part of it was concealed in the binding of the book. In this connection it is said that the defendant Martin Walder a, who could not read, did not have the contract read to him by Eryer, nor even ask that it he read. The objection does not seem substantial. All of the defendants who can read English testify, in substance, that they took the book, and read the supposed contract, or looked over while Eryer was reading it; and they all testify to the condition of the book — as to the stiffness of the binding, and the fact that an inch of the leaf was thereby concealed, and that no perforation was visible. Some of them testify to this particularly, and some generally, by stating that its condition and appearance was identical with the description given by the defendant Moen, who testified positively and clearly to the fact. Most of the witnesses who could not read testify also to the appearance of the book being the same as described by Moen, and they all testify (including Waldera) in one form or another to the effect that there was no one present or accessible who could read English, and that Eryer read or explained its contents to them either upon request or without request, and that his explanation and reading was that it was a contract to form a company and purchase the horse, and that they believed him. As matter of fact, the form of the questions does not prevent the jury from excepting from an affirmative answer the three defendants whom appellant claims might have been found careless in signing. But, even
These considerations also dispose of tbe claim that tbe verdict is contrary to tbe evidence. On tbe whole ease we are satisfied that justice has been done without material error.
By the Court. — Judgment affirmed.