146 Mo. App. 36 | Mo. Ct. App. | 1909
(after stating the facts).— There are two questions in this case of importance, upon which its decision must turn. The first one is as to the sufficiency of the account filed in so far as setting out dates of the furnishing of the material and doing the work. As noted in the above statement, the only dates in the lien notice, which embraced the account, are February 28, 1904, as the date when the first item of labor and material was furnished, and the 20th day of December, 1904, as the date upon which the last item thereof was furnished. It will be remembered that the deed of trust was of date of March 7, 1904, so that it was given subsequent to the date when a right to the lien arose, and as the last item was furnished December 20th and the lien claim filed February 21, 1905, it was filed within the four months’ limit prescribed for the sub contractor. It is argued by counsel for the defendant, The Trust Company of St. Louis County — and when we use the term “defendant,” we refer to that company alone, as it is the only one of the defendants who appealed — that as the plaintiff was a subcontractor, he had but four months from the time of the last item was furnished or work done under the original contract and four months on any items outside of the original contract. Counsel then argue that counting back they find that October 21, 1904, is the crucial date and that unless the last item on both the original contract and on the account for' extras was furnished within those dates, there is no lien for that furnished on the original contract before October 21, 1904, if the last item under that contract was of date prior to October 21st, and that while the lien paper contains an averment that the last item of the whole account was furnished December 20th, it does not specify whether that item arose out of the original contract or on one or more of the four
In Ittner v. Hughes, 133 Mo. 679, the account under consideration and which is set out with the accompanying statement in the notice at page 684, is in the exact condition of the account before us, with the exception that the account in the- Ittner case credits the cash in a lump sum without any dates whatever on which the payments were made, and the only dates in the lien notice are in the account found in the statement following the account, that “all of which work was done, and materials furnished between August 20, 1892, and March 1, 1893, the last thereof being done March 1, 1893.” At page 691, the court, Judge Barclay delivering the opinion, held that the objection to the account for lack of dates to the various items was not tenable. “The statement shows that the labor and materials were furnished between given dates, and that is a sufficient dating for the purposes of the lien account. . . ” A number of decisions are cited in support of this proposition. Later, in the case of Mitchell Planing Mill Co. v. Allison, 138 Mo. 50, Judge Barclay again speaking for the court, held that an account is sufficiently specific, when it shows that the items of material were supplied between named dates, and that where the date of filing the lien was given, it was fairly to be inferred, when the dates between which the items had been furnished had also been given, and these dates brought the filing of the lien notice within the statutory period, that that was sufficient. These decisions settled this proposition against the contention of the appellant.
The more important propositions involved in the case is as to the description of the lots, as contained in the lien notice and as set out in the petition upon which the case was tried. Section 4203 of our Statutes of 1899 gives a mechanic or materialman a lien upon the building, erection or improvements, “and upon the
In the Mitchell Planing Mill case, before referred to, Judge Barclay has said that this lien claim is not in itself a pleading under our law. All that is necessary therein is a substantial compliance with the statutory requirements. “The law intended to extend its benefits to laborers and all sorts of mechanics and materialmen who come within its protecting language. Of such it would be unreasonable to expect such an accurate and careful statement of account as might be required of an attorney in bringing an action. ... If the claim comes into court, it is then time enough to require all the particulars that may be necessary to maintain or defend the action.” That decision was rendered in 1896, hardly far enough back to be called an older decision, and in a very recent one, which we have before cited, Sawyer & Austin Lumber Co. v. Clark, supra, decided in 1902, Judge Gantt approvingly refers to the fact that, “It has often been held that this statute should receive a liberal construction to effectuate its remedial purposes.” No more recent decision, that we know of, has changed this rule. So that the very learned counsel for defendant are inaccurate in their statement that this rule of liberal construction, .which they say was announced in the old cases, “if ever true in fact, that time has certainly gone by; it is certainly not true now.” Our investigation satisfies us that the older decisions were more technical than the later ones, and that the trend has long been toward liberality of construction.
In the Ittner case, before referred to, Judge Barclay holds that the petition in the case is subject to amendment as in other cases; that the plaintiff may withdraw a part of his claim for the lien, if by so doing he does not vitiate the effect of the demand on which he desires the court to proceed. If he can modify his demand, why not his description of the property, so long as the amended description keeps within the bounds included by the original description?
The principal case relied upon by counsel for defendant in support of their contention against a validity of the lien claim in describing an excess of one acre, is Ranson v. Sheehan, 78 Mo. 668. It is to be said of this that it has practically lost its force as a controlling decision by the criticisms to which it was subjected, first in the opinion of Judge Bond, in Sawyer & Austin Lumber Co. v. Clark, 82 Mo. App. 225, and next in that that criticism is concurred in by the Supreme Court, when the Sawyer-Austin case was taken there on a certificate of division from this court. The Supreme Court, in 172 Mo. 588; after setting out the opinion of Judge Bond in full, in unmistakable terms approved it, and while not
We are referred to other cases in which our courts have refused to sustain descriptions in lien notices for lack of sufficient certainty in the description of the land, but an examination of these cases will show that the uncertainty of description was of such a character as to fail to locate the property on which the lien was desired, either truly or so near as to identify the same. In brief, there was nothing to aid a description or locate the acre. Thus, to say that an acre is claimed “out of forty acres of the northwest quarter of the southeast quarter” of a given section is no description whatever. That is the case of Williams v. Porter, 51 Mo. 441, the description being “a two-story frame dwelling house” “on the northwest quarter of the southeast quarter of section 11.”
In Wright v. Beardsley, 69 Mo. 548, the description was a “house situated near the northeast corner of the northeast quarter of the southwest quarter,” of a certain section, township and range in Audrain county.
In Ranson v. Sheehan, before referred to, the description was of fifteen and one-half acres of land, and the claimant asked for a lien to the extent of one acre, but did not describe the acre, or its location in the tract, so that irrespective of anything else that was said in the Eanson-Sheehan case and for which it was criticised in the Sawyer-Austin case, the facts on which the precise point in decision there rest bear no analogy to the facts in the case at bar.
On the other hand, in Oster v. Rabeneau, 46 Mo. 595, it is distinctly announced as a rule of decision, that where the description is sufficient for the purpose of general identification and sufficient to enable the court,
In Hammond v. Darlington, 109 Mo. App. 333, which was for property in the city of St. Louis, but the property not divided into lots, and in which it was claimed that the lien was void by reason of a misdescription of the property, this court, through Judge Reyburn, held: “It has already been determined in proceedings of this nature, but it is not indispensable, that the description should be complete or precise, but it is sufficient that the description adopted points out and indicates the premises so that the land can be found and identified.”
Can it possibly be claimed that by this notice, or lien claim, even if it specified the whole of these lots, which as seem embrace about thirty-five hundreths in excess of one acre, anybody was misled? It gives the numbers of the lots and it gives, by name, the hotel constructed on it, “Hotel Epworth,” and locates it on these lots, and as in Rosedale Addition, an addition laid out in a known and designated survey of St. Louis county, even the block number of the subdivision is given. Whether .the plaintiff claimed more than the law gave him or whether he claimed in excess of what the lien law says he shall have, certainly cannot be held to have misled anybody or to have vitiated the lien. No matter how much he claimed, he could only secure a lien upon one acre and that the one acre upon which these buildings were situated. It is a curious anomaly in our law to note in this connection that inasmuch as this property" is in the county and not in an incorporated city, town or village, if the buildings had happened to extend over
Nor can it be possible that this defendant, the Trust Company or any one else, was in any way injured, surprised or misled by the assertion of this claim, or by the fact that the lots described included a fraction over an acre. It is averred in the petition that when the defendant’s agent, Mr. Skinker, bought in at the assignee’s sale, that he bought subject to the deed of trust and to mechanics’ liens. The deed of trust itself was made, executed and recorded after the work was commenced and the materials furnished for which this subcontractor plaintiff has made his claim. The whole world was bound to take notice of the date of commencement of construction of this work. The very deed of trust and the assignee’s deed to Mr. Skinker, as appears by the admissions in the pleadings, describes these
There remains the proposition as to the sufficiency of the evidence of the loss of the papers evidencing the bid and acceptance thereof under which the subcontractor did the work and furnished the materials in suit. It is to be remembered that this was a case which was tried before the court without a jury, and the same strictness and particularly in testing the correctness of the action of the judge in the admission and exclusion of testimony is not applied in cases determined by the court as in cases tried before a jury. It is to be presumed that even if a court admits some evidence that in a trial before a jury would not be relevant or competent or the best evidence, that the weight of that testimony is determined by a judge learned in the law and in the application of the law to the facts in evidence.
The proposition of defendant’s counsel, that the court erred in overruling the motion of defendant to require plaintiff to elect upon which of its causes of action it would proceed, and dismiss as to the other causes of action is untenable. There are not two causes of action here presented. This- action is on a claim of a lien for work and labor done and material furnished under one contract for the erection of the building, and the addition of items outside of the original contract, extras, in no manner split up the cause of action or required its division into separate counts.
We see no error of law in this case, either in the admission of evidence or in the conclusion arrived at by the trial court, to the manifest prejudice, harm and injury of the defendant. Our conclusion is that the* finding and judgment of the trial court is for the right party, is correct on the facts and on the law, and it is affirmed.