62 Ky. 151 | Ky. Ct. App. | 1864
delivered the opimion op-the court:
The appellee having been found guilty of a forcible detain-er, traversed the inquisition, and on the trial of the traverse, the circuit eourt, at the instance of the appellee, quashed the warrant, and refused to permit the appellants to file an “amended petition and warrant” offered by them. The appellants seek, by this appeal, to reverse that judgment.
First. The warrant was fatally defective in several particulars. It charges, in substance, that the defendant “ did, in the year 1859 and 1860, forcibly detain one house and field on the waters of the little South Fork in the .county .aforesaid, which
But, in the second place, a forcible detainer is defined to be “ the refusal of a tenant to surrender to his landlord the land or tenements demised, after the expiration of his term; or, of a tenant at will, after the determination of the will of the landlord.” (Civil Code, sec. 500.). To maintain a proceeding for a “forcible detainer,” it is, therefore, obviously essential that the relation of landlord and tenant should- be alleged, or in some, fortp appear on the face of the warrant.
On the trial of a traverse, it is expressly provided that nothing contained in the statute regulating the proceeding shall be construed to prevent the court “ from deciding any matter of law properly brought before'them asín other cases.” (Code, sec. 573.) The court, therefore, had the power to quash the warrant at any stage of the trial; and from what has been said, it is clear that the power was properly exercised in this-case.
Second. Nor did the court err in refusing to allow the filing of the “ amended petition and warrant,” as it is styled. Without deciding whether a warrant in forcible entry and detainer is amendable at all — especially after a traverse to the circuit court — we deem it sufficient to say, that the amendment offered was not only defective in failing to show that the relation of landlord and tenant existed between the parties, but it presented an entirely new case by introducing a number of new parties plaintiff. This cannot be allowed. In the case of Burbage vs. Squires (3 Met. Ky. Rep., 79), it was held that,, although, upon an appeal, the case is to be tried anew, as if no previous judgment had been rendered* yet it must be the-
It is admitted that this class of proceedings should always be reviewed with great liberality. Errors which are merely formal or technical should be disregarded. But there is a point beyond which the toleration of irregularities and errors cannot be extended, and we are satisfied that that point was reached in the present case.
The judgment is therefore affirmed.