Prager v. Knight/Trimark Group, Inc.Prager v. Knight/Trimark Group, Inc.
OPINION
This action arises out of allegations that defendant Knight/Trimark Group, Inc. (“Knight”), a “market maker” engaged in the business of executing the purchase and sale of NASDAQ securities for various brokerage houses, improperly used information about retail customers’ intent to trade particular securities in order to execute its own trades for its own profit before exеcuting its customers’ trades. Plaintiff Yakov Prager asserts five causes of action against Knight, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, alleging breach of contract, violation of the implied covenant of good faith, breach of fiduciary duty, unjust enrichment, and violation of New Jersey’s Consumer Fraud Act.
Plaintiff alleges that although the Rules of Conduct of the National Association of Securities Dealers (“NASD”) require brokers to execute retail customers’ trades at the best available market price, without excessive markups, and that market makers execute their customers’ trades before their own, Knight traded “in advance of such retail customers,” thus giving Knight “an informational advantage amounting to exclusive intelligence on which it can trade for its own profit.” (Complin 11-20.) Plaintiff alleges that “[s]uch practice violates the NASDAQ rules of conduct, the implied and express agreements between Plaintiff and the Class of customers and the broker/dealers for whom they act, and the fiduciary obligations of defendant.” (ComplY 21.) Plaintiff asserts, inter alia, that Knight
concealed, suppressed and omitted the fаct that it was executing for Plaintiff and the other class members orders in a manner which caused Plaintiff and the class customers to pay artificially higher prices than they would have otherwise paid. Defendant failed to disclose[ ] this information with the intent that Plaintiff and Class members rely upon such concealment, suppression or omission. (ComplY 44.)
On March 17, 2000, plaintiff filed this аction against Knight in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Hudson County, purporting to represent “all retail purchasers and sellers throughout the United States of NASDAQ listed securities whose orders were executed through [Knight], during the period March 3, 1996 through March 3, 2000.” (Compl.f 3.) On June 2, 2000, defendant filed a notice of removal of this action to federal court pursuant to
Standard for Removal
Doubts concerning removability are usually resolved in favor of remanding the case to state court.
Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets,
Discussion
Enacted in 1998, SLUSA amended the Securities Act of 1934 to preclude a private party from bringing a “covered class action” in federal or state court, based on state law, alleging a “misrepresentation or omission of a material fact” or the use of “any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance” “in connection with the purchase or sale of a covered security.”
SLUSA,
No covered class action based upon the statutory or common law of any State or subdivision thereof may be maintained in any State or Federal court by any private party alleging— (A) a misrepresentation or omission of a material fact in connection with the purchase or sale of a covered security; or (B) that the defendant used or employed any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in connection with the purchase or sale of a covered security-
Generally, a “covered class action” involves common questions of law or fact brought on behalf of more than 50 persons or an action brought on behalf of one or more unnamed parties.
SLUSA provides for limited exceptions, termed “preserved” actions.
Essentially, the removing party must establish that the action is (1) a “covered class action”, (2) that is based on state law, (3) alleging a misrepresentation or omission of a material fact or use of any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance (4) “in connection with” [or “involving,” for removal purposes] (5) the purchase or sale of a covered security.
See
Plaintiff does not dispute that this is a “covered class action” based on state law claims and that there has been a purchase or sale of a covered security. However, plaintiff does debate SLUSA’s applicability in this case by arguing that this is not an action
“involving
” a covered security within the meaning of SLUSA’s removal provision. Plaintiff argues that thе word “involving” as it is used in the removal provision,
The legislative history of SLUSA shows that Congress sought to establish federal courts as “the exclusive venue for most securities class action lawsuits” involving nationally traded securities. H.R.Conf. Rep. No. 803, 105th Cong., 2d Sess. at 13 (1998) (“House Report”). The House Report noted that one year after the passage of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PSLRA”), which erected protections against “strike suits” in federal courts, the Securities and Exchange Commission reported a significant shift of securities fraud cases from federal to state court.
Id.
at 14. Apparently, PSLRA drove many would-be plaintiffs to file their claims in state court, based on state law, in order to avoid the heightened pleading requirements of PSLRA.
In re Lutheran Brotherhood,
Must defendant be an “issuer” or affiliate of an issuer for SLUSA to apply?
Plaintiff argues that this action “is not the type of action intended for regulation [under PSLRA or SLUSA] because plaintiff was not an investor in the securities issued by defendants, nor did the fraud complained of arise out of the acts and omissions of a company in which plaintiff was an investor.” (Pl.Br. at 8.)
Neither the language of the statutes nor their legislative history indicate that they were intended to apply only to situations in which issuers of securities are accused of misrepresentation. Adoрting plaintiffs proffered limitation on SLUSA’s reach would frustrate Congress’s clear intent to make federal courts the “exclusive venue” for securities class actions because it would preserve all state law securities claims alleging fraud “in connection with the purchase or sale of a covered security” by anyone other than a securities issuer or affiliate thereof: brokers, dealers, clearinghouses, and others. There is no indication that Congress intended to limit SLU-SA in that manner or to that extent. Moreover, Congress explicitly provided that certain types of actions' — none of which apply here — are exempt from SLU-SA.
Contrary to plaintiffs contention, it does not necessarily follow that Congress intended SLUSA to apply only in cases involving issuers or their affiliates simply because the majority of cases to which SLUSA has been applied involved such situations. Additionally, courts have applied both PSLRA and SLUSA in'cases invоlving non-issuers of securities. In
Abada v. Charles Schwab & Co., Inc.,
Plaintiff argues that four of his five causes of action are not claims that may be adjudicated under the federal securities laws. (Pl.Rep.Br. at 8-9.) With respect to the fifth claim, pled pursuant to the New Jersey Consumer Fraud statute, plaintiff contends the issue is whether the complaint alleges intent to defraud. In essence, plaintiff аrgues that since the majority of his claims against Knight are not securities fraud claims, SLUSA does not govern.
Plaintiff refers to
Burns v. Prudential Securities,
Plaintiff is correct that the
Bums
court considered whether the complaint satisfied
[T]his case involvеs an allegation of one instance of unauthorized trading. While this may sustain conversion, breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, or negligence claims, it does not suggest, much less strongly so as is mandated by PSLRA, that [the defendant] meant to defraud plaintiffs by liquidating their accounts. Only additional “facts giving rise to a strong inference” that (the defendant) acted with intent to defraud could support a tenable securities fraud claim.
Id.
Unlike the facts alleged in
Bums,
the facts alleged in this case give “rise to a strong inference” that Knight acted with intent to defraud. Specifically, the complaint alleges that Knight falsely stated in various public filings that it guaranteed to execute retail customers’ trades at the best available market price, yet Knight traded “in advance of such retail customers,” thus giving Knight “an informational advantage amounting to exclusive intelligence on which it can trade for its own profit.” (CompLM 11-20.) Plaintiff asserts that Knight “concealed, suppressed and omitted the fact that it was executing” trades in a manner that caused customers “to pay artificially higher prices than they would have otherwise paid. Defendant failed to disclose! ] this information with the intent that Plaintiff and Class members rely upon such concealment, suppression or omission.” (ComplJ 44.) Unlike
Bums,
which
Plaintiff dissects his individual causes of action in an attempt to argue that they are state law claims “not capable of being adjudicated under the federal securities laws.” (Pl.Rep.Br. at 8.) Additionally, ' plaintiff asserts that
Bums
cites cases for the proposition that many “courts have not found securities laws violations ‘based on allegations of conversion, breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty and negligence.’ ” (Pl.Rep.Br. at 8, n. 3.) However, unlike
Bums
and the cases cited in footnote 2 of that opinion, allegations of Knight’s pattern and practice of misrepresentation and intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud pervade the complaint and are incorporated by reference in each cause of action in the complaint.
3
See Abada,
Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, removal of the case to federal district court was proper. Plaintiff will have twenty days to file an amended complaint that conforms with PSLRA. If plaintiff fails to do so, the matter will be dismissed pursuant to SLU-SA. An appropriate 'order shall be entered.
Notes
. Plaintiff does not argue that this is a “preserved” action pursuant to SLUSA.
. Incidentally, the defendant in Burns was a broker, not a securities' issuer or affiliate thereof. There is no discussion in that opinion concerning whether SLUSA applies to non-issuers of securities.
. The only cause of action that does not "reрeat and reallege” the foregoing allegations is the first cause of action for breach of contract. That cause of action does, however, allege "a pattern and practice of trading ... at unfair prices, obtaining an unfair markup and/or a secret profit.” (Compl-¶ 24.) That allegation is sufficient to give rise to a strong inference that Knight acted with intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud.