8 Utah 442 | Utah | 1893
In March, 1887, David Count obtained a patent from the United States for lots 3 and 4, section 35, Salt Lake Meridian, Utah Territory. This land is admitted to join Utah lake on the north, and the south line thereof is admitted to run to the meander line running along the old shore of Utah lake. It is also admitted that the patent from the United States to Count called for the meander line on the lake as the southern boundary of the lots. In June following, Count conveyed to Poynter, the plaintiff, a portion of this land, by full covenant warranty deed. The land so conveyed adjoins Utah lake on the north. Plaintiff’s deed describes the land as running to the waters of Utah lake, and along the north side of the
The court instructed the jury, in substance, as follows: In this case the law is: “It it be true, if you find by a preponderance of the evidence, that Mr. Poynter, the plaintiff, owns the land down to the meander line of lake— That meander line is established by the government, and is supposed to be the water’s edge. Indeed, that is the water’s edge, and the abutting land owner, who owns down to that, owns to the water’s edge. If the water’s edge moves he has the right to move with it. If it recedes from the shore, he has the right to follow it up clear to the water’s edge. If it comes back on him, he has to go back, — he loses that much; but he has the right to follow it to its edge, and no man has the right to get between him and the water’s edge; and any man who settles between him and the water, either after it recedes or before it recedes, is there as a trespasser, and he has no more rights there than a trespasser. If you find from the evidence, by a preponderance, that Poynter owns the land to the meander line from the government, he is entitled to all the dry land that is made between him and the water’s edge by recession of the waters, or by adding alluvium so as to make an accretion. Whether that is perceptible or not makes no difference. He is entitled to the occupation 'of the land continuously to the water’s edge. Whether he owns by an absolute title in fee or not, he is entitled to the possession of it.' And, if you find from the evidence that these are the facts, then it is your duty to find for the plaintiff, and give him possession of this land.” Under the instructions the jury found a verdict for the plaintiff. The nature of the verdict does not appear from the abstract. From this verdict the court is asked to pre
The controversy here- is not between adjoining owners or riparian proprietors, but between the plaintiff, as riparian owner, and a party claiming land under the water in front of him, which water had receded and left dry land between the meander line of the riparian owner and the lake itself. In the case of Palmer v. Dodd, 64 Mich. 474, 31 N. W. Rep. 209, the court says “that when the United States grant, by patent, land described by a legal subdivision, the grantee is entitled to all the lands embraced within that subdivision, and is not limited by the number of acres specified in the patent or upon the government plat. The meander lines have no significance as boundaries, and áre not intended as such, but are run simply to afford a means - of computing the area contained in the fraction which the government requires payment for on sale of the public domain.-” In Clute v. Fisher, 65 Mich. 48, 31 N. W. Rep. 614, the court says “that the soil under the water of an ,inland lake does not belong to the general government or to the state, * * * and that private ownership of lands bounded on navigable fresh water is not restricted to the meander line.” , Webber v. Boom Co., 62 Mich. 626, 30 N. W. Rep. 469. In Lincoln v. Davis, 53 Mich. 375, 19 N. W. Rep. 103, the court holds that the paramount rights of the public to be preserved in the Great lakes are those of navigation and fishing, and this is best accomplished by limiting the grants of land bordering on the Great lakes to low water mark; - and that, while the riparian owner on the Great lakes is entitled to occupy the land to low water mark, he also has the right to con
The rights of the plaintiff in this case depend entirely upon the doctrine of riparian proprietors. Practically the common law has prevailed in this Territory, and the code without this basis to rest upon, would not only fail to provide for the great mass of affairs, but would lack
The record shows that, while there was a slight rise
The defendant requested the court to charge the jury that, “if you believe from the evidence that in 1887 the plaintiff stated to the defendants that he had no claim on the land below the f meander'line/ and that the land in dispute is below the meander line, and that he had no objections to their occupying such land, and the defendants, upon the faith of such statements made by the plaintiff, rebuilt their pavilion, and made other improvements thereon, and continued to use and occupy such land, then your verdict should be in favor of defendants in this case.” This request was refused, and the defendants excepted. It must be remembered that the answer filed in this case, as shown by the abstract, simply “ denies plaintiff’s title and ownership, and also his right to recover.” No other defense is set up as against the plaintiff’s right. No license, lease, or estoppel is pleaded. The whole defense was based upon the claim that the land in question belonged to the United States. The principle invoked by this request is' that one should be estopped from asserting a right to property upon which he has, by his own conduct, misled another; who supposed himself to be the owner, or to have a right to make expenditures thereon. “But this salutary principle can