| Mass. | Jan 6, 1909
This is an appeal by the defendant from an order of the Superior Court that judgment be entered for the plaintiff. The appeal is founded upon the fact that an application for a rehearing, on account of a supposed error in law in the decision of the case by the full court, had been sent to the Chief Justice, and the receipt of it had been acknowledged, with a statement that it would be considered by the justices at their next meeting for consultation. The application was sent in July, and the next meeting of the justices was to be on the first Tuesday of September.
The defendant seemingly misapprehends the standing of a case after a final decision of it by the full court upon questions of law. On this subject Chief Justice Gray said, in the opinion in Winchester v. Winchester, 121 Mass. 127" court="Mass." date_filed="1876-10-21" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/winchester-v-winchester-6418653?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="6418653">121 Mass. 127, 129, “ The practice of that court [the English Court of Chancery] affords no rule to govern a court of last appeal, whose judgments have the strongest presumption in their favor, and cannot be freely reconsidered
“After final judgment in the House of Lords, or in the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, no rehearing is allowed, unless for the purpose of correcting mistakes in the form of the decree. ... In the Supreme Court of the United States, no rehearing of a case once decided is granted, nor even an argument permitted upon the question whether a rehearing should be had, unless the court, upon inspection of the petition for a rehearing, sees fit so to order. . . . And this court, for some years past, has conformed to that practice, as essential to the discharge of its increasing business.” He supports his statements as to the practice in England and in the Supreme Court of the United States by numerous citations. A similar practice prevails generally in the courts of- last resort in the States of this country, although there are two or three, and possibly more, in which applications for a rehearing of questions of law are entertained and arguments heard upon them. The application in Winchester v. Winchester, ubi supra, was on the ground that a decree had been entered erroneously as by consent of the parties, when in fact there was no consent. The court received the application without hearing argument upon it, and announced a decision refusing a rehearing. In cases of applications for a rehearing on the ground of a supposed error of the full court, it has been the practice, for many years, not to treat them as having any standing as a part of the legal procedure in the case. They are not recognized by our statutes. They cannot be made as a matter of right, and they are not entered upon the records of the court unless the justices, in their discretion, think'they ought to be.
Of course there is a possibility of error in a decision by the most learned and painstaking court in the world. The justices of the Supreme Court of the United States, and of other distinguished tribunals, are often nearly evenly divided in opinion upon a difficult question of law. But when a decision is made, after a court’s best efforts to reach a correct conclusion, it ought not to be open to revision merely because it seems to the defeated party to be wrong. On the other hand, if by any accident, oversight or inadvertence a wrong conclusion should be reached in any case, the judges who made the decision presum
Judgment affirmed.