157 Iowa 347 | Iowa | 1912
— The defendant’s railroad track intersects the main street of the town of Liscomb at about right angles; its depot being on the north side of the street and west of its line of railway where they intersect. The plaintiff was driving west on Main street, and was struck on this crossing by a freight train coming from the south. One of the grounds of negligence alleged was that defendant was running its train at a rate of speed prohibited by an ordinance of the town, and at an unreasonable and dangerous rate of speed. The ordinance in question made it unlawful to run a train within the town at a greater rate of speed than eight miles per hour.
_ i. Evidence: # competency5115 of witness. The defendant objected to the testimony of witnesses as to the speed of the train immediately before it struck the plaintiff, and now insists that such tes- * 7 fhnony was incompetent, because sufficient foundation therefor had not been laid. The witnesses examined on this question showed that they
Objection was also made to Sweet’s testimony that the ordinance was signed by the mayor during his term of office in 1903, and to his testimony that the ordinance was published by posting notices. Objection was also made to the ordinance itself. All of this testimony, and the ordidance itself, was in our judgment competent. It was clearly competent to show by parol that the ordinance was properly signed by the mayor, and that the ordinance was published in accordance with the requirements of the statute. City of Des Moines v. Casady, 21 Iowa, 572; Larkin v. Railway Co., 85 Iowa, 502, and Id., 91 Iowa, 655; Bayard v. Baker, 76 Iowa, 220.
Tor the reasons pointed out, the court should have directed a verdict for the defendant. The case is therefore —Reversed.