107 Ind. 106 | Ind. | 1886
This was a suit for an injunction. The complaint was as follows:
Edward E. Powell, on behalf of himself and others who are citizens of the city of Madison, in the county of Jefferson, in the State of Indiana, and taxpayers to said city, but whose names are too numerous to mention, plaintiff, for substituted complaint in sa.id cause, complains of the city of Madison, a municipal corporation, situated in said county and State, and incorporated under the general laws of said State, for the incorporation of cities, and Joseph T. Brashear, the mayor of said city, and John A. Zuck, the clerk of said city, defendants, and says that he, the plaintiff, is a resident citizen of said city and a taxpayer to said city, and that said defendant, city of Madison, ivas, on the 14th day of March, 1881, and long prior thereto, such municipal corporation.
The plaintiff further says that for the alleged purpose of funding the sum of one hundred and four thousand dollars, of said indebtedness of said city in the four per centum negotiable bonds of said city, payable eight thousand dollars each year for a period of thirteen years, commencing two years from date, to bear interest at four per centum per annum, payable semi-annually, principal and interest, at the National Branch Bank in said city, and called the “ Funding Bonds of the City of Madison,” the common council of said city did, on the 4th day of March, 1886, pass the preamble and ordinance which read as follows, to wit:
“An Ordinance
“Adopted by the common council of the city of Madison, State of Indiana, to fund a portion of the indebtedness of said.
“ Whereas, Said city of Madison has a voting population of less than sixteen thousand, as shown by the votes cast •for governor at the last preceding election, and having an indebtedness evidenced by the bonds, notes, and other obligations of said city, exceeding $104,000, which debt is drawing a rate of interest of six per cent, per annum, and some of it .a greater rate of annual interest, and,
“ Whereas, Said city had not the present means for payment of said debt or any considerable part thereof, without the levy of most oppressive taxes, and,
“ Whereas, On, and ever since the 14th day of March, 1881, said city has been and is now indebted by her bonds, notes and other obligations in an amount greatly exceeding two per cent, on the amount of her taxable property, as shown each year since 1881 by the assessment of taxable property of said city for State and county purposes for the last and each preceding year of said period, and,
“ Whereas, Many of said outstanding city bonds, notes and other city obligations of debt have been renewed by the like city evidences of debt, because of the inability of the city to pay the same, and,
“ Whereas, We, the common council of said, city, believe it will be for the best interest of the city, and taxpayers, to fund one hundred and four thousand dollars ($104,000) of said indebtedness into 4 per cent, city bonds, payable within fifteen years in equal annual instalments, at the ^National Branch Bank of Madison, in said city, bearing interest pay.able semi-annually. Said bon,ds to be of the denominations . of $50, $100, $500 and $1,000 each, and to be exchanged for the said outstanding city bonds, notes and other obligations, representing city indebtedness prior to March 14th, 1881, at par, therefore,
“Be it ordained by the common council of the city of Madison, .by a vote of more than two-thirds of her said common coun
“ Section 2. Be it further ordained that said common council shall levy a tax each year for fifteen years upon thetaxables of said city, to pay the annual interest on said bonds,, and the annual payments of principal thereof of $8,000 two years after date, and $8,000 per year thereafter.
“ Section 3. This ordinance shall take effect and be in force from and after its passage and legal publication.
“ By order, • Jos. T. Brashear, Mayor.
“ John A. Zuck, Clerk.”
The plaintiff says that there is no money in the treasury of said city, and that the revenues of said city from all sources-are not sufficient to pay all of the annual expenses of said city, necessarily incurred in carrying on the city government,, and the interest on her said debt, and that the debt of said city is increasing by the non-payment of interest as it matures, or in borrowing other money to pay such interest. That the issue and sale, or negotiation or exchange, of said
The plaintiff says that said city had no legal right to pass said preamble and resolution or ordinance, and has no right or authority to issue the bonds therein provided for, or exchange the same. And that unless the said defendants, the said city and her said officers, are restrained, the said bonds will be issued and put upon the market and sold, greatly to. the injury and damage of the plaintiff and the taxpayers of said city generally, and that the said officers of said city are threatening to and about to issue said bonds and put the same upon the market in accordance with the provisions of said ordinance.
Wherefore the plaintiff prays the court that said city and her said officers be, on the final hearing of this cause, perpetually enjoined and restrained from issuing the said bonds, or any part of them, or in any manner borrowing money or creating a debt under and by virtue of said ordinance, and for all relief proper in the premises.
This complaint was held to be sufficient upon demurrer.
The defendants then answered, admitting the debt of the city of Madison to have been, on the 14th day of March, 1881, as stated in the complaint, and that the value of the taxable property of said city was on that day, and is now, as alleged by the plaintiff; also, admitting that the plaintiff is a resident citizen and taxpayer of the city in question; also, further admitting that the common council of said city did,
The defendants, still further answering, offered to consent that judgment might be rendered enjoining the city and its officers from using any of the new bonds proposed to be issued, or their proceeds, for the payment of any debt contracted since the 14th day of March, 1881.
.The plaintiff demurred to this answer, and his demurrer being overruled, and he declining to jdead further, final judgment went against him upon demurrer.
The plaintiff, as the appellant here, complains of the overruling of his demurrer to the answer, and cross error is assigned upon the refusal of the circuit court to sustain the demurrer of the appellees to the complaint.
Two sections of the statutes having relation to the government of cities, known as sections 3230 and 3231 of the
“ 3230. Any city or town in this State, having a voting .population of less than sixteen thousand, as shown by the votes cast for governor at the last preceding election, and having an indebtedness evidenced by bonds, notes, or other obligations heretofore issued or negotiated by such city or town, may, for the purpose of funding such indebtedness, or any part thereof, and reducing the rate of interest thereon, and cancelling so much thereof as may be due or shall hereafter become due, upon the vote of two-thirds of the members of the common council of such city or the board of trustees of such town, issue its bonds, with interest coupons attached, for an amount not exceeding, in the aggregate, the whole ■amount of the indebtedness of such city or town; which bonds maybe of any denomination not less than fifty dollars, nor more than one thousand dollars, and shall be payable at any place, after two years, in equal annual instalments, not exceeding in all the period of fifteen years, and shall bear any rate of interest not exceeding six per cent, per annum, payable semi-annually; and such city or town may negotiate such bonds at any market or place at not less than par.
“ 3231. The common council of such city or the board of trustees of such town shall add to the -tax-duplicate thereof, annually, a levy sufficient to pay the yearly interest on said bonds and to provide a sinking fund for the liquidation of the principal thereof, as they become due; which sinking fund, together with all interest, increase, or profit thereon, shall be applied to the payment of said bonds and to no other purpose.”
On the 14th day of March, 1881, the following amendment to the Constitution, known now as Article 13 of that Instrument, was adopted: “ISTo political or municipal corporation in this State shall ever become indebted, in any manner or for any purpose, to an amount, in the aggregate
This suit was instituted, and this appeal is prosecuted, upon the theory that the adoption of the constitutional amendment, above set out, so far modified sections 3230 and 3231-of the statutes of 1881, previously herein also set out, as to-prohibit cities and towns from issuing new bonds, and in that way funding their debts, whenever their aggregate indebtedness exceeds two per cent, of the value of their taxable property respectively, and in support of that theory it is argued that the issuance of new bonds in a form different from older1 outstanding obligations, no matter for what purpose, is, in a sense, the creation of a neAV debt, and that such is the case in its fullest sense, Avhere new bonds are issued to provide for the payment of interest already due, or Avhere coupons are attached for the payment of future interest when it shall become due.
The issuing of new bonds to provide, at their par value,, for the payment of an old debt, or the substitution of new evidences of a pre-existing debt, is not, in any legal or proper sense, the creation of a neAV indebtedness. Nor is the funding of interest, already due, or the execution of coupons for the payment of interest Avhich will thereafter accrue upon a pre-existing indebtedness, either the creation of a neAV debt, or, in legal contemplation, an increase of such pre-existingindebtedness. Interest is the premium alloAved by Uav for the use of money. Gaar v. Louisville Banking Co., 11 Bush.,
Section 10 of the Constitution of the United States declares, amongst other things, that no State shall pass any ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts. This limitation upon the power of a State is as restrictive upon its action through its organic law as it is upon the character of the statutes which its Legislature may enact. Railroad Co. v. McClure, 10 Wall. 511; County of Moultrie v. Rockingham Ten-Cent Savings Bank, 92 U. S. 631.
The constitutional amendment in question could not, therefore, have, and, for that reason, did not have, any retrospective effect upon the existing indebtedness of municipal corporations at the time of its adoption. For the same reason it did not impair, and was, presumably, not intended to impair, the obligation of any of the contracts into which municipal corporations had already entered, whether for the payment of a principal sum of money or of interest which, had accrued, or might thereafter accrue thereon. Scott v. City of Davenport, 34 Iowa, 208.
Its operation was only prospective. Where the limit of a two per centum indebtedness had already been reached, it prohibited the contracting of any new or further indebted
As the ordinance, set out in the complaint, proposes to fund only indebtedness which had been contracted prior to said 14th day of March, 1881, it applies to a class of debts not affected by the constitutional amendment in question, and is, in consequence, not in conflict with any of the provisions of that article of the Constitution.
The second section of the ordinance involves a pledge of full compliance with the provisions of section 3231, R. S. 1881, supra, and affords all the security in that respect which could reasonably be expected in advance of the regular times of making levies of the necessary taxes to carry the proposed new arrangement into full effect. It places the common council in the position of being easily required to make the necessary levies at the suit of any person interested in having such levies made.
Construing the complaint, as we do, to really and only mean that the appellees were taking measures to have a part of the indebtedness of the city of Madison, neither invalidated, nor in any manner affected, by the recently adopted article 13 of the Constitution, refunded, as the city has the power to do under existing laws, we feel constrained to hold that the facts averred did not present a cause of action against the appellees, and that, therefore, the appellant has no cause to complain of the ultimate result of the proceedings below. As having a bearing on some of the questions which have
The judgment is affirmed, with costs.