Powell v. Philadelphia & Reading Railway Co.

220 Pa. 638 | Pa. | 1908

Opinion by

Mr. Justice Elkin,

Aftercareful consideration we have concluded that the first assignment of error must be sustained. Whether the plaintiff remained in the waiting room for an unreasonable length of time so as to become a loiterer or mere licensee, was, under the circumstances of this case, a question of fact to be determined by the jury. The learned trial judge in his opinion overruling the motion for a new trial and for judgment non obstante ver*643edicto states that this was a question for the jury and that it was so submitted, but upon an examination of the charge it is clear that this question was not submitted to the jury with instructions for them to determine this fact. On the other hand, the jury were instructed that “ according to the view which the court takes of that situation, the court will instruct you that her rights as a passenger had not ceased.” This had reference to the exact question whether she had remained at the station an unreasonable length of time, and it can only be construed as a binding instruction to the jury. This binding instruction was followed by a general discussion of the facts relating to this particular question, but nowhere does it appear that any direction was given to the jury to determine this exact question. The effect of the charge in this respect can only be considered as binding instructions upon the question of reasonable length of time, and therefore the jury were not left to determine whether, under the circumstances, she had remained an unreasonable time'at the station. We do not agree with the contention of the learned counsel for appellant that the relation of carrier and passenger had ceased as soon as plaintiff had been discharged from the train on the south side and had proceeded from that point to the station house on the north side of the railroad tracks, being the point nearest her destination. This position is predicated on the thought that in passing from the station house on one side to the station house on the other, the passenger passed over the tracks at a public crossing. If the railroad company had chosen to make a public crossing a convenience for its passengers in going from the station on one side of its tracks to that on the other, it cannot be excused for an act of negligence on the ground that the relation of' carrier and passenger had ceased the moment the passenger placed his foot upon the public highway. The general rule is that the relation of carrier and passenger begins as soon as one intending in good faith to become a passenger enters in a lawful manner upon the carrier’s premises to engage passage, ahd that relation continues to exist until the passenger has been made aware of his arrival at the place of destination and has had a reasonable time to alight from the car and to leave the premises of the carrier. The duty of the defendant company under this general rule in the present case did *644not cease the moment plaintiff alighted from the train on the south side of the tracks, nor when she proceeded in the direction ordinarily taken by passengers to reach the station on the north side of the tracks, nor did it cease then until she had a reasonable opportunity to make her arrangements to depart. And right here is the pinch of the case on the question raised by the first assignment of error. Clearly the plaintiff had the right after alighting from the train to proceed to the station on the opposite side of the tracks to await the arrival of a friend who was to meet her there. She was delayed a considerable length of time, and for the reason stated in the testimony she remained in the waiting room until the friend whom she intended to visit called for her. In this connection we quite agree with the suggestion made by the learned counsel for appellant that it was no part of the duty of the railroad company to furnish a waiting room for the intending passengers of a street railway company with which the railroad company had no connection, and if it clearly appeared that the only purpose of the plaintiff after alighting from the train at the south side of the tracks was to go to the station on the north side, for the purpose of awaiting the arrival of a street railway car on which she intended to become a passenger, there could be no recovery because the relation of carrier and passenger would, under these circumstances, have ceased to exist before the injury occurred. But we do not so understand the testimony on this branch of the case. The plaintiff went to the station by the ordinary route, either to meet her friend or await his arrival in order to accompany her to her place of destination. The friend who was to meet her at the station might have walked, or even driven in a carriage, or come as a passenger on the street railway, and the manner of his coming would in no way affect her rights as a passenger of the railroad company. Under these circumstances the plaintiff had a right to make use of the waiting room of the defendant company for a reasonable length of time, and what was a reasonable length of time was a question of fact to be determined by the jury. It was the duty of the court to instruct the jury to first determine this question before proceeding to inquire into the alleged negligence of the defendant company, because the right to recover at all *645depended upon the determination of this question by the jury. If it should be determined that plaintiff had remained at the station an unreasonable length of time before her departure, it would necessarily follow that the relation of carrier and passenger had ceased, and there could be no recovery for an injury subsequently sustained. As we view the testimony the question of negligence was too broadly submitted to the jury. It was not negligence on the part of the defendant company to run the train which caused the injury on its own tracks and at the usual rate of speed for that train. The question of signals, headlights and other incidental matters connected with the running of the train, about which some testimony was furnished at the trial, has no connection with this case. The negligence, if any, of the defendant company is in no manner connected with the running of the train which caused the injury. It was the duty of the defendant company to provide safe means of access to and departure from its station for the use of passengers, and the plaintiff in the present case had a right to assume that the means of ingress and egress were reasonably safe. It was the duty of the defendant company to make and maintain the walk in a reasonably safe condition, and if, on the night of the accident, the walk was torn up or covered with obstructions which interfered with its proper use, or which caused the plaintiff to walk too close to the railroad tracks in order to avoid the obstructions, and if this condition of the walk was the proximate cause of the injury, there can be a recovery of damages for the injuries thus sustained. Again, it was the duty of the defendant company to keep the walks and approaches to the station properly lighted at night or when required. This duty was more imperatively demanded of the defendant company in the present case because of the close proximity of the walk to the railroad tracks, which necessarily made it somewhat dangerous. As we view it, there are only two questions of negligence to be submitted to the jury, that is, was the walk reasonably safe for the use intended and was it sufficiently lighted, and if not, was failure to perform these duties the proximate cause of the accident ?

It was the duty of plaintiff to use reasonable care in order to avoid danger. She was charged with notice that the defendant company had a right to run its trains on its own *646tracks at any time it suited its purpose to do so, and that a train might pass along while she was on the walk, and the duty rested on her to use reasonable care in order to avoid danger to her person. If she walked too close to the railroad tracks without looking ahead and without exercising such reasonable care as a prudent person should exercise under the circumstances and was injured by reason of her own neglect, clearly there could be no recovery. Under the circumstances, however, we have concluded that this question was also for the jury.

Judgment reversed and a venire facias de novo awarded.