440 N.E.2d 560 | Ohio Ct. App. | 1981
This matter is before us on the appeal of defendant-appellant, St. John's Evangelical Protestant Church (St. John's Church), from a judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County, Probate Division, ordering that a certificate of deposit issued by defendant-appellee, City National Bank and Trust Company (City National), be paid over to plaintiff-appellee, Bruce W. Powell, as administrator of the estate of Cora May Bahrke, deceased.
Powell sought a declaratory judgment declaring the rights of the parties with respect to a certificate of deposit issued by City National in the name of Cora May Bahrke, payable on death, to St. John's Church. Bahrke died on March 15, 1979. City National, in its answer, sought an *2 order instructing it as to whom the proceeds of the account should be paid. In its answer, St. John's Church asked the court to declare it the vested beneficiary of the certificate of deposit.
St. John's Church raises two assignments of error:
"I. The Probate Court erred in holding that only a natural person may be the beneficiary of a `payable on death' certificate of deposit.
"II. The Probate Court erred in failing to hold that the classification of `natural person' as the only beneficiary on a `payable on death' certificate constitutes an unreasonable and arbitrary classification which deprives a corporation of equal protection under the
In order to determine the merits of the assignments of error, we must turn our attention to three sections of the Revised Code. R.C.
"A bank may enter into a written contract with a natural person whereby the proceeds of such person's deposit may be made payable on his death to another natural person in accordance with the terms, restrictions, and limitations set forth in sections
R.C.
"A natural person * * * referred to in sections
R.C.
"When [a] * * * deposit * * * is made, in any bank * * * payable to the owner during his lifetime, and to another on his death, such * * * deposit * * * may be paid to the owner during his lifetime, and on his death such * * * deposit * * * may be paid to the designated beneficiary * * *."
The General Assembly enacted R.C.
St. John's Church maintains that any fair reading of the three statutes quoted above will not preclude naming a corporation not for profit as the beneficiary of a "P.O.D." account, since R.C.
We believe any ambiguity in R.C.
(1) It is a long-standing rule of statutory construction that where two statutory provisions appear to be in conflict, wherever possible, they should be read in a manner as to give effect to both, and where that is not possible, the more specific or limited provision will be given effect over the more general one. See R.C.
(2) In R.C.
(3) The words "another" and "designated beneficiary" as used in R.C.
(4) R.C.
Reading the three sections of the Revised Code together, we conclude that the General Assembly intended that only natural persons may be designated as the beneficiaries of "P.O.D." accounts. The first assignment of error is overruled.
We do not believe that the General Assembly created an unreasonable and arbitrary classification when it permitted only natural persons to be the beneficiaries of "P.O.D." accounts.
It is certainly true, as St. John's Church argues, that the state may not create an arbitrary classification which discriminates against corporations in favor of natural persons where there is no rational basis for that discrimination. LouisK. Liggett Co. v. Lee (1933),
But it is equally true that, for many purposes, corporations may be put into one class and individuals into another, without violating constitutional guarantees of equality, where there is a rational basis for the classification. Prudential Ins. Co. v.Cheek (1922),
While a number of public policy purposes may underlie the General Assembly's enactment of the subject classification, one is particularly apparent. It has long been the policy of this state, and nearly every other jurisdiction of the Anglo-American legal tradition, through enactment of "mortmain" statutes, to prevent deathbed bequests to charitable organizations like the appellant. See R.C.
The second assignment of error is overruled.
Both assignments of error are overruled, and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
WHITESIDE and MCCORMAC, JJ., concur. *4