26 Wend. 591 | N.Y. Sup. Ct. | 1841
After advisement, the following opinions were delivered:
The law appears to be well settled, at least in this state, that the owners of steamboats, railroads, canal boats, stage coaches, &c., whose ordinary business it is to carry passengers, together with their ordinary baggage, for hire or reward, are liable as common carriers for the safety of the baggage, although such carriers do not receive any compensation for the transportation of the baggage, other than that which is included in the ordinary fare which is charged for the conveyance of the passengers with their usual travelling baggage. See Hollister v. Nowlen, 19 Wend. Rep. 234, and Cole v. Goodwin and Story, Id. 251, and the cases there referred to by Justices Bronson and C'owen. It is only upon the principle that the transportation and risk of the ordinary baggage of the passenger forms a part of the service for which the fare is charged, that those decisions can be sus
The salutary rule of holding such common carriers liable for losses, other than those arising from public enemies or inevitable accidents, and which is so essential to the preservation of the baggage of the otherwise unprotected traveller, against the negligences of the carriers, or the frauds of their servants, I trust will not be impaired by any decision of this court.
Nor do I find any thing in the circumstances of the present case to take it out of the general rule. It appears from the testimony, that the boat usually arrived at New-York in the night, and though the passengers usually landed with their baggage before morning, they frequently remained on board through the night. The jury, therefore, were right in concluding that the baggage left on board was in the custody of the master, in his capacity of common carrier, until it was called for at the usual time in the morning, after his arrival at his place of destination. The owners of the boat, in whose custody the trunk was, were therefore clearly liable for the misdelivery thereof to the colored man, upon the forged order, and were rightfully charged with the loss. Even in the ordinary case of a bank which pays out the money of a depositor upon a forged check, in his name, the institution and not the depositor, must sustain the loss. So too, the warehouseman, who is not liable to the same extent as the common carrier, has been held liable for delivering the goods entrusted to his care to the wrong person, where such delivery was by mistake merely and not intentionally wrong. See Devereux v. Barclay, 2 Barn. & Ald. Rep. 702.
For these reasons I think the decisions of the judge who tried the cause, and of the supreme court, were correct, and that the judgment should be affirmed.
I entirely assent to the correctness of the decision upon the main points of this case.
Another important point is presented in this case. This is, that the carrier’s responsibility does not terminate by arrival at the place of destination, but continues unchanged until due delivery, unless he is otherwise before discharged of his peculiar custody as a carrier. The passenger’s trunk left in the boat till a convenient and usual time of delivery is governed by the same law with the merchandize transported in the boat. Mere t rrival does not discharge the
I have expressed these general views merely to prevent our affirmance from unsettling or throwing doubt upon any decision exonerating carriers from their peculiar liabilities upon the natural termination of their contract, whatever that may be. I have been much impressed with the wisdom of a remark of Chief Justice Marshall, Boyce v. Anderson, 2 Peters’ R. 155, which bias been cited in this argument. “ The law applicable to common carriers is one of great rigor, though to the extent to which it has been carried, and in the cases to which it has been applied, we admit its policy and necessity; but we do not think it ought to be carried further as applied to new cases.”
On the question being put, Shall this judgment be reversed ? All the members of the court present at the argument, except Senators Dixon, Ely and Humphrey, voted in the negative; the three named members voted in the affirmative. Whereupon the judgment of the supreme court was Affirmed.