175 Ga. 732 | Ga. | 1932
(After stating the foregoing facts.) It appears from the agreed statement of facts that Powell’s title was founded on a deed as purchaser at sheriff’s sale of lands which were alienated by the Powell Land Company, first, by a security deed dated January 25, 1912, to the Southern States Life Insurance Company; and secondly, by warranty deed executed to Wilson and Ivey. Powell as an individual was a stranger to these conveyances, and acquired title as any other purchaser at the sale, having, so far as the record discloses, no interest to protect. It is his claim that the land bought by him should be freed from any part of the burden of taxes, under an application of Code section 6029, which states the "inverse order of alienation” rule, as follows: "Where property is subject to a lien and part of it is sold by the debtor, the part remaining in him should be first applied to the payment of the lien. If the property subject to such lien is sold in several parcels at different times, the parcels should be charged in the inverse order of their alienation.” It is contended by the defendants in error that the rule and principle embodied in this section of the Code is not applicable to this case, under the facts thereof. This section is a codification of the principle announced in Craigmiles v. Gamble, 85 Ga. 439 (11 S. E. 838). The following are the facts in that case, as set forth in the official report: G. M. C. Branner being indebted to several creditors, they sued and obtained general
Under the principle ruled in that case, now codified, in view of the facts upon which the ruling was predicated, we are of the opinion that that ruling is applicable to the present case. While the section referred to is a codification of the principle ruled in Craigmiles v. Gamble, there is another Georgia decision, Cumming v. Cumming, 3 Ga. 460, in which there is a very thorough discussion of the principle involved here; and the principle announced in that case is illustrated by a great wealth of authorities to be found both in English and American cases. And it might be well said
Counsel for defendants in error insist that the case is controlled by the decision in Phœnix Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Bank of Kestler, 170 Ga. 734 (154 S. E. 247). We do apply certain principles there stated, but the ruling upon the controlling question in that case was based upon facts that are different from this case. The contest there was between lienholders, and the parties at
Judgment reversed.
Under the rulings made in Phœnix Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Bank of Kestler, 170 Ga. 734 (supra), and authorities cited, the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed. That case is controlling authority. In the ease just mentioned a large number of decisions by this court are analyzed and classified. The rule adopted, by which the court will determine whether taxes will be prorated is determined by the facts. If the tax liens accrued before the security deeds were executed, the principles stated in the Civil Code (1910), § 6029, are applicable. On the other hand, if the tax lien accrued after the security deeds were executed, the taxes are prorated, as held by the trial court in the present case. In the present case the tax liens accrued after all the security deeds had been executed. Mr. Justice Atkinson concurs in this dissent.