This case involves the Colorado long arm statute, C.R.S. 13-1-124 (1973). Premier Corporation is a Delaware corporation, with headquarters in Michigan. It also conducts business and maintains offices in Colorado. In separate actions, Premier brought a brеach of contract action in a state court of Colorado against Dr. Newsom and Dr. Chavez, each of whom is a citizen of South Carolina. Both defendants are physicians, and each was served with a copy of the summons and complaint in South Carolina. On petitions for removal, both actions were removed to the United States District Court for the District of Colorado. Motions to remand were denied.
In federal district court the defendants filed motions to quash service of рrocess on the ground that there was no valid service of process. The district court, after an evi-dentiary hearing that involved live testimony, several affidavits and depositions, *221 granted the motions and dismissed both actions on the ground that there was a lack of in personam jurisdiction over both defendants. Premier appeals. We affirm.
The background facts as they relate to the question of personal jurisdiction are not in any real dispute. As indicated, Dr. New-som and Dr. Chavez are both citizens of South Carolina. Both are medical doctors and each wanted to make a financial investment which might serve as a tax shelter.
Also, as indicated, Premier is a Delaware corporation with headquarters in Michigan. Premier is engaged, inter alia, in the business of cattle breeding and management of cattle. In mid-1972, representatives of Premier contacted Dr. Newsom and Dr. Chavez in South Carolina in an effort to induce the doctors to make an investment in what was said to be a tax-sheltered cattle operation. * As explained by Premier’s representatives, Premier proposed to sell cattle to the defendants, and then, for a management fee, Premier would thereafter manage, feed and maintain the cattle thus purсhased by the defendants. Premier and the two doctors agreed to terms, and the parties executed three documents: (1) a representation statement; (2) a purchase agreement; and (3) a management contract. Specifiсally, Dr. Newsom bought 100 head of nonregistered breeding cows from Premier at $750 per head and then entered into a management contract with Premier whereby, for a management fee, Premier agreed to take care of the cattlе thus purchased. Dr. Chavez bought 180 head of nonregistered breeding cows for $750 per head and contemporaneously therewith entered into a management contract with Premier whereby the latter agreed to take care of the сattle thus purchased, for a management fee.
The management contracts between Premier and Dr. Newsom and Dr. Chavez provided, in each instance, as follows: “The animals may be kept at such place or places as Prеmier may determine, with the understanding, however, that Premier shall maintain supervision of the animals at all times.”
As mentioned earlier, Premier had offices in Colorado, as well as maintaining several feeding areas within that state. Premier also maintained offices and feed lots in several other western states. It is agreed that some of the cattle purchased by Dr. Newsom and Dr. Chavez from Premier, and thereafter committed under the management contract to the care of Premier, were physically present within the State of Colorado. They had been placed there at the direction of Premier, who, under the management contract, had the right to feed the cattle wherever it pleased. Dr. Newsom and Dr. Chavez wеre not themselves concerned with the whereabouts of their cattle, such being a matter reserved to Premier under the management contract.
It was in this general setting that Premier brought suit in a state court of Colorado against Dr. Newsom and Dr. Chаvez for breach of contract, alleging that money was due it under the management contract. Service of process was made in South Carolina on both defendants. After removal, the federal district court dismissed the action for lack of in personam jurisdiction.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure contemplate that in personam jurisdiction may be obtained by a federal district court in any manner permitted by state law of the particular state in which the federal district court is held. Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(e) provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
(e) Same: Service Upon Party Not Inhabitant of or Found Within State. . Whenever a statute or rule of court of the state in which the district court is held provides (1) for service of a summons, or of a notice, or of an order in lieu of summons upon a party not an inhabitant of or found within the state, or (2) fоr service upon or notice to him to appear and respond or defend in an action by reason of the.attachment or garnishment *222 or similar seizure of his property located within the state, service may in either case be mаde under the circumstances and in the manner prescribed in the statute or rule. (Emphasis added.)
The Colorado statute concerning long arm jurisdiction is C.R.S. 13-1-124 (1973), and provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
(1) Engaging in any act enumerated in this section by any person, whether or not a resident of the state of Colorado, either in person or by an agent, submits such person, and, if a natural person his personal representative to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state concerning any cause of action arising from:
(a) The transaction of any business within this state;
The district court held that the defendants, each of whom was a citizen of South Carolina, did not have sufficient “minimum contacts” with the State of Colorado to warrant the exercise by the federal district court in Colorado of personal jurisdiction over either defendant, citing
International Shoe Co. v. Washington,
Whether in a particular case a nonresident defendant, who is served outside the forum state, has sufficient minimum contacts with the forum state tо warrant the latter in exercising in
personam
jurisdiction over the person of such nonresident necessarily depends on the facts of the case at hand.
Kulko v. California Superior Court,
Premier argues, alternatively, that assuming the defendants themselves did not have the necessary minimum contаcts, nevertheless the defendants were “present” within the State of Colorado by virtue of the acts of their agent, Premier, occurring within the state. The trial court declined to find that Premier was an agent for either of the defendants, as that term is used in the Colorado long arm statute. Be that as it may, even though service of process may comport with local state law on the subject, such service must also comport to the Fourteenth Amendment. A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant, served outside the forum state, only if there exists “minimum contacts” between the defendant and the forum state. Minimum contacts must be such that the maintenance of the suit “does not offend ‘traditional notions’ оf fair play and substantial justice.”
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, supra,
and
Milliken v. Meyer,
Hanson v. Denckla,
*223 The unilateral activity of those who claim some relationship with a nonresident defendant cannot satisfy the requirement of contact with the forum State. The application of that rule will vary with the quality and nature of the defendant’s activity, but it is essential in each case that there be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.357 U.S. at 253 ,78 S.Ct. at 1240 .
Anderson v. Shiflett,
We have here a single, isolated transaction in the form of a contract for personal service. The totality of the contacts with Oklahoma wаs the performance of certain phases of the work at the plaintiff’s Oklahoma City office. Nothing in the record discloses the reasonable anticipation of contractual consequences in Oklahoma. To support jurisdiсtion, the plaintiff relies on his own unilateral activities. Under the decision in Hanson v. Denckla this is not enough. To become subject to Oklahoma jurisdiction, the defendant must purposefully avail himself of the privilege of doing business in that state and thereby invoke the benefits and protections of its laws. The record before us does not satisfy this requirement. Instead, it shows no more than the unilateral performance of contracted personal service in the forum. The idea that such performance alоne can subject the employer to the jurisdiction of the forum has frightening consequences.435 F.2d at 1038 . (Emphasis added.)
We regard the present case to be comparable to Anderson. In each case in person-am jurisdiction was sought over a nonresident on the basis of the unilateral activities, pursuant to the terms of a contract, of the party seeking to invokе the jurisdiction of the forum state under its long-arm statute. In Anderson we rejected such a bootstrap operation, as we do here. To hold to the contrary would in the instant case mean that the defendants could be required to defend in any one оf the fifty states where Premier chose to maintain the cattle. Such is not our idea of fair play, and a rule to such effect would have the “frightening consequences” referred to in Anderson.
We do not regard
Houston Fearless Corporation v. Teter,
Judgment affirmed.
Notes
Premier’s contacts with Dr. Newsom and E identical in nature. '. Chavez were separate and unrelated, though