Praisner v. StockerPraisner v. Stocker
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Cavanaugh
Lead Opinion
Does the rule of immunity from liability for judicial acts extend to district justices? This is the principal issue raised by the appeal in the instant case. Before reaching that issue, however, we must first determine whether this Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal. Our jurisdiction depends upon the appealability of an order entering summary judgments on two counts of a three count complaint where the three counts contained separate causes of action joined in the same complaint pursuant to
After a criminal complaint charging Bruce Praisner with issuing bad checks had been dismissed, Praisner filed a complaint in trespass against the district justice, Olive S. Stocker, alleging, in three counts, causes of action for false arrest, malicious abuse of process and assault and battery. After the pleadings were closed, Stocker filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings on the grounds that a district justice is immune from liability for acts performed in his or her capacity as a judicial officer. The trial court, following argument, entered summary judgments in favor of Stocker on the counts alleging causes of action for false arrest and malicious abuse of process. From this order, Praisner appealed. The remaining count alleging a cause of action for assault and battery was ordered down for compulsory arbitration and resulted in an award in favor of Praisner for Ten ($10) Dollars. No appeal was filed from that award, and the time therefor has now expired.
It is well settled that an appeal will lie only from a final order unless otherwise permitted by statute. A final order is usually one which ends the litigation or, alternatively, disposes of the entire case. Pugar v. Greco, 483 Pa. 68, 72-73, 394 A.2d 542, 544 (1978); Bracken v. Bracken, 294 Pa.Super. 371, 373, 439 A.2d 1247, 1247-1248 (1982); Mitchell v. Center City Cadillac, 287 Pa.Super. 350, 353, 430 A.2d 321, 322 (1981); Hall v. Lee, 285 Pa.Super. 542, 544, 428 A.2d 178, 179 (1981); Malenfant v. Ruland, 274 Pa.Super. 506, 509, 418 A.2d 521, 522 (1980). “Conversely, an order is interlocutory and not final unless it effectively puts
“In ascertaining what is a final appealable order ... we must look beyond the technical effect of the adjudication to its practical ramifications.” Jackson v. Moultrie, supra 288 Pa.Super. at 255, 431 A.2d at 1034-1035. Accord: Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 482 Pa. 615, 618, 394 A.2d 491, 493 (1978); T.C.R. Realty, Inc. v. Cox, 472 Pa. 331, 337, 372 A.2d 721, 724 (1977); Bell v. Beneficial Consumer Discount Co., 465 Pa. 225, 228, 348 A.2d 734, 735 (1975); Husted v. Board of Directors of Wellsboro Area School District, 57 Pa. Cmwlth. 520, 524, 427 A.2d 272, 274 (1981); Giannini v. Foy, supra 279 Pa.Super. at 556, 421 A.2d at 339; Schaefer v. American States Insurance Co., supra 272 Pa.Super. at 70, 414 A.2d at 673. “The finality of an order is a judicial conclusion which can be reached only after an examination of its ramifications.” Pugar v. Greco, supra 483 Pa. at 73, 394 A.2d at 545, quoting Bell v. Beneficial Consumer Discount Co., supra 465 Pa. at 228, 348 A.2d at 735. Accord: Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission v. Atlantic Richfield Co., supra 482 Pa. at 618, 394 A.2d at 493; West v. West, 301 Pa.Super. 75, 76, 446 A.2d 1342, 1342 (1982); Gordon v. Gordon, 293 Pa.Super. 491, 498, 439 A.2d 683, 686 (1981).
As a general rule, an order dismissing some but not all counts of a multi-count complaint is interlocutory and not appealable. Gordon v. Gordon, supra, 293 Pa.Superior at 499, 439 A.2d at 686-687 (1981); Stengena v. Madden,
However, the general rule is not without exceptions. Certain orders which have not put a litigant literally “out of court” or completely terminated the litigation have nevertheless been held to possess sufficient aspects of finality to be appealable immediately because the effect of the order has been to preclude the litigant from asserting the cause of action alleged. Hudock v. Donegal Mutual Insurance Co., 438 Pa. 272, 276, 264 A.2d 668, 671 (1970). Thus, the following have been held appealable: (1) an order denying class status (Klemow v. Time Incorporated, 466 Pa. 189, 194 n. 5, 352 A.2d 12, 14 n. 5 (Í976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 828, 97 S.Ct. 86, 50 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976); Bell v. Beneficial Consumer Discount Co., supra; Lee v. Child Care Service Delaware County Institution District, 461 Pa. 641, 645 n. 1, 337 A.2d 586, 588 n. 1 (1975)); (2) an order dismissing a third party complaint (Brandywine Area Joint School Authority v. VanCor, Inc., 426 Pa. 448, 451, 233 A.2d 240, 241
In the case sub judice, appellant joined three separate causes of action in one complaint. This he was permitted to do by
The appealability of the summary judgments entered in this case becomes readily apparent if we understand the basis upon which separate causes of action may be joined in the same complaint.
The practical ramifications of the order entered by the trial court also demonstrate the finality of that order. Indeed, in this case the finality of the court’s order stands forth in clarity which only the occurrence of subsequent events can produce. The trial court recognized that the summary judgments entered on two counts involved causes of action separate and distinct from the count averring assault and battery. Therefore, as permitted by
Where separate and distinct causes of action have been joined under permissive joinder standards of
The test announced by the Supreme Court of the United States in Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corporation, 337 U.S. 541, 69 S.Ct. 1221, 93 L.Ed. 1528 (1949), and followed by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Bell v. Beneficial Consumer Discount Company, supra, and Pu-gar v. Greco, supra, has no application where an appeal has been taken from judgment entered on a separate cause of action. That rule, which contains a three part test for determining appealability, has applicability only to orders which are collateral to the main cause of action. In Cohen, the issue was the appealability of an order, collateral to a stockholders’ derivative action, which denied a petition to require the plaintiff to post security to cover defendant’s expenses and counsel fees if plaintiff’s action proved unsuccessful. The Supreme Court held the order appealable because the claim adjudicated was “separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the action, too important to be denied review and too independent of the cause itself to require that appellate consideration be deferred until the whole case is adjudicated.” Id. 337 U.S. at 546, 69 S.Ct. at 1225, 93 L.Ed.2d at 1536. In Bell v. Beneficial Consumer Discount Company, supra, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania applied the Cohen test in holding appealable an order denying class action status although the underlying cause
These decisions make it clear that the Cohen test is applicable only to determine the appealability of an order which is collateral to the main action. In the instant case we are not concerned with an order that is collateral to a main action. Rather, we are faced with an order which has entered summary judgments on two entirely separate and independent actions which, for purposes of efficiency and convenience, were joined in the same complaint with a third, separate action as permitted by
We hold, therefore, that where, as here, a final judgment has been entered on a separate cause of action, that judgment is appealable.4 Neither the finality nor ap
The substantive aspects of the instant case are fairly clear. Judges are absolutely immune from liability for damages when performing judicial acts, even if their actions are in error or performed with malice. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 98 S.Ct. 1099, 55 L.Ed.2d 331 (1978), rehearing denied, 436 U.S. 951, 98 S.Ct. 2862, 56 L.Ed.2d 795 (1978). “ ‘A judicial officer is not liable for acts done in his judicial capacity where there is not a clear absence of all jurisdiction over the subject-matter and person, even though such acts constitute an excessive exercise of jurisdiction or involve a decision that the official had jurisdiction over the particular case, where in fact he had none...... The principle involved is that all judicial officers are protected by their official character from liability in tort, because of public conduct clearly within the pale of their authority, although involving demonstrable legal error.’ ” Commonwealth v. Cauffiel, 79 Pa.Super. 596, 600 (1922), quoting 25 Corpus Juris, 515 (emphasis supplied).
Judicial immunity extends to all judicial officers, including district justices. “If a judge of an inferior jurisdiction has the power under authority of law to hear and pass on cases, to which the particular offense belongs, the same reason requires that he should be protected from liability for erroneous action, which exempts judges of superior or general jurisdiction from such liability. If judges properly expected to be most learned in the law can plead official exemption for their blunderings in the law, a fortiori those from whom less is to be expected should not be compelled to respond in damages for their mistakes
Judicial immunity insures “the independence of the magistrates so that they may be free to exercise their discretion and apply their understanding of the law, whether correct or erroneous, to the facts and circumstances presented to them....” Petition of Dwyer, supra 486 Pa. at 591, 406 A.2d at 1358 (emphasis in original). Thus, there can be no cause of action and no recovery of damages against a district justice who accepts and processes a criminal complaint even though a careful examination of the evidence may have revealed, as appellant contends, that there was no probable cause for the criminal charges against him. See: Huendling v. Jensen, 168 N.W.2d 745 (Iowa, 1969). Similarly, there can be no recovery of damages in a civil action against a district justice who temporarily detains in his or her office or courtroom a person against whom a criminal complaint has been filed. See and compare: Burgess v. Towne, 13 Wash.App. 954, 538 P.2d 559 (1975).
The order entering summary judgments on causes of action for false arrest and malicious abuse of process is affirmed.
CAVANAUGH, J., files a concurring statement in which POPOVICH and HOFFMAN, JJ., join.Notes
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. This rule “prevent[s] a pending appeal from affecting ‘separate disputes between other parties or involving separate subject matter.’ ” Litt v. Rolling Hill Hospital, 293 Pa.Super. 97, 100 n. 2, 437 A.2d 1008, 1010 n. 2 (1981), quoting Pennsylvania Bar Institute, Pennsylvania Practice under the Rules of Appellate Procedure (Pub. No. 1980-130) at 18.
. If an appeal had been delayed until after final determination of the assault and battery action, it would have been untimely. It is axiomatic that an appeal must be filed within thirty days from entry of the order or judgment from which the appeal is taken. Commonwealth v. Jones, 308 Pa.Super. 41, 453 A.2d 1058 (1982); Boden v. Tompkins, 306 Pa.Super. 494, 452 A.2d 833 (1982); Erie Human Relations Commission ex rel. Dunson v. Erie Insurance Exchange, 304 Pa.Super. 172, 176, 450 A.2d 157, 158 (1982); Commonwealth v. Riebow, 299 Pa.Super. 458, 459, 445 A.2d 1219, 1220 (1982); Hesson v. Weinrebe, 288 Pa.Super. 216, 218, 431 A.2d 1015, 1016 (1981);
. The appealability of an order or judgment must be determined as of the time the appeal therefrom is filed. If the order appealed from is interlocutory, the appeal may be quashed immediately upon motion. See:
Concurrence Opinion
concurring:
I agree with the majority’s thoughtful analysis of the law concerning appeals in multi-count complaints but I feel that it is unnecessary and improper to decide, under the facts of this case, the issue of whether an order entering summary judgment on one or more but not all counts of a multi-count complaint in which several causes of action have been joined pursuant to
I agree with the majority’s disposition of the merits of the instant appeal and therefore I, too, would affirm the order of the lower court.
POPOVICH and HOFFMAN, JJ., join this concurring statement.