84 Wash. 136 | Wash. | 1915
This action was commenced by John Prentice against Franklin How, a minor, Wong How, his guardian, Wong How and Ong How, his wife, and Horrigan Brothers Company, a corporation, to recover possession of and quiet title to lot 12 in block 3, Northern Pacific Railroad Company’s plat of Pasco. From a decree in favor of the defendants Franklin How and Horrigan Brothers Company, a corporation, the plaintiff has appealed.
Wong How, one of the defendants herein, is a Chinaman and an alien. Franklin How, a minor, son of Wong How and his wife, is a native of the United States and the state of Washington. The issue presented is whether the title to, and ownership of, lot 12 in block 3, the lot in question, is in the appellant John Prentice or in the minor defendant, Franklin How. The trial court decreed the legal and equitable title to Franklin How. As Horrigan Brothers Company, a corporation, holds as lessee of Franklin How, and its rights are dependent upon and protected by the title which was decreed to Franklin How, no further notice need be taken of it. Franklin How not only claimed title through his father Wong How, but also pleaded title by adverse possession under several statutes of this state. Our conclusion is that he maintained each and every defense pleaded. We shall, therefore, discuss but one of his sources of title, which we find sufficient to sustain the final decree.
On the trial, it was agreed that the Pasco Union Land Company, a corporation, héreinafter called the land company, was the common source of title. The record shows beyond question, that the land company held title to and owned
Appellant claims title under the Wong How certificate of sale in the following manner: It appears that, on January 21, 1899, J. J. Davis, then sheriff of Franklin county, in pursuance of the Wong How certificate of sale, executed and delivered to R. Olney a sheriff’s deed for lot 12, block 3. This deed, which was introduced in evidence and is now before us as an exhibit, was never recorded, nor does it have attached any certificate of the clerk of the superior court that it had
“And Whereas, at said sale Wong How became purchaser of the real estate hereinafter described, for the sum of $165, by reason of his being the highest and best bidder therefor at said sale; and
“Whereas, afterwards, to wit: The 16th day of July, A. D. 1896, for a valuable consideration, the said Wong How sold, assigned and transferred all his right, title and interest in and to the hereinafter described real estate to R. Olney, the herein named party of the second part; and
“Whereas, said sale has been in all things confirmed by the said superior court, and the time for redemption having now fully expired, and no application having been made to redeem the hereinafter described premises; now therefore,” etc.
After obtaining this deed and while the same was in his possession, R. Olney died intestate; his wife also died intestate, leaving M. W. Olney, their daughter, as their only heir at law. There never was any administration on their estate. After M. W. Olney had acquired title to the several thousand lots sold to her under the execution, taxes on her lots were permitted to become delinquent, foreclosure was had, and tax titles passed to Franklin county. It being supposed that these tax titles were defective and that a settlement could be made with the county, the appellant John Prentice obtained from M. W. Olney a quitclaim deed for all of her lots, paying a consideration of $125 therefor. This deed did not include lot 12 in block 3, as it had not been sold to M. W. Olney at the sheriff’s sale. Later appellant obtained from M. W. Olney a quitclaim deed for lot 12, block 3, the record indicating that he represented to her that it had been omitted inadvertently from the first quitclaim deed. He now claims that she had inherited title to lot 12, block 3, as the heir at law of R. Olney and wife, who held title under the sheriff’s deed executed and delivered to R. Olney during his lifetime, as above stated.
“This indenture, made this 30th day of January, 1899, Witnesseth: That R. Olney and L. L. Olney, his wife, of Franklin county, state of Washington, lessors, do hereby lease, demise and let unto Wong How of Pasco, Franklin county, state of Washington, lessee, the following described premises situated in the county of Franklin, state of Washington, to wit: Lot 12 of block 3 in the Northern Pacific Railroad plat of the town of Pasco, together with all and singular the tenements, hereditaments and appurtenances thereunder belonging, to have and to hold the same, for the term of ninety-nine years, to wit: from the 30th day of January, 1899, to the 30th day of January, 1998, and yielding and paying therefor the sum of one dollar, the payment of which is hereby acknowledged. In witness whereof,” etc.
Wong How was in China at the date of the execution of this lease, which with the sheriff’s deed were found among the papers of R. Olney after his death, and had never been delivered. Shortly after the death of R. Olney, they came into the possession of his daughter, M. W. Olney. She caused them to be left with an agent of Wong How, who was in charge of his property during-his absence in China. Wong How testified that he had never assigned the certificate of sale to R. Olney; that he never authorized the execution of a sheriff’s deed to him; that he never received the ninety-nine-year lease, and that the instruments had never been delivered to him.
“And Whereas, on the 25 day of February, A. D. 1908, Wong How, purchaser aforesaid, duly sold, transferred and assigned unto Franklin How, party of the second part, herein, a sheriff’s certificate of purchase to the property hereinafter described, and set forth in this instrument of conveyance, and authorized and directed the said sheriff to issue a deed for the same to the said party of the second part herein instead of to him; and
“Whereas, since the making of said sale the said J. W. Hays, party of the first part, has succeeded to the office of sheriff of the county of Franklin, state of Washington, and is now such sheriff;
“Now, Therefore.” etc.
This deed was duly acknowledged, was presented to the clerk of the superior court of Franklin county on the 21st day of March, 1918, was entered upon the book of levies, was afterwards recorded in the manner provided by law, and was authorized by Wong How. It is under the certificate of sale to Wong How, the quitclaim deed from Wong How to the respondent Franklin How, and the sheriff’s deed to Franklin How, that Franklin How now claims to hold the legal title. The record further shows that Franklin How and Wong How, his predecessor in interest, have paid all taxes on the property since the year 1896, and until the time of the commencement of this action, with the possible exception of one or two years, for which years plaintiff, John Prentice, made
It is conceded that, on July 27, 1903, the date on which appellant, John Prentice, obtained his quitclaim deed for lot 12, block 3, from M. W. Olney, the value of the lot did not exceed $150; that he did not commence this action until December 16, 1912, and that on the latter date the value had increased to some six or seven thousand dollars. Many other facts appear in the record, all favorable to respondent, which we deem it unnecessary to state, the above being sufficient.
From this statement it is manifest that neither R. Olney, M. W. Olney, his heir at law, nor appellant ever acquired title to the property in dispute. Appellant failed to show that Wong How at any time assigned his certificate of sale to R. Olney. No deed appears of record. No assignment has been shown. Wong How denies that any deed or assignment to R. Olney was ever executed by him. The only intimation of any such assignment is the recital set forth in the sheriff’s deed which was executed and delivered to R. Olney. This recital was not binding upon persons who were not parties to that deed. 13 Cyc. 612; Carpenter v. Sherfey, 71 Ill. 427; Bosman v. Davis, 39 Iowa 308.
If, in fact, no assignment had been made, the sheriff was without authority to execute and deliver a deed to R. Olney, and the failure to show such an assignment constitutes a missing link .in appellant’s alleged chain of title. The facts are that R. Olney was Wong How’s attorney and confidential ad
Referring to the title of Franklin How, this court has decided that a certificate of sale is color of title. Philadelphia Mtg. & Trust Co. v. Palmer, 32 Wash. 455, 73 Pac. 501; Olson v. Howard, 38 Wash. 15, 80 Pac. 170; Johnson v. Bartlett, 50 Wash. 114, 96 Pac. 833; Goetter v. Moore, 53 Wash. 5, 101 Pac. 365.
The certificate of sale to Wong How, the quitclaim deed from Wong How to respondent, and the deed executed and delivered by the sheriff of Franklin county to respondent, constitute a complete chain of title in respondent. These instruments at least constitute color of title which, with pos
The record shows that appellant relies upon the sheriff’s deed to R. Olney. He contends that Wong How’s only interest was the ninety-nine-year lease, and that Wong How, an alien, could not acquire real estate by purchase under the constitution of this state. The only person who could question Wong How’s claim or title while he held either a ninety-nine-year lease or a certificate of sale, was the state of Washington, it having authority to institute proceedings for a forfeiture. Abrams v. State, 45 Wash. 327, 88 Pac. 327, 122 Am. St. 914. No such proceedings were commenced by the state, and after Wong How conveyed to respondent, a native of the United States, the state of Washington itself could not maintain such an action against respondent. State ex rel. Atkinson v. World Real Estate Commercial Co., 46 Wash. 104, 89 Pac. 471.
It is impossible to read this record without arriving at the conclusion that Franklin How, by his predecessors, has been in possession of the real estate for more than twenty years; that he holds a good record fee simple title, and that the appellant has no interest whatever. Other facts and arguments are presented and discussed in the record and briefs, but their-discussion here would only fortify the conclusion we have reached.
The judgment is affirmed.
Morris, C. J., Fullerton, Parker, and Mount, JJ., concur.