ELIZABETH POWELL v. WAL-MART STORES, INC.
No. 101662
Court of Appeals of Ohio, EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: May 28, 2015
[Cite as Powell v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 2015-Ohio-2035.]
BEFORE: Jones, J., E.A. Gallagher, J., and Stewart, J.
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Case No. CV-13-801802
Sarah T. Kovoor
Thomas D. Lambros
Ford, Gold, Kovoor & Simon Law Group
8872 East Market Street
Warren, Ohio 44484
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Paul L. Jackson
Karen D. Adinolfi
Alexander J. Kipp
Roetzel & Andress, L.P.A.
222 South Main Street
Akron, Ohio 44308
Shawn A. Romer
Mazanec, Raskin, Ryder & Keller Co., L.P.A.
100 Franklin‘s Row
34305 Solon Road
Cleveland, Ohio 44139
{¶1} Plaintiff-appellant, Elizabeth Powell, appeals the trial court‘s decision granting summary judgment in favor of defendant-appellee, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. We affirm.
{¶2} In 2002, Powell filed a workers’ compensation claim against Wal-Mart, her employer, for injuries to her right knee. In 2007, she sought an additional allowance for tooth decay she alleged was the result of pain medicine she took for her knee injury and a decreased capacity to care for her teeth, which she also claimed was a result of the injury. Her claim was denied, and she appealed to the court of common pleas. Powell v. Bur. of Workers’ Comp., Cuyahoga County C.P. No. CV-06-589436 (“Powell I“).
{¶3} In May 2008, the parties reached an agreement and the trial court entered an order dismissing the case. A dispute arose between the parties, and Wal-Mart filed a motion to enforce the settlement agreement. The trial court held a hearing and granted the motion in part. Powell appealed. See Powell v. Bur. of Workers’ Comp., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 91915. The record reflects that the parties met with this court‘s conference attorney and devised an amended settlement agreement (“October 2008 Settlement Agreement“). This court‘s order stated “[s]ua sponte, by agreement of the parties and upon recommendation of the conference attorney, the appeal is settled and dismissed.”
{¶4} In March 2009, Powell filed a motion to enforce the settlement agreement with the trial court, challenging paragraph 2 of the October 2008 Settlement Agreement,
{¶5} In May 2009, Powell filed a new case, Case No. CV-09-692172 (“Powell II“), seeking specific performance of the October 2008 Settlement Agreement. Wal-Mart moved to dismiss based on res judicata, which the trial court granted. Powell appealed and this court reversed and remanded the case, finding that it was error for the trial court to dismiss her complaint based on res judicata because the trial court considered evidence outside the complaint. Powell v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 93707, 2010-Ohio-5233, ¶ 12. Powell voluntarily dismissed Powell II in April 2012.
{¶6} In February 2013, Powell filed the case that is the subject of this appeal (“Powell III“). In her complaint, Powell asserted that Wal-Mart breached its contract by failing to uphold Paragraphs 1-6 of the October 2008 Settlement Agreement.1
{¶7} Wal-Mart moved for summary judgment, arguing that Powell‘s claims were barred by res judicata. The trial court granted the motion and dismissed Powell III.
{¶8} Powell filed a timely notice of appeal, and raises the following assignment of error for our review:
[I.] The trial court erred in applying the doctrine of res judicata because the issue decided in the prior proceeding was not identical to the issue raised in
this lawsuit, the issues raised in this lawsuit were not necessary to the earlier decision, and plaintiff-appellant Elizabeth Powell was never given a full and fair opportunity to litigate the precise issue that she raised in this lawsuit in the prior proceeding.
{¶9} Summary judgment is appropriate when (1) there is no genuine issue of material fact, (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and (3) viewing the evidence most strongly in favor of the nonmoving party, reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion and that conclusion is adverse to the nonmoving party.
{¶10} Powell claims that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to Wal-Mart because the issues she sets forth in Powell III are different from the issues in her former cases. Wal-Mart argues that Powell‘s claims are barred by res judicata because she is bringing the same claims as she brought forth in Powell II and in her March 2009 motion to enforce the settlement agreement in Powell I.
{¶11} Under the doctrine of res judicata, “‘[a] valid final judgment rendered upon the merits bars all subsequent actions based upon any claim arising out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous action.“’ Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Collins, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 101405, 2014-Ohio-5152, ¶ 11, quoting Hughes v. Calabrese, 95 Ohio St.3d 334, 2002-Ohio-2217, 767 N.E.2d 725.
{¶12} Public policy favors the finality of judgments. M & T Bank v. Steel, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 101924, 2015-Ohio-1036, ¶ 13, citing Rhoads v. Greater Cleveland Regional Transit Auth., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 92024, 2009-Ohio-2483. If not appealed, a trial court‘s judgment must remain undisturbed pursuant to the doctrine of res judicata, which bars claims that were or could have been raised on direct appeal. Rhoads, supra at id., citing La Barbera v. Batsch, 10 Ohio St.2d 106, 227 N.E.2d 55 (1967).
{¶13} “The doctrine of res judicata involves both claim preclusion (historically called estoppel by judgment in Ohio) and issue preclusion (traditionally known as collateral estoppel).” Grava v. Parkman Twp., 73 Ohio St.3d 379, 381, 653 N.E.2d 226 (1995). Issue preclusion
holds that a fact or point that was actually and directly at issue in a previous action, and was passed upon and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, may not be drawn into question in a subsequent action between the same parties or their privies, whether the cause of action in the two actions be identical or different. * * * In short, under the rule of collateral estoppel, even where the cause of action is different in a subsequent suit, a judgment in a prior suit may nevertheless affect the outcome of the second suit.
(Internal citations omitted.) Fort Frye Teachers Assn., OEA/NEA v. State Emp. Relations Bd., 81 Ohio St.3d 392, 395, 692 N.E.2d 140 (1998).
{¶14} To successfully assert collateral estoppel, Wal-Mart must show: (1) Powell
{¶15} With regard to the claim preclusion, a final judgment or decree rendered upon the merits, without fraud or collusion, by a court of competent jurisdiction is a complete bar to any subsequent action on the same claim or cause of action between the parties or those in privity with them. Grava at id. citing Norwood v. McDonald, 142 Ohio St. 299, 52 N.E.2d 67 (1943).
{¶16} It is undisputed that the parties have remained the same throughout. Powell also argues that res judicata does not apply because: (1) the causes of action are different, specific performance in her Powell I motion to enforce and in Powell II versus a breach of contract claim in Powell III, and (2) Powell III asserts claims for more than dental procedures. However, we find she is collaterally estopped from bringing the instant claim. As stated above, even where the cause of action is different in a subsequent suit, a judgment in a prior suit may nevertheless affect the outcome of the second suit. Although Powell claims the issues in this case are different from Powell I and Powell II, and involve more than her dental problems, a review of the record shows otherwise.
{¶17} The complaint in Powell III alleged that Wal-Mart breached Paragraphs 1-6
{¶18} A review of the record shows that Powell‘s claims in Powell III involve the same issues as were already decided in Powell I; it is a matter that was previously decided upon by the trial court. There was a final judgment in Powell I, denying Powell‘s motion to enforce the settlement agreement and she chose not to appeal that final judgment. When the trial court granted Wal-Mart‘s motion to dismiss based on res judicata in Powell II, this court reversed and remanded the case, which would have given Powell the opportunity to proceed on her claims through the summary judgment stage. Instead, Powell dismissed that case.
{¶19} Now, in Powell III, Powell sets forth the same theory based upon the same set of facts as she did in her motion to enforce her settlement agreement in Powell I: whether Wal-Mart was obligated to pay for certain “presently indicated” dental expenses to which Powell claimed she was entitled to pursuant to the October 2008 Settlement Agreement.
{¶20} Finally, we are cognizant of the Ohio Supreme Court‘s recent holding that “[a] trial court has jurisdiction to enforce a settlement agreement after a case has been dismissed only if the dismissal entry incorporated the terms of the agreement or expressly stated that the court retained jurisdiction to enforce the agreement.” Infinite Sec. Solutions, L.L.C. v. Karam Props. II, Slip Opinion No. 2015-Ohio-1101, ¶ 34.
{¶21} There is the issue, too, of whether the trial court retained jurisdiction over the settlement agreement once the parties dismissed their 2008 appeal. See Powell, supra. Again, Powell did not appeal Powell I. In fact, Powell herself sought to enforce the continuing jurisdiction of the trial court to pursue her claims against Wal-Mart in Powell I when she filed her motion to enforce the October 2008 Settlement Agreement.
{¶22} Every court is said to have authority to consider its own jurisdiction. Diagnostic & Behavioral Health Clinic, Inc. v. Jefferson Cty. Mental Health, 7th Dist. Jefferson No. 01 JE 5, 2002-Ohio-1567, ¶ 13, citing State ex rel. Pearson v. Moore, 48 Ohio St.3d 37, 38, 548 N.E.2d 945 (1990). Therefore, the trial court in Powell I was “competent to rule on the question of the scope of its own jurisdiction.” Diagnostic & Behavioral Health Clinic, Inc. at id. Its decision “became a final judgment by a court competent to make that decision, and the ‘correctness’ of the determination became irrelevant when the time for appeal passed.” Id. citing Columbus v. Union Cemetery Assn., 45 Ohio St.2d 47, 52, 341 N.E.2d 298 (1976). Although the trial court in Powell I did not expressly state it had determined it had jurisdiction over the October 2008 settlement agreement, the trial court denied Powell‘s motion to enforce the settlement agreement as opposed to dismissing it for lack of jurisdiction. Therefore, we can presume the trial court made that determination before it denied Powell‘s motion. And the “correctness” of its decision became irrelevant once the time for appeal passed.2
{¶23} Had Powell wanted to challenge the trial court‘s jurisdiction over the October 2008 Settlement Agreement, she should have done so at the time her motion to enforce the settlement agreement in Powell I was denied through the filing of a direct appeal.3
{¶24} In light of the above, no question of material fact remains as Powell‘s instant
{¶25} The trial court correctly determined that Powell is barred by res judicata from asserting her claims and that Wal-Mart was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
{¶26} The sole assignment of error is overruled.
{¶27} Judgment affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to
LARRY A. JONES, SR., PRESIDING JUDGE
EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, J., CONCURS;
MELODY J. STEWART, J., DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE OPINION
MELODY J. STEWART, J., DISSENTING:
{¶28} The application of res judicata is based on there being a valid, final
{¶29} There are two ways to enforce a settlement agreement: “either through filing an independent action for breach of contract, or by filing a motion to enforce the settlement agreement in the underlying action pursuant to
{¶30} Admittedly, before filing her breach of contract action, Powell improperly filed a motion asking the trial court to enforce the terms of the settlement agreement. That motion was a non-starter because the court of common pleas had no subject matter jurisdiction to enforce it. A court of common pleas has no subject matter jurisdiction to enforce the terms of a settlement agreement reached in the court of appeals, any more than
{¶31} The court denied Powell‘s motion to enforce the settlement agreement (as it should have), but it did so substantively, not procedurally. This conclusion is compelled for two reasons.
{¶32} First, the court gave preclusive effect to the April 6, 2009 order denying the motion to enforce the settlement agreement when granting summary judgment in the breach of contract action. And the only way that order could have preclusive effect for purposes of the breach of contract action was if the court‘s order had rejected on the merits Powell‘s arguments to enforce the settlement agreement. It follows that the court construed the terms of the settlement agreement reached in this court of appeals, even though it never had jurisdiction to do anything more than deny Powell‘s motion to enforce the settlement agreement on the basis that it lacked jurisdiction.
{¶33} Second, the majority‘s discussion of Infinite Security Solutions, L.L.C. v. Karam Properties II, Slip Opinion No. 2015-Ohio-1101, indicates that the majority believes the trial court, somehow, reserved jurisdiction to enforce the terms of the October 2008 settlement reached in this court of appeals. This is because the majority implicitly acknowledges, as it must, that the April 9, 2009 order cannot be valid if indeed the court had no jurisdiction to review the October 2008 settlement.
{¶34} Infinite is inapplicable to this case, Infinite holds that “[a] trial court has jurisdiction to enforce a settlement agreement after a case has been dismissed only if the dismissal entry incorporated the terms of the agreement or expressly stated that the court
{¶35} The majority concludes that Infinite does not apply to this case,5 however for the wrong reason, and applies precedent from this appellate district that favored a more “liberal” interpretation of what constituted a reservation of the right of a court to enforce a settlement agreement. The majority‘s application of those prior case decisions to find that a reservation of jurisdiction to enforce the October 2008 settlement existed supports the majority‘s conclusion that the court did reach the merits on Powell‘s motion to enforce the