365 F.3d 514 | 6th Cir. | 2004
Before: COLE and GILMAN, Circuit Judges;
SCHWARZER, Senior District Judge. [*] UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS _________________ FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT _________________ COUNSEL ARGUED: James M. Morris, MORRIS & MORRIS, S ALLY P RATT , et al., (cid:88) Lexington, Kentucky, for Appellants. David B. Tachau, (cid:45) Plaintiffs-Appellants/ TACHAU, MADDOX, HOVIOUS & DICKENS, Louisville, (cid:45) Cross-Appellees, Kentucky, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: James M. Morris, (cid:45) Nos. 02-5632/5638 Sharon K. Morris, MORRIS & MORRIS, Lexington, (cid:45) > v. Kentucky, for Appellants. David B. Tachau, John D. Dyche, (cid:44) TACHAU, MADDOX, HOVIOUS & DICKENS, Louisville, (cid:45) Kentucky, for Appellees. V ENTAS , I NC ., a/k/a Vencor, (cid:45) Inc., et al., (cid:45) _________________ (cid:45) Defendants-Appellees/ (cid:45) OPINION Cross-Appellants, (cid:45) _________________ (cid:45) J OHN D OES , #1 through #5, (cid:45) RONALD LEE GILMAN, Circuit Judge. Sally Pratt and Defendant-Appellee. (cid:45) others (Plaintiffs) filed various state-law claims against a (cid:45) large health care provider, Vencor, Inc., which subsequently (cid:78) spun off a subsidiary with the same name as the parent company, and then changed the name of the parent company
Appeal from the United States District Court to Ventas, Inc. When “New Vencor,” the subsidiary, filed for for the Western District of Kentucky at Louisville. Chapter 11 bankruptcy in the Bankruptcy Court for the No. 01-00317—John G. Heyburn II, Chief District Judge. District of Delaware, Ventas agreed to make substantial financial contributions towards New Vencor’s reorganization.
Argued: March 18, 2004 In exchange, New Vencor’s Reorganization Plan granted Ventas a full release from Plaintiffs’ claims. The bankruptcy
Decided and Filed: April 20, 2004 court entered a Confirmation Order approving the Plan, which Ignoring the injunction, Plaintiffs sued Ventas in the district proceedings. In September 1996, Plaintiff Sally Pratt court below, which subsequently dismissed their case for lack filed suit against “old” Vencor . . . for age discrimination of subject matter jurisdiction. Plaintiffs then filed a motion and wrongful termination. In March 1998, Plaintiff to vacate the Confirmation Order in the Delaware bankruptcy Valiza Nystrom filed suit against Vencor Hospitals Texas court. Because Supreme Court precedent requires us to . . . for constructive discharge. In October 1998, Mark accord preclusive effect to the Delaware bankruptcy court’s Dayman, Executor of the Estate of Liesel Dayman, filed conclusion that it had jurisdiction over this matter, Plaintiffs suit against “new” Vencor . . . for negligence. In are barred by res judicata from continuing their suit in this
November 1999, Plaintiff Robert McCray, pursuant to a court. We therefore AFFIRM the judgment of the district Power of Attorney for Lee Ona Lee, sued Vencor court. Nursing Centers East . . . for negligence. I. BACKGROUND Pratt , 273 B.R. at 110. Finally, Nystrom’s attorney Mark Byrne filed suit against Vencor for tortious interference with A. Factual background his prospective contractual advantage with his client. Id. at n.2.
Two lower court opinions, one in Delaware and the other in Kentucky, have summarized the relevant facts of the present After New Vencor filed for bankruptcy, it filed motions case. See In re Vencor, Inc. , 284 B.R. 79 (Bankr. D. Del. pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362 for an automatic stay in each of 2002), and Pratt v. Ventas, Inc. , 273 B.R. 108 (W.D. Ky. Plaintiffs’ respective state-court actions. Pratt, Damon, and 2002). Because the principal issues on appeal are questions McCray responded by filing proofs of claim in the bankruptcy of law, we abstract the following undisputed facts from the court. On December 14, 2000, a Reorganization Plan for lower courts’ opinions: New Vencor was proposed, and notice of the Plan was mailed to each of the Plaintiffs who had filed a proof of claim. The
Prior to May, 1998, Ventas operated, inter alia , several bankruptcy court confirmed the Plan in a Confirmation Order nursing homes under the name Vencor, Inc. (“Old issued on March 19, 2001, with the Plan becoming effective Vencor”). On May 1, 1998, Old Vencor changed its on April 20, 2001. A key component of the Plan was name to Ventas and spun off its nursing home operations summarized as follows: to a newly incorporated entity named Vencor, Inc. (“New Vencor”). Ventas retained ownership of the real estate
As part of that Plan, Ventas agreed to contribute $40 and became New Vencor’s landlord at many of the million to the funding of a settlement with the United facilities. . . . On September 13, 1999, New Vencor and States and agreed to amendments of certain leases which several of its affiliates filed for relief under chapter 11 of it had with [New Vencor], thereby reducing [New the Bankruptcy Code. Vencor’s] rental obligations. In exchange, Ventas was given a release of [Plaintiffs’ personal injury and other]
In re Vencor, Inc. , 284 B.R. at 81. Nos. 02-5632/5638 Pratt, et al. v. 5 6 Pratt, et al. v. Nos. 02-5632/5638
Ventas, Inc., et al. Ventas, Inc., et al. claims arising from operation of the nursing homes prior district court for the judicial district in which the bankruptcy to May 1, 1998. court is serving.”) (emphasis in Pratt ))
In re Vencor, Inc. , 284 B.R. at 81. The terms of the Plan thus Plaintiffs were encouraged to pursue their claim in the incorporated an injunction proscribing suits against New Delaware bankruptcy court, in the United States District Vencor and Ventas for “any alleged improprieties committed Court for the District of Delaware, and if necessary, in the in connection with [New] Vencor’s bankruptcy, prior to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. Id. The date of confirmation.” Pratt , 273 B.R. at 111. complaint was initially dismissed with prejudice, but the
district court later modified the order to make it “without B. Procedural background prejudice,” presumably so that Plaintiffs could raise their claims against Ventas in the proper forum. Plaintiffs filed suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky, alleging that Ventas Each side appealed the district court’s decision, but this obtained the releases in the Confirmation Order through court held both appeals in abeyance while Plaintiffs pursued fraudulent means. They argued that in overseeing New
the merits of their claims in the Delaware bankruptcy court. Vencor’s bankruptcy proceedings, the bankruptcy court The bankruptcy court subsequently held that there was no lacked jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ third-party action against basis for Plaintiffs’ assertion that it lacked jurisdiction to Ventas. As a consequence, Plaintiffs contended that the grant the releases to Ventas contained in New Vencor’s Plan. Confirmation Order’s injunction barring suit against Ventas In re Vencor, Inc. , 284 B.R. at 86. Plaintiffs did not appeal had no preclusive effect on Plaintiffs’ suit filed in the federal this latter decision. district court in Kentucky. Ventas responded by filing a motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Rules (9)(b) and On December 6, 2002, this court lifted the stay on the 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. present appeal of the district court’s decision in Pratt v.
Ventas , 273 B.R. 108 (W.D. Ky. 2002). This matter is now Relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in Celotex Corp. ripe for disposition. v. Edwards , 514 U.S. 300 (1995), the district court held that Plaintiffs were barred from collaterally attacking the II. ANALYSIS Confirmation Order issued by the Delaware bankruptcy court.
A. Standard of review Pratt , 273 B.R. at 116. The district court subsequently granted Ventas’s motion based upon a lack of subject matter
This court reviews whether the district court properly jurisdiction. It also expressly declined to consider whether dismissed a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal the bankruptcy court exceeded its statutory authority in Rules of Civil Procedure using a de novo standard. Sistrunk granting injunctive relief to Ventas. Id . The court concluded v. City of Strongsville , 99 F.3d 194, 197 (6th Cir. 1996). A that it could “not properly exercise appellate review over motion to dismiss may be granted “only if it is clear that no these earlier bankruptcy proceedings.” Id. ((quoting 28 relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be U.S.C. § 158(a): “An appeal . . . shall be taken only to the proved consistent with the allegations.” Id . (citation omitted). Nos. 02-5632/5638 Pratt, et al. v. 7 8 Pratt, et al. v. Nos. 02-5632/5638 Ventas, Inc., et al. Ventas, Inc., et al. B. Application of the “collateral attack” doctrine of the law,” id . at 313, it held that the Edwardses would not be permitted to collaterally attack the Florida bankruptcy The district court held that Plaintiffs’ suit filed in the court’s § 105 injunction in the federal courts in Texas. The Western District of Kentucky was an impermissible collateral Court reasoned: attack on the bankruptcy court’s Confirmation Order. Pratt , 273 B.R. at 116. A “collateral attack” is a tactic whereby a It is for the court of first instance to determine the party seeks to circumvent an earlier ruling of one court by question of the validity of the law, and until its decision filing a subsequent action in another court. Id . at 114 (citing is reversed for error by orderly review, either by itself or Willy v. Coastal Corp. , 503 U.S. 131, 137 (1992)). As by a higher court, its orders based on its decision are to applied to the present case, the district court below believed be respected. If respondents believed the Section 105 that Plaintiffs’ suit against Ventas in Kentucky was an Injunction was improper, they should have challenged it improper attempt to circumvent the Delaware bankruptcy in the Bankruptcy Court, like other similarly situated court’s Confirmation Order that enjoined Plaintiffs from bonded judgment creditors have done. If dissatisfied pursuing their claims against Ventas. with the Bankruptcy Court’s ultimate decision,
respondents can appeal to the district court for the The district court found that the Supreme Court’s decision judicial district in which the bankruptcy judge is serving, in Celotex Corp. v. Edwards , 514 U.S. 300 (1995), controlled see 28 U.S.C. § 158(a), and then to the Court of Appeals the disposition of Plaintiffs’ action. In Celotex , Bennie and for the Eleventh Circuit, see §158(d). Joann Edwards won a judgment against Celotex in the District Court for the Northern District of Texas for asbestos- Celotex , 514 U.S. at 313 (quotation marks and citation related injuries. Celotex posted a supersedeas bond to stay omitted). the execution of the judgment pending its appeal to the Fifth
In the present case, the district court found that Celotex was Circuit. Northbrook Property and Casualty Insurance controlling, reasoning as follows: Company served as surety on the bond. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the judgment for the Edwardses, but, on that very
Like the claimants in [ Celotex ], Plaintiffs . . . assert that day, Celotex filed a Chapter 11 petition for reorganization in the Bankruptcy Court exceeded its jurisdictional bounds the Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Florida. An by enjoining post-confirmation suits against a non-debtor injunction was issued by the bankruptcy court, pursuant to 11 third-party for its pre-confirmation action. Celotex U.S.C. § 105(a), which stayed all actions against Celotex. reaffirmed the rule that such a challenge cannot be The district court in Texas nevertheless permitted the sustained . . . . Edwardses to enforce the bond against Northbrook. Although the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision, it was
. . . subsequently reversed by the Supreme Court. [I]f the Confirmation Order was issued in error— whether Because the Supreme Court concluded that the district the result of either fraud or lack of jurisdiction —it court’s action would “seriously undercut[] the orderly process remains the responsibility of the Delaware Bankruptcy Nos. 02-5632/5638 Pratt, et al. v. 9 10 Pratt, et al. v. Nos. 02-5632/5638 Ventas, Inc., et al. Ventas, Inc., et al. Court, Delaware District Court, and, if necessary, the that litigants must go through the “proper channels of the Third Circuit, to effect any necessary corrections. statutorily-defined appellate process,” id . at 116, to challenge
a bankruptcy court’s judgment was perfectly appropriate. But Pratt , 273 B.R. at 116 (emphasis added). the district court should not have dismissed the Plaintiffs’ case under the collateral attack doctrine without first
In Celotex , the Supreme Court reaffirmed determining that the Delaware bankruptcy court in fact had jurisdiction to enter the Confirmation Order. Its failure to do
the well-established rule that ‘persons subject to an so, however, is harmless in light of the Plaintiffs subsequent injunctive order issued by a court with jurisdiction are return to the bankruptcy court for the very purpose of expected to obey that decree until it is modified or challenging that court’s authority to grant Ventas a full reversed, even if they have proper grounds to object to release from their claims. the order.’ C. Application of res judicata 514 U.S. at 306 (quoting GTE Sylvania, Inc. v Consumers Union , 445 U.S. 375, 386 (1980)) (emphasis added). The
While the present appeal was held in abeyance, Plaintiffs bankruptcy court’s injunction in Celotex , therefore, was to be returned to Delaware to litigate their claim that the honored only if it was acting “with jurisdiction.” bankruptcy court lacked jurisdiction to release Ventas. See In Accordingly, the Celotex court examined whether the Florida re Vencor, Inc. , 284 B.R. 79 (Bankr. D. Del. 2002). The bankruptcy court had jurisdiction to enjoin the Edwardses bankruptcy court reviewed two rounds of briefs and held two from proceeding against the third-party surety. The Court hearings on the myriad of claims raised by Plaintiffs. Id. at ultimately held that the Edwardses’ action fell within the 82. Following these proceedings, the court issued an opinion bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction to adjudicate matters that are with a section dedicated specifically to Plaintiffs’ “related to” a case under Title 11. Id . at 310; see 28 U.S.C. jurisdictional argument. The court “conclud[ed] that the § 1334(b), 28 U.S.C. § 157(a). Because the Court found that Confirmation Order was not beyond [its] jurisdiction.” Id . at the bankruptcy court did have jurisdiction, the Edwardses 86. were barred from collaterally attacking the Florida bankruptcy court’s injunction in the federal courts of Texas.
Now that the Delaware bankruptcy court has adjudicated the issue of its jurisdiction in In re Vencor, Inc. , the Plaintiffs’ The district court in the present case, by contrast, right to question that decision in Kentucky is barred by both “expressly decline[d] to consider whether the Bankruptcy the collateral attack and res judicata doctrines. “A party that Court exceeded its statutory authority in granting injunctive has had an opportunity to litigate the question of subject- relief to Defendants.” Pratt , 273 B. R. at 116. As excerpted matter jurisdiction may not . . . reopen that question in a above, the district court stated that it was the responsibility of collateral attack upon an adverse judgment.” Ins. Corp. of the Delaware bankruptcy court, the Delaware district court, Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee , 456 U.S. 694, and the Third Circuit to correct any jurisdictional errors. Id . 702 n.9 (1982). The district court’s reliance on Celotex for the proposition Plaintiffs argue, however, that the timeliness of their motion was the real issue before the Delaware bankruptcy Nos. 02-5632/5638 Pratt, et al. v. 11 12 Pratt, et al. v. Nos. 02-5632/5638 Ventas, Inc., et al. Ventas, Inc., et al. court, not jurisdiction. At oral argument, Plaintiffs’ counsel collateral action.”); see also Trulis v. Barton , 107 F.3d 685, contended that the court’s conclusion that it was not acting in 691 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that plaintiffs could not excess of its jurisdiction was simply dicta. We read the challenge the bankruptcy court’s subject matter jurisdiction bankruptcy court’s discussion of Plaintiffs’ jurisdictional because they failed to appeal the bankruptcy court’s issue not as dicta, however, but as an alternative holding. confirmation order). After concluding that the Plaintiffs’ motion to set aside the The Supreme Court addressed similar circumstances in Confirmation Order was untimely, In re Vencor, Inc., 284 Stoll v. Gottlieb , 305 U.S. 165 (1938). In Stoll , a bankruptcy B.R. at 83-84, the court stated:
court confirmed a debtor’s reorganization plan that included The [Plaintiffs] assert that the relief requested in their a release of the debtor’s bond guarantors. Gottlieb, one of the Motion can nonetheless be granted. They argue that bondholders, did not appear at the hearing on the Rule 60(b)(4) permits the modification of the reorganization plan. The plan was confirmed over the Confirmation Order because it was entered by this Court objection of other bondholders, but no one appealed the beyond its jurisdiction and is, therefore, void. confirmation order. Instead, Gottlieb launched a two-pronged
attack. He first instituted an action against the bond Id . at 85 (emphasis added). The above-quoted language guarantors in the Illinois state court system. Second, Gottlieb indicates that the bankruptcy court considered the Plaintiffs’ filed a motion to vacate the bankruptcy court’s confirmation jurisdictional claim to be an alternative basis for relief. After order on the basis that it did not have jurisdiction to cancel the examining that alternative ground, the court “conclude[d] that bond guaranty. The bankruptcy court denied Gottlieb’s there is no basis for an assertion that this Court lacked contested motion. Back in state court, the bond guarantors jurisdiction to consider and grant the releases contained in the defended themselves on the ground that the bankruptcy Plan.” Id . at 86. We therefore conclude that the bankruptcy
court’s initial confirmation order and its subsequent order court’s decision in In re Vencor, Inc. is a judgment on the denying Gottlieb’s jurisdictional claim were res judicata. The merits of this jurisdictional issue. See Gillespie v. U.S. Steel Supreme Court of Illinois found in favor of Gottlieb, but the Corp. , 321 F.2d 518, 529-30 (6th Cir. 1963) (holding that United States Supreme Court reversed, explaining: where a matter is argued before the court, and the court’s opinion passes on the issue, the language is not dicta). We see no reason why a court in the absence of an
allegation of fraud in obtaining the judgment, should A judgment is “any order from which an appeal lies.” Fed. examine again the question whether the court making the R. Civ. P. 54(a). Because Plaintiffs did not appeal the earlier determination on an actual contest over bankruptcy court’s decision to the district court in Delaware, jurisdiction between the parties, did have jurisdiction of the judgment of the bankruptcy court is now final. See Chicot
the subject matter of the litigation. In this case, the order County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank , 308 U.S. 371, upon the petition to vacate the confirmation settled the 377 (1940) (“The court has the authority to pass upon its own contest over jurisdiction. jurisdiction and its decree sustaining jurisdiction against attack, while open to direct review, is res judicata in a Id . at 172. Nos. 02-5632/5638 Pratt, et al. v. 13 14 Pratt, et al. v. Nos. 02-5632/5638
Ventas, Inc., et al. Ventas, Inc., et al. In the present case, there are no allegations of fraud D. Ventas’s cross-appeal regarding the decision handed down in In re Vencor, Inc . As In its original order, the district court dismissed Plaintiffs’ in Stoll , Plaintiffs engaged Ventas in “an actual contest over complaint “with prejudice.” Pratt , 273 B.R. at 116. The jurisdiction,” and therefore “the order upon the petition to court subsequently amended its dismissal as being “without vacate the confirmation settled” this issue. See also Republic prejudice” because the “order was limited solely to the Supply Co. v. Shoaf , 815 F.2d 1046, 1053-54 (5th Cir. 1987) question of whether jurisdiction was proper in the Western (holding that where a bankruptcy court determined that it had District of Kentucky, and did not reach the merits of the subject matter jurisdiction, its confirmation of a parties’ underlying substantive claims.” In doing so, the court reorganization plan that released a third-party guarantor had explained that it had not intended to preclude Plaintiffs from res judicata effect in a subsequent suit).
litigating their claims in an appropriate venue, i.e., the We note, moreover, that the Stoll court “express[ed] no Delaware bankruptcy court. opinion as to whether the Bankruptcy Court did or did not On its face, the motion presented by Ventas to the district have jurisdiction of the subject matter.” Id . at 171 n.8. In court was brought pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), which authorizes fact, the Supreme Court assumed that the bankruptcy court a dismissal for failure to state a claim. A “dismissal for failure “ did not have jurisdiction of the subject matter of the order .” to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Id . at 171 (emphasis added). Whether the bankruptcy court 12(b)(6) is a ‘judgment on the merits,’” and is therefore done erred in its determination was immaterial to the Court, which with prejudice. Federated Dep’t Stores, Inc. v. Moitie , 452 held that
U.S. 394, 399 n.3 (1981). By contrast, “a dismissal for lack we base our conclusion here on the fact that in an actual of subject matter jurisdiction does not operate as an controversy the question of the jurisdiction over the adjudication on the merits for preclusive purposes.” subject matter was raised and determined adversely to the Holloway v. Brush , 220 F.3d 767, 778 (6th Cir. 2000) (citing respondent. That determination is res judicata of that Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure) issue in this action . . . . (quotation marks omitted). This court has explained:
Id. at 177. We likewise pass no judgment on whether the The rationale behind this is that merely because one court Delaware bankruptcy court erred in determining that it had does not have jurisdiction over a dispute does not jurisdiction to enter the Confirmation Order and the releases necessarily mean that another court is precluded from contained therein. For our purposes, the fact that the Delaware properly exercising jurisdiction over the matter. bankruptcy court has decided the matter is enough to preclude Moreover, if a court does not have jurisdiction over a us from entertaining an identical claim in this court. matter, it cannot properly reach the merits of the case.
Wilkins v. Jakeway , 183 F.3d 528, 533 n.6 (6th Cir. 1999) (citation omitted).
Ventas is technically correct that the district court dismissed Plaintiffs’ claim pursuant to Ventas’s Rule 12(b)(6) Nos. 02-5632/5638 Pratt, et al. v. 15 Ventas, Inc., et al. motion and that such dismissals are presumptively “with prejudice.” But a plain reading of the district court’s opinion and amended order indicates that the district court’s basis for dismissing Plaintiffs’ claim was jurisdictional in nature and was therefore “without prejudice.” Because the district court amended its order to be “without prejudice,” Plaintiffs were able, while the present appeal was being held in abeyance, to pursue their claim in the Delaware bankruptcy court. Whether the district court erred in amending its order is therefore moot.
III. CONCLUSION
For all the reasons set forth above, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
NOTES
[*] W illiam W Schwarzer, Senior United States District Judge for the Northern District of California, sitting by designation. 1 Nos. 02-5632/5638 Pratt, et al. v. 3 4 Pratt, et al. v. Nos. 02-5632/5638 Ventas, Inc., et al. Ventas, Inc., et al. permanently enjoined Plaintiffs from pursuing their claims Each of the named Plaintiffs in this case had filed a state against Ventas. court suit against one of the Vencor entities prior to or soon after the commencement of its bankruptcy