POWHATAN COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD, Plaintiff, v. TODD SKINGER AND KANDISE LUCAS, Defendants.
Civil Action No. 3:24-cv-874
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA Richmond Division
August 29, 2025
This matter is before the Court on COUNT I of Powhatan County School Board‘s (“PCSB“) COMPLAINT, ECF No. 1,1 which seeks permanent injunctive relief against Defendant Kandise Lucas (“Lucas“) barring Lucas: (1) “from pursuing any further due process hearings (under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act,
For the reasons set forth below, a permanent injunction will be entered that prohibits Lucas from participating, directly or indirectly, as a special advocate on behalf of any Powhatan County student, including the pursuit of any further due process complaints under the IDEA as to any Powhatan County student, without first obtaining leave of this Court.2 As explained below, Skinger has settled this case with PCSB and, as part thereof, he has agreed to sever all professional ties with Lucas. And, of course, Lucas cannot proceed with any due process hearing as to H.S. without Skinger. So, the requested injunctive relief in WHEREFORE ¶ (b) is moot and will be denied as such. So too is the relief requested in WHEREFORE ¶ (c). Finally, the grant of injunctive relief requested in WHEREFORE ¶ (a) renders moot the PI
I. BACKGROUND3
This action was initiated by PCSB on December 6, 2024. In addition to the injunctive relief sought in COUNT I, PCSB seeks an award of attorneys’ fees (COUNT II)4 against Lucas and Skinger. The claims in COUNTS I and II arose from a series of actions taken by Lucas, on behalf of Skinger and H.S., against PCSB pursuant to the IDEA. So, it is necessary briefly to summarize: (1) the IDEA provisions under which that conduct occurred; and (2) the actions that precipitated the filing of this action.
A. THE IDEA: A SUMMARY OF RELEVANT PROVISIONS
The IDEA guarantees students a “free appropriate public education.”
As instructed by the IDEA, Virginia created a statutory scheme that permits individuals to act as IDEA special advocates on behalf of students and families.
Virginia does not define the qualifications necessary to undertake [IDEA] representation. Nor does Virginia regulate or review non-attorney advocates who undertake a representational role in the due process hearing under the IDEA . . . [T]he course taken by Virginia is fraught with problems. And, in this case that approach was harmful to the parents and, more importantly, the child.
Matthews, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 171735, at *5. Those unremedied problems have allowed kindred results in this case.
The IDEA also provides that, if an “issue separate from [one alleged in] a due process complaint already filed” with an administrative hearing officer arises, then the parent may file
B. THE ACTIVITY THAT FORMS THE BASIS FOR THIS ACTION
Beginning in April 2024, Lucas, in coordination with Skinger, filed nine due process complaints against PCSB challenging the IEP proposed for H.S. As explained below, hearing officers resolved each of those nine due process complaints adversely to Lucas and Skinger. None of those adverse decisions were appealed. Instead, Lucas and Skinger pursued the approach of filing successive IDEA due process complaints based on substantially the same set of operative facts as the previous ones, with some minor adjustments (sometimes, “the follow-on due process complaints“).
The administrative hearing officers dismissed the original due process complaint on its merits. ECF No. 27, at 45. Thereafter, the respective hearing officers dismissed each of the eight follow-on due process complaints based on res judicata and/or collateral estoppel grounds because the follow-on complaints were based on the same set of operative facts as the first complaint and for other reasons. ECF No. 1, ¶¶ 9-31. Nonetheless, Lucas and Skinger filed a tenth due process complaint against PCSB. It was also based on the same set of operative facts as in the previously dismissed nine complaints. The record, which contains the due process
After an administrative hearing officer again ruled against Lucas and Skinger on the tenth due process complaint, and after PCSB had filed this action, Lucas and Skinger filed an eleventh due process complaint involving the same set of operative facts as the previous ten that had been resolved in PCSB‘s favor.
So, on February 24, 2025, PCSB filed the PI MOTION, requesting that the Court preliminarily enjoin Lucas and Skinger from pursuing that complaint either by ordering its withdrawal or staying (“pausing“) its administrative adjudication. ECF No. 12. Then, in less than a month, and while the PI MOTION was still pending, Lucas and Skinger filed an additional six due process complaints against PCSB, again based on the same set of operative facts as the ten previous proceedings decided adversely to Lucas and Skinger. In some instances, the additional due process complaints contained minor changes, but nothing meaningful was changed as part of the operative facts. ECF Nos. 142-147. Like the preceding ten due process complaints, these new ones sought home-schooling for H.S.
That conduct prompted PCSB to file the EMERGENCY MOTION, ECF No. 14. In the EMERGENCY MOTION, PCSB sought injunctive relief to halt the consideration of the newly filed follow-on due process
The Court convened an Evidentiary Hearing on the EMERGENCY MOTION, which consisted of three sessions, one each on April 2, 9, and 10, 2025. ECF No. 81, 98, 102. During that Hearing, it was brought to the Court‘s attention that the Defendants had filed an eighteenth administrative due process complaint on the morning of April 2—just hours before the first session of the Evidentiary Hearing began. At the conclusion of the Evidentiary Hearing‘s first session on April 2, the Court issued an oral ruling that temporarily stayed: (1) the consideration of due process complaints thirteen through eighteen at the administrative level;6 and (2) the Defendants’ ability to file additional IDEA due process complaints at the administrative level until the resolution of the Evidentiary Hearing. The temporary stay was partially lifted at the conclusion of the third session of the Evidentiary Hearing on April 10, 2025,7 and the Court ordered additional briefing to aid
in deciding the EMERGENCY MOTION. Id. at 19-20.
On June 30, 2025, the Court held a Motions Hearing to hear remaining argument on the EMERGENCY MOTION and to consider whether any issues remained before ruling on the PI MOTION and EMERGENCY MOTION. ECF No. 178. The day before that Hearing was convened, Skinger and PCSB settled the claims against Skinger. ECF Nos. 188, 189. As part of the settlement agreement, Skinger agreed to “sever his professional relationship with” Lucas as his IDEA special advocate and to no longer “confer with [her] concerning [H.S.‘s] educational needs.” ECF No. 188-1, at 1.
At the June 30 Hearing, the Court questioned whether injunctive relief was still appropriate against Lucas following Skinger‘s removal from the case because the IDEA only authorizes special advocates to bring due process complaints on behalf of disabled students—not on behalf of the special advocate.
In its final supplemental brief, PCSB argues that, even in light of Skinger‘s settlement, and the consequent termination of his special-advocate relationship with Lucas, its claim for permanent injunctive relief against Lucas is not moot. ECF No. 210, at 2. In support of the position that the Court retains the authority to permanently enjoin Lucas from filing any IDEA due process complaints on behalf of any Powhatan County student against PCSB, it points to: (1) the detrimental conduct in which Lucas has engaged in the IEP processes and due process hearings in this case, and in others; (2) the damage inflicted by that conduct; (3) how Lucas continues the practice of filing repeated, redundant due process complaints on behalf of the students even after administrative hearing officers previously have denied closely related, or identical, preceding due process complaints (or, in some instances, how Lucas has filed such redundant due process complaints before the hearing officer has even ruled on pending complaints involving the same set of operative facts); (4) how Lucas continues to advocate on behalf of families who have severed the special-advocate relationship with her, such as Skinger and the Halvorsens (who were co-defendants with Lucas in a separate case before the Court), Powhatan Cnty. Sch. Bd. v. Halvorsen, No. 3:24-cv-216; and (5) how PCSB continues to be injured by the need to defend against those improper follow-on due process complaints.
Lucas was directed to file a response brief to PCSB‘s supplemental brief by July 10, 2025. ECF No. 206, at 1-2. Lucas did not do so. On July 14, 2025, PCSB timely filed a reply brief to note Lucas’ lack of response and to reiterate its position that injunctive relief against Lucas remains appropriate. ECF No. 222.9
Although Lucas did not respond to PCSB‘s supplemental brief, she did respond to other portions of the ORDER that required her to file the response to PCSB‘s supplemental brief. That filing was ECF No. 214. And, even though Lucas did not file a response to PCSB‘s supplemental brief, she did submit a litany of other (unrelated) filings during the timeframe in which her response was due. E.g., ECF Nos. 215, 216, 217. She has also filed several additional briefs and motions since that time, but none of them provide a response to PCSB‘s supplemental brief as required by the ORDER, ECF No. 206. ECF Nos. 228, 229, 237, 238, 239, 257, 258. Taken together, these facts demonstrate that Lucas had the knowledge, capability, and capacity to file a response to PCSB‘s supplemental brief, but did not do so—whether by willful choice or
Even though Lucas has not responded to PCSB‘s supplemental brief, she has filed, from time to time, various and sundry papers that might be construed to address PCSB‘s claims and motions for injunctive relief. Those filings include ECF Nos. 115 (STRUCK by ORDER ECF No. 171), 154 (STRUCK by ORDER ECF No. 205), 155 (STRUCK by ORDER ECF No. 205), 175, 180 (STRUCK by ORDER ECF No. 254), 187 (DENIED by ORDER ECF No. 255), 216 (DENIED by ORDER ECF No. 256), 217 (DENIED by ORDER ECF No. 256), 229 (DENIED by ORDER ECF No. 256).
Lucas is a pro se litigant who, under settled law, is entitled to a measure of leniency and understanding in consideration of the issues and arguments that she presents.10 Therefore, in considering PCSB‘s request for permanent injunctive relief, the Court has given due consideration to each of Lucas’ filings that can reasonably be construed to address the requested injunctive relief, even where
The exhibits filed with PCSB‘s motions and brief, and the testimony and exhibits presented during the three-day April Evidentiary Hearing on the EMERGENCY MOTION, seemed to the Court to provide a complete record on the PI MOTION, the EMERGENCY MOTION, and the prayer for permanent injunctive relief sought in COUNT I of the COMPLAINT and its WHEREFORE ¶¶ (a), (b), and (c). But, to ensure that the requests for injunctive relief, including the request for permanent injunctive relief in the COMPLAINT, were ripe for decision, the Court convened a telephone conference between the parties to “assess whether the record is sufficiently developed for the Court to make a decision on the merits of the requested relief in the COMPLAINT as stated in the [WHEREFORE] paragraphs (a) and (b) on page 11. ECF No. 1, at 11.” ECF No. 232.
During that telephone conference, the Court asked counsel for PCSB whether any additional evidence or argument needed to be presented before the adjudication of PCSB‘s permanent injunctive relief as requested in the COMPLAINT, noting that a decision on the request for a permanent injunction would necessarily subsume
[A]gree[d] that no further evidence is necessary to be taken for the Court for purposes of the injunctive relief, whether it‘s permanent, emergency, or preliminary in this particular aspect. And thinking about the permanent injunction, we don‘t believe that the Court needs any additional evidence. There‘s ample evidence in the record for the Court to enter a permanent injunction.
ECF No. 262, at 4.
When asked for her position, Lucas stated that:
[T]here‘s definitely not sufficient evidence, specifically when you‘re looking at the fact that we have yet to receive all of the invoices, unredacted, to see exactly what is going on regarding the injunctive relief request, and who‘s involved in it.
Id. at 4-5. She also stated that:
[T]here is a pending due process proceeding that was interrupted by this proceeding — by the emergency filing by Powhatan in which the hearing officer had already determined the issue to be litigated. And so none of that has been addressed.
Id. at 5.
PCSB responded to Lucas’ statements by pointing out that:
[T]he invoices [do not] have anything to do with the injunctive relief. And [the attorneys’ fees] issue the Court has already addressed as part of scheduling out the remainder of this case.
* * *
As per the injunctive relief, Mr. Skinger, per his settlement agreement, has agreed to sever ties with Dr. Lucas, and to not pursue due process complaints on behalf
of his child with Dr. Lucas. So, the matters that were previously stayed, I think should likely be dismissed, but I haven‘t confirmed that with Mr. Skinger himself. But, again, . . . I don‘t think the fact that those matters remain has anything to do with whether or not the Court can proceed with the permanent injunction against Dr. Lucas at this time.
Id. at 5-6.
Lucas was afforded the final opportunity to address this issue. She stated that:
[T]he invoices are key because as our forensic team was going through the information, we‘re finding that the school division did not make the decisions regarding [H.S.] The attorneys did. [Plaintiff‘s counsel] all billed for extra work related to the IEP development, discussed it with the superintendent. All of those invoices show the pattern of Sands Anderson engaging the school board‘s contracted duties. There were only four special licensed educators. So, when we say that they‘re not relevant, they‘re highly relevant because they identify who did what, when, and how.
Id. at 7-8.
PCSB is not entirely correct that the invoices for legal fees have nothing to do with the injunctive relief. That is because the fact that PCSB has incurred, and continues to incur, legal fees that cannot be recovered is a component of its claimed irreparable injury that is offered in support of PCSB‘s request for injunctive relief. However, the undisputed record is that PCSB has incurred significant legal fees because of Lucas’ practice of filing the follow-on due process complaints; and that, absent injunctive relief, PCSB will continue to incur such fees. Whatever, if any, facts that Lucas may find in reviewing the fee invoices
So, the reasons offered by Lucas for further proceedings respecting the request for permanent injunctive relief11 miss the mark. The review of the invoices for legal fees for discrepancies goes to the accuracy of the attorneys’ fees claimed by PCSB, not to whether significant fees have been incurred and will continue to mount absent an injunction. So the review of the fee invoices does not mean that the request for a permanent injunction is not ripe for decision.
Therefore, having considered all papers and arguments, the Court determined, on July 22, that the record was complete as it pertained to the permanent injunctive relief requested as to Lucas in the WHEREFORE paragraphs (a), (b), and (c) on page 11 of the COMPLAINT, as well as to the preliminary injunctive relief requested as to Lucas in the PI MOTION and the EMERGENCY MOTION. After again considering all of the evidence and argument received, the Court is satisfied that the testimonial and documentary record has been fully developed, and that the parties have been given sufficient time (through both oral argument and briefing) to
II. FINDINGS OF FACT
Based on the testimonial and documentary record, and having considered the oral arguments pertaining to the evidence, the Court finds that the following facts have been proven by a preponderance of the evidence.
H.S. is a student in the public schools of Powhatan County, Virginia. H.S. also is a child who is covered by the IDEA and who is entitled to the educational benefits that it provides and to have her education directed pursuant to an IEP. Skinger is H.S.‘s father.
Lucas holds herself out, and has also represented to the Court and to Skinger, that she is an IDEA special advocate licensed and certified by the Commonwealth of Virginia. But that is not true because Virginia neither licenses nor certifies IDEA special advocates. Powhatan Cnty. Sch. Bd. v. Skinger, No. 3:24-cv-874, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 147778, at *6 (E.D. Va. July 31, 2025) (ECF No. 246). However, Lucas does possess degrees and training in education. Specifically, she possesses a Doctor of Philosophy in Education (a Ph.D.) with a concentration in education law from Liberty University and she has certifications from the Virginia Department of Health Profession‘s Board of Counseling, including
In April 2024, Lucas undertook to be a special advocate in the IEP process for H.S. The record does not reflect Skinger‘s contractual arrangements, if any, with Lucas. But, it does show that, beginning in April 2024, Lucas has been serving as a special advocate who, with Skinger, has interacted with PCSB officials about an IEP for H.S. ECF No. 77-1, ¶ 4. The record also shows that PCSB proposed an IEP for H.S. that, as is one of the IDEA‘s principal objectives, has her attending public school, while Skinger and Lucas have taken the view that H.S. must be schooled at home. The record of the due process hearings shows that Skinger and Lucas offered some evidence to support that view. But, that record also shows that PCSB offered evidence to support its view. That difference of views has precipitated the filing of some eighteen due process complaints by Lucas acting on behalf of Skinger and H.S. Those actions, in turn, spawned this action.
To challenge PCSB‘s IEP, Skinger and Lucas first filed a due process complaint on April 8, 2024. Like all of the due process complaints, the core issue was the homeschool/in-school issue, and the operative facts centered on that issue. On May 3, 10, and 16, Lucas, on behalf of Skinger, filed three more due process complaints. Those focused on the same issue but contained some additional evidence thought by Lucas to relate to the
As provided under the IDEA and Virginia law, a hearing officer was assigned. The hearing officer (“HO1“) consolidated all four due process complaints because they “involved the same parties, the issues arose out of the same operative facts, and the witnesses are the same.” ECF No. 77-1, ¶ 9 (internal quotation marks omitted). The due process hearing took place from June 18-21, 2024, and HO1 issued a decision on July 17, 2024 (amended July 31, 2024) resolving all issues in favor of PCSB. ECF No. 77-1, ¶¶ 9-11; ECF No. 27. That decision was not appealed and thus is final.
However, while those four due process complaints were pending before HO1, Lucas, on behalf of Skinger, filed another due process complaint on May 22, 2024. ECF No. 29. It was assigned to another hearing officer (“HO2“) who, on June 10, 2024, issued a decision dismissing the complaint, finding that it presented issues already pending before HO1 that, although “not identical,” were “intrinsically related to said issues.” ECF No. 77-1, ¶¶ 13-14 (internal quotation marks omitted); ECF No. 30. The dismissal of that due process complaint was not appealed and thus it is final.
There followed more due process complaints in 2024, on August 5 and 8, September 17, October 7, and December 3, and, in 2025, on February 10 and 27, March 20 (two complaints), 21, and 24 (two complaints), ECF No. 77-1, ¶¶ 6, 15-33; ECF Nos. 31, 33, 35, 38,
On this point, it is well to recall that, as required by state law, PCSB filed, in the Powhatan Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court, a child in need of services petition (“CHINS“) to address H.S.‘s chronic absence from school. According to the record, the chronic absence occurred on Lucas’ advice that H.S. should not attend school unless she was allowed to be schooled at home. See ECF No. 77-1, ¶ 39. On January 21, 2025, a state court judge resolved the CHINS petition and issued an order directing H.S. to return to school “all day, every day, for full academic schedule, without any unexcused absences.” ECF No. 13, at 3. That order was part of the record considered by the hearing officers who decided due process complaints after the state court issued it on January 21, 2025.
Significantly, the hearing officers have continued to
conclude that the follow-on due process complaints are based on the same set of operative facts and barred by the doctrine of res judicata.13 Typical of these findings is the decision resolving the August 5 and 8, 2024, due process complaints, finding that the complaints arose “from the same nucleus of operative facts involving the same parties” and that all “22 issues listed is barred by res judicata” (as to the August 5 complaint), ECF No. 32, at 1, 9, and, as to the August 8 complaint, finding that the “doctrine of res judicata bars all of the Parent‘s allegations . . . [because] [the] issues were either litigated or could have been addressed in the five due process hearing requests filed . . . between April 8, 2024 and May 22, 2024.” ECF No. 77-1. ¶¶ 17-18; ECF No. 34, at 9.The same fate was visited by the hearing officers on the other due process complaints that have thus far been decided. Every one was resolved against Skinger and Lucas and in favor of PCSB. Not one was appealed. ECF No. 77-1, ¶¶ 15-40; ECF Nos. 32, 34, 36, 38, 41.
And, so it came to pass that PCSB filed the COMPLAINT in this action. But, as explained above, that did nothing to stop the onslaught of due process complaints, filed by Lucas on behalf of
Lucas’ strategy to inundate PCSB with repetitive, vexatious due process complaints is not a new one. For example, in Henrico Cnty. Sch. Bd. v. Matthews, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 171735 (E.D. Va. 2019), supra, the Court found that Lucas was engaged in a “scorched earth” practice of bringing endless, meritless, and repetitive due process complaints in an effort to cause Henrico County to incur such great expense that it would just capitulate to her IEP demands, without regard to the merits of the due process complaints and in complete disregard of administrative hearing officers’ repeated dismissals of the due process complaints for lack of merit or repetition. Matthews, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 171735, at *23-25. In fact, Lucas, as to the Matthews’ due process complaints, actually declared to a reporter from the Richmond Times Dispatch that:
It was intentional to start filing due process [complaint] after due process [complaint] to show the financial impact we could have if the school division didn‘t address these issues.
* * *
We wanted to send a strong message to the school division: “If you don‘t listen to us, we will start costing you money.” I think we got that message across.
Id. at *25 (emphasis added). Her admitted strategy was then clear: Overwhelm the school system with repetitive claims until it relents or is forced to incur significant legal fees to respond to the
We will continue to file one due process complaint for each day that PCPS, Sands Anderson, and the Hearing Officers are permitted to obstruct VIRGINIA FOIA, as amended; [sic] in violation of their own ethical codes to uphold state law . . . .
ECF No. 82-1, at 1.14 In fact, beginning last year, this action and two other civil actions have been filed against Lucas in this Court alleging that, in those three cases, Lucas continues to engage in the same scorched earth practice that she was found to have engaged in against Henrico County in the Matthews decision.
First came Powhatan Cnty. Sch. Bd. v. Halvorsen, No. 3:24-cv-216, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 150086 (E.D. Va. Aug. 21, 2024), supra, in which Lucas filed ten due process complaints against PCSB on behalf of the student, A.H. Hearing officers dismissed each for lack of merit and/or repetitiveness. Powhatan Cnty. Sch. Bd. v. Halvorsen, No. 3:24-cv-216, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 150086, at *2-7 (E.D. Va. Aug. 21, 2024). Eventually, the Halvorsens reached a settlement with PCSB, which, inter alia, severed the special-advocate relationship with Lucas and left Lucas as the sole defendant in
Notwithstanding that injunction and the fact that the Halvorsens severed their professional relationship with Lucas, she continues to try to advocate on behalf of the Halvorsens. E.g., ECF No. 204-3, at 3, 5; 204-5, at 7;15 see also ECF No. 210, at 3-4 (describing filings made by Lucas in the Court of Appeals of Virginia on behalf of the Halvorsens). That conduct is probative of Lucas’ disinclination to abide by Court orders, a factor to be
Then came the second case—this one—which also seeks to stop Lucas’ scorched earth practice against PCSB. Lucas has been sanctioned three times in this case: (1) for $3,000.00 after making material misrepresentations during a hearing, ECF No. 158;16 (2) for $3,000.00 after practicing law without a license; and (3) for $3,000.00 after violating the Matthews permanent injunction by participating before this Court on behalf of Skinger as an
In emails sent to the Court, Lucas has indicated that she has continued to file administrative due process complaints on behalf
The third case brought against Lucas is Goochland Cnty. Sch. Bd. v. Sims, No. 3:25-cv-238 (E.D. Va. Mar. 26, 2025). In Sims, the Goochland County School Board (“GCSB“) filed a Complaint, id. (ECF No. 1), alleging that Lucas and her co-Defendant Cheryl Sims (“Sims“) have continued Lucas’ strategy of filing frivolous, repetitive, and vexatious due process complaints against GCSB on behalf of Sims’ grandchildren. At the time of the filing of the complaint in Sims, a total of seven (7) due process complaints had been filed on behalf of one of Sims’ grandchildren, Ca.G., and a total of nine (9) due process complaints had been filed on behalf of Sims’ second grandchild, Cr.G. Id. at 2. When the Complaint in Sims was filed, all but the most recent due
In Sims, GCSB seeks the same relief against Lucas as PCSB seeks against her in this case, namely, a permanent injunction against Lucas from participating as an
After Sims and Lucas failed to respond to the complaint, the Clerk granted GCSB‘s request to enter default against both Sims and Lucas. Id. (ECF Nos. 28 (Sims), 29 (Lucas)). Default judgment was subsequently entered against Sims, which resulted in an award of approximately $14,000.00 in attorneys’ fees against her. Id. (ECF No. 52). Lucas contested the entry of default as to her, and so, the request for default judgment against her is pending. (ECF No. 30).
During the April Evidentiary Hearing in this case, Lucas called Sims as a witness. Lucas asked Sims whether she had any intention to stop filing due process complaints against GCSB until she got what she wanted from the school, even though over a dozen due process complaints submitted on behalf of her grandchildren had already been denied as meritless and/or repetitive. Sims
The record in this case, thus, teaches that, as in Matthews, Lucas continues to employ in the
Lucas’ refusal to cease that practice, as found in Matthews, and to which Lucas has admitted in this case, was the basis of imposing in Halvorsen a permanent injunction prohibiting Lucas from acting as an
III. THE LEGAL STANDARD
A permanent injunction may be awarded only if PCSB proves that:
(1) [PCSB] has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for the injury; (3) considering the balance of the hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction.
eBay v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391, 126 S. Ct. 1837, 14 L. Ed. 2d 641 (2006). Here, the record conclusively establishes that PCSB, having satisfied the eBay factors, is entitled to the permanent injunctive relief described below.
IV. ANALYSIS
The analysis begins by recalling that PCSB‘s COMPLAINT presents three requests for injunctive relief. Specifically, in its WHEREFORE section, paragraphs (a), (b), and (c), the COMPLAINT asks the Court to:
(a) Enter a pre-filing injunction against Lucas barring her from pursuing any further due process hearings concerning any Powhatan County student without first obtaining leave of this Court;
(b) In the alternative, enter a pre-filing injunction against Lucas barring her from pursuing any further due process hearings concerning H.S. without first obtaining leave of this Court;
(c) Enter an injunction staying the currently pending tenth due process hearing request pending further order of this Court.
ECF No. 1, at 11, WHEREFORE ¶¶ (a)-(c). Also, there is pending the PI MOTION, ECF No. 12, which seeks an order preliminarily enjoining Lucas from continuing to pursue due process complaint number eleven at the administrative level against PCSB, ECF No. 12, and the EMERGENCY MOTION, ECF No. 14, which seeks an order preliminarily enjoining Lucas from continuing to pursue due process complaint numbers fourteen through seventeen at the administrative level against PCSB, ECF No. 14.
A. COUNT I, WHEREFORE ¶ (a)
In COUNT I, WHEREFORE ¶ (a), PCSB seeks a permanent pre-filing injunction prohibiting Lucas “from pursuing any further due process hearings concerning any Powhatan County student without first obtaining leave of this Court.” ECF No. 1, at 11, WHEREFORE ¶ (a). In effect, such an injunction would prohibit Lucas from acting as an
When the COMPLAINT was filed, Lucas, acting on behalf of Skinger, had filed ten due process complaints against PCSB on behalf of H.S. The record demonstrates that those due process complaints were based on the same set of operative facts insofar as they related to issues cognizable under the
After the COMPLAINT was filed, Lucas, on behalf of H.S., filed at least eight more due process complaints against PCSB. ECF Nos. 42-48.21 In the ORDER temporarily staying the adjudication of those newly-filed due process complaints, the Court found that each new due process complaint was also likely to be dismissed for the same
The record further demonstrates that Lucas, and the parents that she advises, never filed an administrative appeal, as permitted by the
While filing a new due process complaint is permissible under the
And, this practice is in pursuit of an insidious purpose: To force school boards, like PCSB, to expend their limited time, money, and human resources to address and defend against the claims in never-ending due process complaints or, as Lucas sees it, to cave to her demands—even though her demands have been dismissed as repetitive and meritless time and time again. See Matthews, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 171735, at *23-25. That, quite simply, is a gross misuse of the
What happens to the children whom Lucas purports to represent during all of this frivolous, vexatious filing? The record shows that Lucas usually advises the parents to hold the child out of school until the school board caves in to her demands. In this case, H.S. was held out of school for almost a year, from February 5, 2024, to January 27, 2025, ECF No. 77, at 3 n.2; see ECF No. 77-1, ¶ 39, and so, she accumulated dozens of absences, resulting in the failure of many of her courses and her being retained in the sixth grade for the following school year rather than being promoted to the seventh grade. ECF No. 87.22 In sum, the children
The record shows that Lucas has practiced that strategy in Powhatan County.23 For example, not only has Lucas brought the eighteen due process complaints on behalf of H.S., but also she has brought almost a dozen due process complaints against PCSB on behalf of A.H. Halvorsen, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 150086, at *2-7. As part of the Default Judgment ORDER in Halvorsen, the Court found that all eBay factors were satisfied, and, as it relates to the first and second factor, that:
PCSB has incurred significant fees and costs to defend against all of the [due process complaints] that Lucas has filed [on behalf of A.H.] Attending to those requests imposes significant hardship on school officials, administrators, and staff who must devote their time and resources to address those [due process complaints]
rather than attending to students’ needs. This has taken a toll on the mental and emotional health and physical performance of educators and staff members at PCSB‘s schools; * * *
The mental, emotional, and physical toll exerted on PCSB‘s teachers, administrators, and staff members as well as the concomitant harm that students experience due to diminished care, attention, and instruction cannot be remediated by legal remedies. Furthermore, in other cases before the Court, it has been demonstrated that Lucas is likely judgment proof because of her unwillingness or inability to pay monetary debts, even under court order. Powhatan Cnty. Sch. Bd. v. Skinger, No. 3:24-cv-874.
Halvorsen, supra, (ECF No. 55, at 3-4). The Court found that these findings were sufficient to impose a permanent injunction against Lucas from acting as an
Relatedly, the record in this case contains evidence that Lucas continues to attempt to be a special advocate for A.H., notwithstanding the Default Judgment entered against Lucas in Halvorsen, which prohibits such conduct, and the settlement reached between PCSB and the Halvorsens that requires the severance of Lucas’ and the Halvorsens’ special-advocate relationship. For example, in many, if not most, of the papers that Lucas files in this case, she provides arguments that seek relief from, contests rulings in, or makes other statements about the rulings in Halvorsen, all in an effort to continue to represent A.H. E.g.,
Lucas’ conduct in Matthews and Halvorsen teaches that she is continuing to act as a special advocate in cases that are pending before this Court even when she has been told not to by the Court and by former clients themselves. That is further illustrated by the fact that, in this case, Lucas has even filed a motion attempting to void the settlement agreement entered into between Skinger and PCSB. ECF No. 215.24 Lastly, Lucas actually advised in open court at the April Evidentiary Hearing that she, like her co-defendant in Sims, would not stop filing due process complaints against school boards, including PCSB, until her demands are met.
Taken together, this evidence demonstrates that Lucas has every intention to continue to employ against PCSB the scorched earth strategy that she employed in Matthews and Halvorsen, and that she is currently employing in Sims and this case, until she is ordered to stop that practice by an injunction, the disobedience of which can be enforced with civil and criminal penalties.
There is evidence that PCSB has incurred significant fees and costs associated with defending against all of [Lucas‘] repeated [due process complaints]. There is evidence that attending to those requests takes significant time and resources from school officials. Those individuals must divert their energy and resources away from educating and providing for students, and, instead, toward dealing with the repetitive requests and complaints against them. Unsurprisingly, this also takes a toll on the mental health and physical performance of educators and staff members at PCSB‘s schools.
ECF No. 104, at 14.
Here, as in Halvorsen, the record proves that PCSB has sustained significant, irreparable injury in the form of: (1) unrecoverable legal fees to defend against the serial attacks mounted by Lucas in this case; (2) having to divert the limited fiscal and human
PCSB has filed initial documentation that substantiates the significant (almost $195,000.00) attorneys’ fees that it already has incurred in defending against the due process complaints that Lucas has filed so far on behalf of Skinger and H.S. See ECF Nos.
So, although the attorneys’ fee amount is quantifiable, there is no adequate legal remedy because an award of attorneys’ fees that would remedy the financial harm already experienced by PCSB is not collectable. It is settled that an uncollectable award of money damages is not an adequate remedy at law. Multi-Channel TV Cable Co. v. Charlottesville Quality Cable Operating Co., 22 F.3d 546, 551-52 (4th Cir. 1994); BMO Harris Bank, N.A. v. S & F Logistics, LLC, No. 3:20-cv-574, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43226, at *23-24 (E.D. Va. Mar. 10, 2022).
Further, even if Lucas could ameliorate the financial hardship that she has caused to PCSB (she cannot), as has already been found in a previous ORDER:
damages will not adequately compensate for the mental and physical toll exerted on teachers, staff members, and administrators at [PCSB‘s] schools. Nor will damages adequately compensate for the resulting reduction of teacher capacity to serve other special needs students who suffer from having school officials who are less attentive and available to respond to their needs. And, there is evidence that Lucas is abusive to the school officials.
ECF No. 104, at 14. These very real, intangible harms can in no way be remedied by an award of damages or fees. The record shows that PCSB officials and employees have already diverted “significant time and resources” and “energy . . . away from educating and providing for [other] students [in need of
Lucas’ vexatious and harassing conduct is not confined to the filing of repetitive, meritless due process complaints. That is because Lucas’ special advocacy is punctuated with mean and baseless allegations of improper, unlawful conduct. Specifically, Lucas freely accuses any school employee who does not agree with her about the contents of an IEP of being racist and of committing criminal conduct such as fraud, of being abusive, and of lying. Her vitriol is not confined to the School Board or its employees. As explained above, Lucas circulated, on a state-wide basis, vitriolic criticism about a hearing officer (who had rejected Lucas’ views about an IEP) that was so intense that the hearing officer recused herself from that case and declined to accept assignment to any case in which Lucas was involved. ECF No. 91-2, at 2, 4-5.
Nor is Lucas’ defamatory conduct reserved for PCSB. For example, Lucas has “repeatedly harassed [Goochland County School Board] staff, threatening their licenses and livelihood and making repeated baseless allegations of child abuse” against them. ECF No. 77-2, at 3-4. So defamatory was Lucas’ public abuse of a school board employee of the Chesterfield County School system in an IEP matter that the employee was awarded $110,000 in damages ($65,000 in compensatory damages, and $45,000 in punitive damages) and costs 40
As another exemplar of how Lucas conducts herself as an
Sims was told at the outset of the meeting by the school officials that she was not allowed to record the meeting and so they asked her to stop recording. Sims represented to those officials that she had stopped filming; however, instead, she put her phone that was recording the meeting into her purse but left the recording to continue. At that point, no video of the meeting is available, but sound was still audible from the recording.
While Sims was streaming the meeting on her phone, Lucas was
The video, ECF No. 76, demonstrates how Lucas treats school officials with whom she must interact when engaging in her kind of special advocacy on behalf of the children whom she purports to represent; namely, by abusing, demeaning, insulting, interrupting, and belittling them. It also shows how Lucas’ disruptive actions make it next to impossible for real progress to be made in finalizing and effectuating IEPs for the children involved. And, it illustrates how Lucas can: (1) disrupt the normal functioning of schools and their employees; (2) waste the time of those officials; (3) divert resources away from the children who need them; and (4) demoralize school officials to the point of making
The exhibit also discloses a most disquieting aspect of the approach to the IEP process and the scorched earth practice practiced by Lucas. Specifically, the exhibit discloses that Sims, with the knowledge of Lucas, brought to the IEP meeting one of Sims’ grandchildren, Cr.G. Even before the meeting, the child was visibly upset and he cried loudly throughout the meeting. So loudly, in fact, that the meeting was utterly chaotic. When asked to remove the child so that the meeting could proceed, Sims refused, and told the school officials that “I want [Cr.G.] right in this room where he is, thank you. You traumatized him. You watch him and see the damage that you have caused.” Id. at 10:01-10. In other words, Sims, with Lucas’ knowledge and approval, used a disabled and distressed child as a pawn.
Lucas’ disruptive and abusive practices are not confined to IEP meetings with school staff. They extend into the record in this Court. For example, pleadings that Lucas has filed in this case accuse, without any support, PCSB, counsel for PCSB, and even the Court of racist, criminal, and unethical conduct in words that, as accurately described by one administrative hearing officer, are vitriolic. ECF No. 91-2, at 2. And, Lucas has pursued a scorched
For her part, Lucas does not really seek to defend the abusive conduct in the filing of repetitive due process complaints. To the contrary, she actually vows to continue it. And, her habit is to file papers peppered with conclusory statements followed (sometimes) by citations to purported legal authority. Much of this cited authority has been found to be nonexistent. Powhatan Cnty. Sch. Bd. v. Skinger, No. 3:24-cv-874, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104564, at *6-18 (E.D. Va. June 2, 2025) (holding that Lucas cited over forty nonexistent legal authorities across six filings and, as a result, striking from the record those filings) (ECF No. 170, at 5-20). None of it has been found pertinent to the issues and facts presented in this case. Id. And, in most instances, the filings contain ad hominin attacks of the ilk that has been previously described.
In sum, Lucas has offered no response to the COMPLAINT or to the eBay factors of irreparable injury or adequacy of legal remedy.
In the face of these irreparable harms, and considering that damages or other legal remedies will not ameliorate them, the first two eBay factors have been satisfied.
2. The Balance of the Hardships Warrants Equitable Relief
The third factor that PCSB must demonstrate is that, “considering the balance of the hardships between [PCSB] and [Lucas], a remedy in equity is warranted.” eBay, 547 U.S. at 391. That factor is also satisfied.
As explained, PCSB bears the entirety of the financial harm that comes with responding to, and defending against, Lucas’ meritless and repetitive due process complaints. Supra; ECF No. 104, at 15 (“This [harm] occurs by paying attorney‘s fees to address these actions as well as diverting the time and resources of teachers, administrators, and staff members to address the
Compared to the harm suffered by PCSB, Lucas will suffer very little harm, if any at all. Lucas is under no obligation to conduct herself and to engage in
Further, there is no evidence in the record that demonstrates that Lucas receives any sort of payment for her
For all of these reasons, the balance of equities tips decidedly in PCSB‘s favor and warrants equitable relief in the form of a permanent injunction.
Of course, an “injunction ‘must be narrowly tailored to fit the particular [factual] circumstances of the case‘” that necessitate the extraordinary equitable relief. In re Head, 174 Fed. App‘x 167, 168 (4th Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (unpublished) (quoting Brow v. Farrelly, 994 F.2d 1027, 1038 (3d Cir. 1993)). Here, the record shows that injunctive relief limited to the case of Lucas’ advocacy on behalf of one specific child (e.g., Halvorsen, supra) is of no effect in curbing the abuses in which Lucas engages or in redressing the harm that those abuses have had on PCSB. The only injunction that will protect PCSB is one that permanently enjoins Lucas from acting as a special advocate, including from filing any
3. The Public Interest Would Not Be Disserved by a Permanent Injunction
The fourth factor that PCSB must demonstrate is that “the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction.” eBay, 547 U.S. at 391. That factor has been met as well.
On April 11, 2025, the Court held that:
[I]t is in the public‘s interest that public school teachers, administrators, and staff members can devote their undivided attention to assisting their students and ensuring that they can provide every resource and opportunity for those students’ success . . . [W]ithout an injunction, those educators will continue to disadvantage PCSB students’ educational and professional development. This is true also for the student in this case, H.S., who continues to fall behind in her education as [Lucas] pursue[s her] serial filing tactics. Therefore, it is likely that a preliminary injunction would serve, rather than disserve, the public interest.
ECF No. 104, at 16. That statement remains as true today as it was four months ago, when the Court held that a temporary stay was warranted.
The record clearly reflects that Lucas’ strategy, and the manner in which she conducts it, wreaks havoc on PCSB‘s employees and officials and on the ability of PCSB to provide services under the
After carefully reviewing the record, and, for the foregoing reasons, it is evident that all four eBay factors have been
It is important to take a moment to explain to Lucas exactly what this permanent injunction does, particularly because Lucas oftentimes seems to misunderstand the boundaries of the Court‘s orders. In Matthews, the Court entered a permanent injunction prohibiting Lucas from “participating in any way, directly or indirectly, in any case filed in this Court” as an
So, the permanent injunction that the Court imposes against Lucas today permanently prohibits her from acting as a special advocate, directly and indirectly, and therefore, from filing or pursuing any
Finally, Lucas is admonished that failure to comply with this permanent injunction can result in both civil and criminal35
B. COUNT I (WHEREFORE ¶¶ (b) AND (c)), THE MOTION, AND THE EMERGENCY MOTION
The permanent injunctive relief that the Court imposes today necessarily subsumes PCSB‘s other requests for injunctive relief, rendering them moot.
Under the mootness doctrine, a claim becomes moot when “the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome,” United States v. Hardy, 545 F.3d 280, 283 (4th Cir. 2008) (quoting Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 496, 89 S. Ct. 1944, 23 L. Ed. 2d 491 (1969)) (internal quotation marks omitted), which occurs when “the claimant receives the relief [that] he or she sought to obtain through the claim.” Simmons v. United Mortg. & Loan Inv., LLC, 634 F.3d 754, 763 (4th Cir. 2011) (internal citation omitted). “Simply stated, a case is moot when the issues presented are no longer ‘live’ or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.” Powell, 395 U.S. at 496.
The injunctive relief granted to PCSB today renders moot the other requests for injunctive relief that remain pending. The relief requested in COUNT I, WHEREFORE ¶ (b) of the COMPLAINT seeks a permanent injunction against Lucas from acting as a special advocate, and from filing due process complaints, on behalf of Skinger and his daughter H.S. against PCSB. ECF No. 1, at 11, WHEREFORE ¶ (b). Because H.S. is a Powhatan County student, Lucas
The COMPLAINT also seeks injunctive relief against Lucas and Skinger under WHEREFORE (c), which seeks “an injunction staying the currently pending tenth due process hearing request pending further order of this Court.” Id. at 11, ¶ (c). As part of his settlement with PCSB, Skinger agreed to: (1) sever his professional relationship with Lucas as his special advocate; (2) sign a more recent IEP for H.S. that would replace the old IEP, which was the subject of due process complaint number ten; and (3) not pursue any due process complaints that pertain to “issues which purportedly occurred prior to May 19, 2025.” ECF No. 118-1, at 1-2. And, pursuant to the permanent injunctive relief entered today, Lucas can no longer act as a special advocate and pursue any pending due process complaint on behalf of any Powhatan County student, including H.S., which includes the adjudication of due process complaint number ten. Therefore, PCSB has received the relief that it sought in COUNT I WHEREFORE ¶ (c), ECF No. 1, at 11, ¶ (c). So, that claim for relief will be denied as moot.
The PI MOTION, ECF No. 12, seeks a preliminary injunction
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will grant COUNT I of the COMPLAINT in the WHEREFORE ¶ (a), ECF No. 1, at 11, WHEREFORE ¶ (a), and COUNT I in the WHEREFORE ¶¶ (b) and (c) of the COMPLAINT, ECF No. 1, at 11, WHEREFORE ¶¶ (b)-(c), will be denied as moot. The PI MOTION, ECF No. 12, and the EMERGENCY MOTION, ECF No. 14, will be denied as moot.
It is so ORDERED.
Richmond, Virginia
Date: August 29, 2025
/s/ REP
Robert E. Payne
Senior United States District Judge