[¶ 1] Rоbin Pratt appealed from a summary judgment dismissing his claim for damages against Richard Altendorf for breach of a contract to provide aerial spraying of fungicide on Pratt’s growing crops. We hold the notification requiremеnts under N.D.C.C. § 4-35-21.1(1) do not apply to Pratt’s action against Alten-dorf, and we reverse and remand for a trial on the merits.
I
[¶ 2] Altendorf, doing business as Northwood Aero Spray or Northwood Aero Service, has a crop spraying business in Grand Forks. In the spring of 2000, Pratt, a Northwood farmer, contracted with Altendorf to spray fungicide on his growing crops. Altendorf was to spray a fungicide called Folicur to prevent scab and foliar disease, which can infect crops аnd result in a lower crop yield. Altendorf performed the spraying services, but after the crops were harvested Pratt sued Al-tendorf for breach of contract, alleging that Altendorf sprayed the crops too early in thеir growing cycle for the fungicide to be completely effective, thereby resulting in a reduced crop yield.
[¶ 3] Altendorf moved for and was granted a summary judgment dismissing the action on the ground that Pratt did not comply with the notification reporting requirements under N.D.C.C. § 4-35-21.1(1) prior to filing his action against Altendorf. The district court concluded the notification statute applied and Pratt had failed to comply with it. However, the court also concluded that under N.D.C.C. § 4-35-21.1(3), the 60-day timе limit for Pratt to serve notice upon Altendorf prior to commencing his action did not apply, because Altendorf had failed to inform Pratt of the statutory notice requirements. The court, therefore, dismissed Pratt’s action withоut prejudice. ' On appeal, Pratt argues the statutory notice requirement does not apply and the trial court erred in dismissing the action.
II
[¶4] The right to appeal is a jurisdictional matter which this Court may consider on its own.
Frontier Enterprises, LLP v. DW Enterprises, LLP,
[¶ 5] The judgment from which Pratt has appealed dismissed his action for damages against Altendorf without prejudice to his filing another complaint. Pratt’s claim is based on breach of contract, and actions arising in contract are governed by a six-year statute of limitations. N.D.C.C. § 28-01-16(1). The alleged breach of contract occurred in the spring of 2000. Therefоre, Pratt would not be barred by the statute of limitations from bringing a subsequent action.
[¶ 6] If we assume, for purposes of determining whether Pratt has a right to appeal from the summary judgment, the trial court is correct that the notification requirements under N.D.C.C. § 4-35-21.1 apply, the dismissal would have the practical effect of terminating the litigation. We reach that conclusion because subsection 2 of the statute provides that when damages are alleged to have occurred to growing crops, a notification report “must be filed prior to the time fifty percent of the field is harvested.” If the statute applies, Pratt would have had to notify Alten-dorf before the crop was morе than 50 percent harvested, even though Altendorf did not inform Pratt of the statute’s notice requirements. See N.D.C.C. § 4-35-21.1(3). The crop is fully harvested, and Pratt did not comply with the notice requirement. Because the summary judgment dismissing this action would have the practical effect of terminating the litigation, we conclude the judgment is final and appealable.
[¶ 7] The district court had subject matter jurisdiction under N.D. Const, art. VI, § 8, and N.D.C.C. § 27-05-06. The appeal was timely under N.D.RApp.P. 4(a). This Court has jurisdiction undеr N.D. Const, art. VI, § 2, and N.D.C.C. §§ 27-02-04 and 28-27-01.
Ill
[¶ 8] Pratt contends the district court should not have granted Altendorfs motion for summary judgment dismissing Pratt’s action for failure to provide notice to Altendorf prior to commencing the action, because the statutory nоtice requirement does not apply to this case.
[¶ 9] Summary judgment under N.D.R.Civ.P. 56 is a procedural device for properly disposing of a lawsuit without trial if, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, therе are no genuine issues of material fact or conflicting inferences that can reasonably be drawn from undisputed facts, or if the only issues to be resolved are questions of law.
Kondrad ex rel. McPhail v. Bismarck Park Dist.,
[¶ 10] Section 4-35-21.1(1), N.D.C.C., provides:
No civil action may be commenced arising out of the application of any pesticide by any applicator inflicting damage on property unless, within sixty days from the date the claimant knew or reasonably should have known of the damage:
a. The claimant has served the applicator allegedly responsible for damage with a verified report of loss;
b. If the claimant is someone other than the person employing the applicator alleged to be responsible for the damage, the claimant has served the person who employed the applicator *118 allegedly responsible for the damage with a verified report of loss; and
c. The claimant has mailed or delivered to the commissioner of agriculture a verified report of loss together with proof of service of the report required by subdivision a and the report required by subdivision b, if applicable.
[¶ 11] Pratt argues the statutory notice requirement does not apply, because his action against Altendorf does not arise “out of the application of any pesticide by any applicator inflicting damage.” Pratt argues that he is not claiming Altendorf inflicted damage to his crops or any other property by the application of the pesticide. Rather, he is claiming that Altendorf breached his contract by not timely spraying when the fungicide application would have produced the desired result.
[¶ 12] Interpretation of a statute is a question of law fully renewable on appeal.
State ex rel. Heitkamp v. Family Life Services, Inc.,
[¶ 13] Section 4-35-21.1(1), N.D.C.C., requires a report of loss prior to commencing an action against the applicator of pesticides “inflicting damage on property.” The term “inflict” is definеd in Webster’s New World Dictionary 722 (2nd Coll. Ed. 1982) to mean:
to strike or beat against ... to give or cause (pain, wounds, blows, etc.) by or as by striking; cause to be borne ... to impose (a punishment, disagreeable task, etc. on or upon)
The Random House Dictionary of the English Language (2nd ed. 1987) defines “inflict” to mean:
to impose as something that must be borne or suffered ... to deal оr deliver, as a blow
Using its general and ordinary meaning, the term inflicting is a word of action, such as striking, beating, or imposing. Consequently, a reasonable interpretation of the statutory language, “application of any pesticide ... inflicting damage on property,” is that it applies to an application of chemicals affirmatively imposing harmful results upon a property. In the context of crop dusting, for “inflicting damage on property,” liability of the applicator generally arises in tort, not contract.
See
An-not.,
Liability for Injury Caused by Spraying or Dusting of Crops,
[¶ 14] Liability for the application of herbicide or pesticides inflicting damage on property, usually by drift of the chеmical resulting in severe damage or destruction of the property upon which it lands, is based upon principles of tort, such as negligence, trespass, and strict liability.
See, e.g., Langan v. Valicopters, Inc.,
[¶ 15] Our statute requires the giving of notice as a prerequisite to filing an action arising out of the application of pesticide “inflicting damage” on property. Used in its general sense, as indicated by the foregoing authorities, “inflicting damage on property” by the application of pesticide connotes tortious action resulting in harm or destruction to property not intended to be adversely impacted by the chemical application. There is no allegation by Pratt that Altendorfs аpplication of the fungicide was a tortious act inflicting damage on Pratt’s crops. Rather, Pratt contends Altendorfs spraying services constituted a breach of his contract by providing the services “prior to being direсted to by [Pratt] .and prior to those fields being ready for the application of the fungicide,” thereby rendering the spraying less effectual and resulting in a reduced crop yield. The alleged harm was not caused by the “application .. .■ inflicting damage” but. rather by the untimely or premature provision of the contracted services. The statutory notification requirement, by its clear language, does not apply to an action of -this type, Construing thе words used in the statute in their ordinary sense, we conclude the notice reporting requirements apply only to actions arising out of the “application” of pesticides .by an applicator “inflicting damage on рroperty.” Pratt’s action against Altendorf is based upon contract principles, not tort, and does not arise out of “the application [of the fungicide by Altendorf]- inflicting damage on property.” Rather, Pratt’s claim is bаsed on Altendorfs failure to timely perform his contractual agreement to spray Pratt’s crops:
IV
[¶ 16] We conclude Pratt’s lawsuit does not fall within those actions for which the claimant must give statutory notice under N.D.C.C. § 4-35-21.1(1) prior to filing the action. Consequently, the court erred in dismissing the action for Pratt’s failure to provide notice. We, therefore, reverse the summary judgment dismissing Pratt’s action against Altendorf and remand for further proceedings on the merits.