The parties to this marital-property-division case married in 1993 and divorced in 2001. Appellee owned a farm subject to a mortgage bеfore he married appellant, and appellant had approximately $26,000 in premarital funds at the time of the marriage. The issuеs at trial focused on the respective rights of the parties to these items of property and on appellant’s request for аlimony.
Appellant contends that the trial court erred.in awarding her only one-third of the reduction in indebtedness on the farm mortgage; in finding that thе premarital funds she deposited into the joint account were marital property; and in denying her request for alimony. We find no error, and we affirm. ■
We first address appellant’s contention that the trial court erred in failing to award her a full one-half of the reduction in indebtеdness on the farm mortgage over the course of the marriage. The record shows that appellee owned a farm before he married appellant. The farm was subject to a mortgage in the amount of $141,508 when the parties married. By the time they divorced, the mоrtgage indebtedness had been reduced to $5,800. After trial, appellant was awarded one-third of the reduction of indebtedness. She argues on appeal that the trial judge erred in failing to award her one-half of that reduction. We do not agree.
With respect to the division of property in a divorce case, we review the chancellor’s findings of fact and affirm them unless they are clearly erroneous. Jablonski v. Jablonski,
We next address appellant’s contention that the trial court erred in finding that appellant’s premarital funds did not remain appellant’s individual property аfter her marriage to appellee. Once property, whether personal or real, is placed in the names of pеrsons who are husband and wife without specifying the manner in which they take, there is a presumption that they own the property as tenants by thе entirety, and clear and convincing evidence is required to overcome that presumption. McLain v. McLain,
In the present case, the record shows that appellant had approximately $26,000 from the sale of her premarital home in a savings account at the time of her marriage to appellee. After she married appellee, appellant deposited these funds into a joint account she held with him. With regard to her intention regarding her separate рroperty, appellant testified that “[w]e did discuss prenuptial things one day. And we planned on being married for the rest of our lives and we сould just both put in everything we had and go from there.” Given that appellant admitted that she deposited these funds in a joint account, that she discussed prenuptial arrangements with appellee, and that she regarded their property to be jointly held during the marriage, we сannot say that the trial judge erred in finding that she failed to rebut the presumption of gift that arises when premarital funds are commingled with marital funds.
Finаlly, we address appellant’s contention that the trial court erred in fading to award her alimony. The award of alimony is not mandatory, but is instead discretionary, and the trial court’s decision regarding any such award will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. McKay v. McKay,
The record in the present case shows that appellee was sixty-four years old at the time of the divorce and was in relatively poor hеalth. He had quadruple bypass surgery for a heart condition, and had knee, intestinal, and hernia repair surgery as well since his marriage to appellant. He has a history of repeated hospitalizations for heart problems and is no longer able to do much farm wоrk other than bookkeeping. Appellant was fifty-eight years old at the time of the divorce and was in good health. She had previous work experience as a union construction worker earning $18.00 per hour. She is currently employed managing an RV park in Branson, Missouri. Given this evidence, we cannot say that the trial judge abused his discretion in failing to award alimony to appellant.
Affirmed.