171 N.W. 246 | N.D. | 1918
Lead Opinion
It is clear that the question of the insufficiency of the evidence to support the findings of’ the jury cannot be raised upon this appeal. Since § 8 of chapter 131 of the Laws of 1913 provides that: “With all orders granting or refusing a new trial, the judge shall file a written memorandum concisely stating the different grounds on which his ruling is based, and unless insufficiency or unsatisfactory nature of the evidence is expressly stalled in such memorandum, as a' reason for granting the new trial, it shall be presumed on appeal that it was not on that ground
No such memorandum was filed in the case at bar, and we must assume, therefore, that the new trial was granted either because he deemed the findings to be inconsistent, or that the special verdict established that the plaintiffs suffered no damage by reason of the alleged fraud, or found no such fraud or the amount of any injury.
It is clear to us that the complaint states an action for actual fraud and deceit, and that the case was tried upon this theory and this theory alone.
The facts present at the most a breach of a contract and in which the remedy of rescission has not been relied upon. Even, if they disclose a constructive fraud and come within the definition of § 5850 ■of the Compiled Laws of 1913, and if, as found by verdict, the defendants agreed to deliver to the plaintiff a new machine, and it was their ■duty to furnish the same, and the defendants were therefore guilty of a breach of duty for which they would be responsible, still constructive fraud cannot be proved under an allegation of actual fraud, nor can one recover upon a concealment where he has alleged an actual fraud. Haynes v. McKee, 19 Misc. 511, 43 N. Y. Supp. 1126; Markham v. Emerson, 69 Mo. App. 292; Biard v. Tyler Bldg. & L. Asso. — Tex. Civ. App. —, 147 S. W. 1168; American Surety Co. v. Pacific-Surety Co. 81 Conn. 252, 19 L.R.A.(N.S.) 83, 70 Atl. 584. We are satisfied, therefore, that the trial court correctly entered judgment for defendant in the first instance, and that there was no justification for .granting a new trial in the premises. We realize that where the findings are inconsistent a new trial may be granted, but there is nothing in the findings that is inconsistent. Actual fraud, as we have before said, is charged. Bindings 6, 7, and 9 absolutely disprove that charge. There is nothing in the other findings that is inconsistent with those mentioned, and findings 17 and 20 seem to support them.
Nor do we believe that the judgment should be set aside on the ground that all questions were not fully presented or material issues were not fully presented, as the findings cover both the questions of fraud, both at the time and the making of the contract and at the time of the delivery of the engine.
The order of the District Court is reversed and the judgment which was formerly entered is ordered to be reinstated.
Dissenting Opinion
(dissenting). In October, 1913, for the sum of $3,250 defendant agreed to sell the plaintiff a new and unused 30x60 gasolene
The motion for a new trial was made on these grounds:
1. Insufficiency of the evidence.
2. .That the special verdict is insufficient and contradictory.
In the opinion as written by the chief justice it is said: The insufficiency of the evidence cannot be raised upon this appeal because the trial court has failed to make a memorandum showing that the order was based on the insufficiency of the evidence. Now, it often happens that in deciding a motion a judge fails to make and file any memorandum of his reasons. But surely the rights of the parties to a suit are not concluded by any such failure of the judge, and the counsel has no means of compelling a judge to give his reasons for any decision.
An order granting a new trial is to some extent discretionary, and it should not be reversed unless it appears to be wrong. Then it is said: The gist of the action is actual fraud, but that is not strictly true. The gist of the action is a failure of the defendant to comply with its contract. It is conceded that for $3,250 defendant agreed to deliver to plaintiff a new and unused engine, and, in lieu of the new engine, it delivered an old second-hand engine, repainted to look like new. And, of course, no old second-hand engine is equal to a new •engine. In a suit to recover actual damages, the question is the difference between a new engine and an old engine, and the question of actual fraud is wholly immaterial. The damage is the difference be-tiueen the value of a new engine and the value of the old engine delivered to the plaintiffs. Comp. Laws, § 1158. There being no claim for exemplary damages, the question of fraud is wholly immaterial. The special verdict is that the plaintiff bargained for a new engine and he .got an old, repainted' engine which he believed to be a new engine. It is true the jury say that the repainted engine was as good as new, but ■that is manifestly untrue. When a gasolene engine has been used so
Defendant talks of its peculiar warranty which is a fraud on its face. No person except an expert machinist could ever comply with such a warranty. But that is of no consequence on this appeal. Defendant contracted for a new engine and an old one was palmed off onto him. It was done by design, by accident, or mistake. The motive is wholly immaterial. The order granting a new trial was clearly right and it should be affirmed.