117 Tenn. 363 | Tenn. | 1906
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The plaintiff in error was indicted in the circuit court of McMinn county for the murder of one Elbert Watten-barger, was convicted of murder in the first degree, and ivas sentenced to confinement in the State penitentiary
The plaintiff in error at the time of the homicide was a hoy of between fifteen and sixteen years of age and attended the school oyer which Mr. Wattenbarger presided. The afternoon before the homicide plaintiff in error and another student, Charlie Stanton, a little boy between twelve and thirteen years of age, had been engaged in throwing stones at each other, with the result that the latter was struck with a stone and knocked down. The father of the little boy complained the next morning to Mr. Wattenbarger, and after school was opened Mr. Wattenbarger called up Charlie Stanton and the plaintiff in error, and questioned them about the incident before referred to, and sought to make the boys promise that they would not throw stones any more. Charlie Stanton readily promised. The plaintiff in error, however, would only make a conditional promise. According to the testimony of the witnesses for the State, he said that it would depend upon circumstances whether he threw stones or not. According1 to the witnesses for the plaintiff in error, he said that it would depend upon circumstances1; if others did not throw stones at him, he would not at them. 1 The teacher, not being satisfied with this conditional promise, sat a moment with his head leaned upon his hands, as if in thought, and then stepped to the window and looked out, and returned to the platform where his seat was, and said to the plaintiff in error that he must whip him, and
We shall not discuss the evidence, or decide which view we think is supported by the weight of the testimony, further than to say that we do not think the evidence makes out a case of murder1 in the first degree.
Before passing to an assignment upon a question of law which we think presents a reversible error, we shall
It is said that the trial judge committed error in making the following statement to the jury in the course of his charge:
“There are a number of admitted facts in this record, to wit: That the tragedy occurred in McMinn county and prior to the finding of the indictment in this case, that deceased was at the time teaching school in this county at Tranquillity Schoolhouse, that defendant was a pupil in his school, and that the tragedy grew out of the teacher’s chastisement of the defendant as a pupil in his school.”
The trial judge in a criminal case should not state to the jury any fact as one proven, but should leave all of the facts to the jury. However, the facts stated were not controverted in the record, and we can see that no injury was done by the statement made, and for this reason the error was not reversible.
Objection is made to the instruction which the trial judge gave upon the subject of the right of a schoolmaster to chastise his pupils in a reasonable manner for insubordination, but .no ground is assigned in support of the objection, and no authority cited, and it is not pressed, but made merely pro forma. We need not, therefore, give it further consideration.
It is insisted the trial judge erred in charging the jury as follows:
*370 “Defendant has put his character in evidence, which he alone could do, and it may be looked to in judging of the defendant’s purpose and. intention at the time of the killing.”
The objection made is that the defendant’s chai*acter was a witness in his favor upon every issue in the case, and that the trial judge should not have limited its effect “to his purpose and intention at the time of the killing.”
In Roman v. State, 1 Shan. Tenn. Cas. 470, 472, it is said: “The defendant is always entitled to the benefit of his good character, and a jury may look to this, with the other evidence, to see if there is a reasonable doubt of his guilt.”
In 4 Elliott on Evidence, sec. 2721, it is said: “It is now well settled in most jurisdictions1, contrary to some of the older decisions, that evidence of good character is admissible and entitled to consideration on the question of guilt along with the other evidence, not only in doubtful cases, or cases in which the other evidence is of itself contradictory or unconvincing, but also' in all proper cases, no matter whether the other evidence, in and of itself, is apparently conclusive or inconclusive.”
In section 3039 of the same book it is said: “It is the general rule that the defendant’s good character or reputation for peace and quiet is admissible in his favor. But the evidence must be confined, in general, to the trait involved *in the crime charged, and it has been held that the defendant cannot show his good character
The charge of the circuit judge should have been broader upon the subject; but, in the absence of a special request, we do not think that his failure to give more liberal instructions upon this subject could be treated as reversible error. Phelan v. State, 114 Tenn., 488, 507, 88 S. W., 1040. The charge upon this subject was correct as far as it went.
It is next insisted that the charge of the circuit judge upon the subject of dying declarations was too meager. He said on this subject: “Dying declarations made by the deceased in this case have the same weight and sanctity as evidence testified to under oath.” He gave this instruction in answer to a general request upon the part of counsel to charge upon the subject, but no special request was made to the court formulating the instruction desired. We are of opinion that, in the absence of such special request, there could be no reversal on the meagerness of the charge upon this subject. There was, indeed, no question as to the fact that deceased was fully aware of his impending death, or of the good character of the deceased. There was some slight contradiction in the testimony of several witnesses who were
It is'insisted that the circuit judge erred in not charging upon the law applicable to involuntary manslaughter, assault and battery, and simple assault. There was no error in this respect. There was no evidence that would have justified such a charge. It is true that the general rule is that the trial judge must charge upon every offense embraced within the indictment; but there is another rule to the effect that there will be no reversal for his failure to do SO', when this court can see that the prisoner suffered no injury by reason of such omission. Good v. State, 1 Lea, 293; State v. Hargrove, 13 Lea, 178, 184; State v. Parker, 13 Lea, 221; Tarvers v. State, 90 Tenn., 485, 16 S. W., 1041.
On the trial in the court below Steve Bales, a witness for the State, testified on cross-examination to the good character of the plaintiff in error. On re-examination the Avitness was permitted to state, over the objection of plaintiff in error, that since the occurrence at the schoolhouse, the homicide of Wattenbarger, he had “heard reports that the Powers boy had run his stepfather away from home with a knife, and had threatened to kill another school-teacher, and had lain in Avait for
This testimony, while belonging to a class of evidence which would be competent in general as against the defendant’s character for peace and quietness and good order, offered by him in aid of his defense to the charge contained in .the indictment, yet was not competent in the present case, because the matter testified to came to the knowledge of the witnesses after the commission of the homicide Avhich was the subject of investigation. The reputation which a defendant has made upon the subject of quietness and good citizenship available for or against him in a criminal cause when he puts his character in issue is that which he bore at and before the taking place of the act for which he is upon trial, not a reputation subsequently acquired or created for or against him.- A different view would put a. premium on the manufacturing of evidence. Lea v. State, 94
Was the evidence competent for the purpose of impeaching plaintiff in error in his capacity of witness?
When the prisoner in a criminal case has put his character in issue as an aid to his defense, and has also testified in his own behalf, and has thus subjected himself to the rules which apply in the impeachment of witnesses and those which apply in protecting them from such attack, and the particular evidence offered is for any reason incompetent in the first aspect, a very perplexing question is presented, especially in jurisdictions such as our own, where the inquiry as to a witness’ reputation is not confined to truth and veracity merely, but ranges over his whole moral character. Gilliam v. State, 1 Head, 38, 73 Am. Dec., 161.
A recent case decided by the supreme court of Missouri, State v. Beckner, 91 S. W., 892, 3 L. R. A. (N. S.), 535, sheds light upon the question. In that case in the trial court the attorney for the State asked the following question: “Do you know the general reputation of the defendant for peace and quietness, or turbulence or violence, in the neighborhood where he lives?” The prisoner had not put his character in issue, but the State insisted that the evidence was competent, because he had testified as a witness in his own behalf, and, having done so, that he occupied the position of any other witness, and was subject to be cross-examined as to
“The difficulty arising out of the fofegoing rules, when a statute like ours permits a defendant in a criminal
“In Lockard v. Com., 87 Ky., 201, 8 S. W., 266, under a statute very similar to ours on this subject, the defendant testified in his own behalf, but offered no evidence as to his character. The commonwealth then introduced several witnesses, who were, over the appellant’s objection, permitted to testify that, while they knew nothing of defendant’s character for truthfulness, yet his general moral character was bad. In Kentucky, as in this State, it had been decided at an early day that evidence of the general moral character of a witness was admissible upon the ground, as Avas said in the case of Tacket v. May, 3 Dana, 80, that a witness Avhose moral character is bad is not as credible as one whose moral character is good. Holt, J., speaking for the whole court, discussed the effect of the statute, in view of the settled rule of decision in that State that the general bad character of any witness might be shown to impeach him.' T-Ie met the objection, urged by many laAV Avriters and many able judges, that impeachment of the general moral character of a defendant as a witness would affect him as a defendant, and would violate the rule that until he put his character in issue the State could not assail it, and said, ‘When, however, the defendant becomes a witness, he voluntarily assumes another character,’ and reached the conclusion that public policy and individual
“Among many other cases the court expressly considered State v. Clinton, supra. In Alabama, as in this State, the rule of decision has long been that a witness might be impeached by assailing his general moral character, and, when a defendant offers himself as a witness, he is subject to impeachment by assailing his general moral character; but it is held by the supreme court of that State in Clarke v. State, 78 Ala., 474, 56 Am. Rep., 45, that, when it was said that his general moral character could be impeached, only so much of his moral character as reflected on his credibility as a witness was open to assault by the State in the first instance; and in Dolan v. State, 81 Ala., loc. cit. 19, 1 South, 713, after citing Clarke v. State, as showing that only so much of his moral character as reflected on his credibility as a witness was open to assault by the State in the first instance, it is said: £A character for violence or turbulence sheds no light upon the credibility of a witness, and such testimony was not admissible, unless the de
We have seen that for the reason previously given the testimony referred to was incompetent as evidence