This is a petition by an employer to set aside an order of the Board which directs the petitioner to cease and desist from сertain unfair labor practices and to' offer reinstatement with back pay to an employee who was discharged, as the Board found, because of labor union activities. The Board’s answer to the petition requests enforcement of its order.
The petitioner’s brief states that the following issues are raised: (1) whether petitioner violated section 8(a) (3) of the Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 158(a) (3), by discharging Josеph Petti; (2) whether petitioner violated section 8(a) (1), 29 U.S.C.A. § 158(a) (1); (3) whether the Board’s proceeding was brought in good faith; and (4) whether so much of the order as directs the petitioner to cease and desist from “in any other manner” violating the Act is too broad.
The first questiоn is whether Joseph Petti, at the time of his discharge was a “supervisor” as defined in the Act.
1
Section 2(3), 29 U.S.C.A. § 152(3), excludes from the definition of “emрloyee” any individual employed as a “supervisor.” The question is essentially one of fact, the answer to which must turn on what powers Petti was authorized to exercise. He was employed in the steel rule die department of the employer’s plant from March 1947 until his disсharge on August 22, 1951. He testified that at least 80% of his time was spent in actually operating machines. The petitioner contends that in additiоn to operating machines Petti had the supervisory duty to “assign” the work to be done by the other employees in the department. Mr. Bishop, the production manager, testified that he would give Petti a “production list” and “orders” from one to three times a week. The list wоuld contain “the customers’ names, the parts that were to be run, and what date was on the schedule that we had to meet to satisfy thе customer.” Petti himself testified “Everything that I did or the employees was [sic] supposed to do, I did by Mr. Bishop’s information to me.” The Trial Examiner оn the entire record found “that though Petti may have assigned work to other employees, whatever authority he exercised was оf a routine nature pursuant to Bishop’s direction and that he was not a supervisor within the meaning of the Act.” We agree with this conclusiоn. Petti did no more than to keep all hands busy on the work given him
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by Mr. Bishop. When an employee finished a job, she would ask Petti what to do next.
2
Wе will assume that he was the room “boss” or “leadman,” but the discretion given him appears to be “routine” in the natural sense of that word. As Judge Magruder said in National Labor Relations Board v. Quincy Steel Cast Co., 1 Cir.,
The petitioner argues that Petti also had authority to recommend the discharge of employees and exercised it in two instances. Petti denied making such recommendations and the Trial Examiner gave credence to his denials. When a finding of fаct turns upon the Examiner’s evaluation of the credibility of witnesses who appeared before him, this court cannot say that the finding is unsupported by the record, merely because the Examiner has believed one witness rather than another. National Labor R. Board v. Dinion Coal Co., 2 Cir.,
It is next contended that even if Petti was not a supervisor, the Examiner’s finding that he was discharged for labor union activity is not suрportable. The principle to which we have just referred with respect to the credibility of witnesses is also applicable here. It will suffice to say that on the whole record there was ample evidence to support the finding that Petti’s discharge violаted § 8(a) (3).
“In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing its employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization, to fоrm labor organizations, to join or assist International Brotherhood of Paper Makers of America, A. F. of B., or any other labor оrganization, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and to refrain from any or all of such activities, except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment as authorized in Section 8(a) (3) of the Act.”
Nor is it necessary to detail the evidence upon which was based the Board’s finding that § 8(a) (1) of the Act was violated. There was testimony which the Examiner credited that the petitioner’s рresident interrogated some of the employees about the union and threatened to “close the place” if the union should get in. Such conduct is not within the privilege conferred by § 8(c), 29 U.S.C.A. § 158(c).
The contention that the Board’s complaint should be dismissed because it was not brought in good faith is so lacking in merit as to require no discussion.
Finally it is urged, in reliance upon National Labor Relations Board v. Exрress Publishing Co.,
The petition is dismissed, and the Board’s request for an enforcement order is grаnted.
Notes
. 29 U.S.C.A. § 152(11):
“The' term ‘supervisor’ means any individual having authority, in the interest of the employer, to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward, or discipline other employees, or responsibly to direct them, or to adjust * * * grievances, or effеctively to recommend such action, if in connection with the foregoing the exercise of such authority is not of a merely routine or clerical nature, hut requires the use of independent judgment.”
. See testimony of Doris Davis at folios 583-5 of Petitioner’s Appendix.
. Seе also National Labor Relations Board v. North Carolina Granite Corp., 4 Cir.,
. Paragraph 1(e) reads as follows:
. See National Labor Relations Board v. Cheney Califоrnia Lumber Co.,
. See National Labor Relations Board v. Charles R. Krimm Lumber Co., 2 Cir.,