{¶ 1} Plаintiff-appellant, Ruby Prakash (“appellant”), appeals the decision and judgment entry of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, Division of Domestic Relations, which ordered appellant to undergo a psychological examination. Because the judgment from which appellant appeals is not a final, appeal-able order, we grant the request of defendant-appellee, Sanjeev Prakash (“appellee”), to dismiss this appeal.
{¶ 2} Appellant and appellee were divorced in 1998. They share parenting responsibilities for their minor child. Sincе 2006, both parties have filed numerous parenting-related motions. The trial court has held at least eight hearings and issued several orders.
{¶ 3} On September 28, 2008, the trial court issued a decision and judgment entry, which overruled objections to a magistrate’s order requiring appellant, appellee, and their child to each undergo a psychological examination. The court’s decision specifically referred to appellant’s motion for reallocation of parental rights and responsibilities and the guardian ad litem’s motion for the psychological evaluations.
{¶ 4} Appellant appeals the trial court’s September 28, 2008 order, and she raises the following assignment of error:
It is error for the trial court to grant a motion for psychological evaluation of the parties and minor child in an action to enforce parental rights without an evidentiary hearing to establish the need, scope and cost of the evaluation pursuant to Ohio Civil Rule 35(A).
{¶ 5} Bеfore reaching appellant’s assignment of error, we must first address appellee’s motion to dismiss. In that motion, appellee argues that the court’s September 28, 2008 judgment was not a final, appealable order. We agree.
{¶ 6} Section 3(B)(2), Article IV, Ohio Constitution limits an appellate court’s jurisdiction to the review of lower courts’ final orders. Thus, it is well
*587
established that an order must be final bеfore an appellate court has jurisdiction to review it.
Gen. Acc. Ins. Co. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am.
(1989),
{¶ 7} The Supreme Court of Ohio has set forth a two-step analysis for determining whether an order is final and appealable. See
Gen. Acc. Ins. Co.,
{¶ 8} R.C. 2505.02(B) defines a final order as “(1) An order that affects a substantial right in an actiоn that in effect determines the action and prevents a judgment; [or] (2) An order that affects a substantial right made in a special proceeding or upon a summary application in an aсtion after judgment.”
{¶ 9} We focus on R.C. 2505.02(B)(2), which states that an order in a special proceeding that affects a substantial right is a final order, and we consider, first, whether the action underlying this appeal is a special proceeding. A special proceeding is an “action or proceeding that is specially created by statute and that prior to 1853 was not denoted as an action at law or a suit in equity.” R.C. 2505.02(A)(2). The Supreme Court of Ohio has concluded that the right of divorce did not exist at common law.
State ex rel. Papp v. James
(1994),
{¶ 10} Having determined that the trial court issued its order in a special proceeding, we consider whether the order affects a substantial right. R.C. 2505.02(A)(1) defines a substantial right as “a right that the Unitеd States Constitution, the Ohio Constitution, a statute, the common law, or a rule of procedure entitles a person to enforce or protect.”
{¶ 11} Here, the trial court ordered the psychological evaluation pursuant to Civ.R. 35(A). Civ.R. 35(A) allows a court to order a party to submit to a physical or mental examination when the mental or physical condition of the party is in controversy, and the order is made on motion for good cause shown and with notice to the party.
{¶ 12} Appellee asserts that this court has previously held that “a Civ.R. 35(A) order for a mental examination аffects a substantial right when made in a custody action. Thus, this order is final and appealable.”
Shoff v. Shoff
(July 27, 1995), 10th Dist. No. 95APF01-8,
{¶ 13} We note, however, that the Supremе Court of Ohio has addressed this issue more recently, and its holding is contrary to the prior holdings of this court. In
Myers v. Toledo,
{¶ 14} In reaching this conclusion, the court considered whether an order requiring a medical examination, pursuant to Civ.R. 35(A), affected a substantial right. The Myers court stated, at ¶ 22:
A party to a сause of action in which the physical condition of the party is in controversy does not have a substantial right to prevent a court from ordering a physical examination. Therefore, а court order requiring a party to submit *589 to an independent medical examination, for good cause shown, does not affect a substantial right and is not a final, appealable order under R.C. 2505.02(B)(2).
{¶ 15} Appellant asks us to distinguish Myers from the case before us. Appellant acknowledges that the Myers court certified the question whether an order granting a motion for a “physical or mental examination” was final and appealable under R.C. 2505.02. Id. at ¶ 1. Appellant points out, however, that the Myers holding and its substantive discussion refer only to a “physical or medical examination,” and not to a “mental examination.” While we also acknowledge the difference between the Myers certified question and the Myers holding, we conclude that the Myers holding apрlies here, where a psychological examination is at issue.
{¶ 16} First, the court’s reference in
Myers
to a “medical examination” is broad enough to include a psychological examination. Second, the court aсcepted the
Myers
appeal based on a conflict among appellate courts, including
Harness v. Harness
(2001),
{¶ 17} Appellant asserts that, undеr certain circumstances, a psychological examination is more intrusive than a physical examination. She argues that that is particularly true here, where the court’s order arose from a contempt proceeding, as opposed to an order that might arise, for example, in an action where a disagreement about the existence of a physical injury liеs at the very heart of the case. While we acknowledge the intrusion a party may perceive as a result of an involuntary psychological evaluation, we do not agree that suсh an evaluation affects rights more substantial than those affected by the physical examination at issue in Myers.
{¶ 18} Here, contrary to appellant’s assertions, the mental health of the partiеs and their daughter is important to the issues before the trial court. The trial court had before it a motion to reallocate parental rights and responsibilities. R.C. 3109.04 requires it to consider the child’s bеst interest when determining the allocation of parental rights and responsibilities, and R.C. 3109.04(F)(1)(e) identifies the mental health of the parents and the child as a factor in making that determination.
{¶ 19} The court also found that the “plethora of pleadings, supporting memoranda and sworn affidavit(s)” filed by the parties, including appellee’s motion for a contempt order against appellant and appellant’s response to that motion, contained allegations of parental alienation and sexual abuse. Such allegations place the mental health of the pаrties and their daughter squarely at *590 issue and show the need for, and the importance of, psychological evaluations in resolving the issues between the parties.
{¶ 20} For all these reasons, and based on Myers, we conclude that the trial court’s order requiring the parties and their minor child to submit to a psychological examination, pursuant to Civ.R. 35(A), is not a final, appealable order under R.C. 2505.02(B)(2). To the extent that our prior holdings in Johnson, Shoff, and Williamson are to the contrary, we overrule them.
{¶ 21} Having detеrmined that the order from which appellant appeals is not a final, appealable order under R.C. 2505.02, we conclude that this court lacks jurisdiction over this matter. Therefore, we grant appellee’s motion, and we dismiss appellant’s appeal.
Appeal dismissed.