22 Mass. App. Ct. 988 | Mass. App. Ct. | 1986
In these discharge proceedings under G. L. c. 123A, § 9, as amended through St. 1966, c. 608,
In a § 9 proceeding, the Commonwealth has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the petitioner is one who suffers from a “general lack of power to control his sexual impulses . . . and who as a result is likely to attack or otherwise inflict injury on the objects of his uncontrolled or uncontrollable desires” (emphasis omitted). Page v. Commonwealth, 13 Mass. App. Ct. 384, 387 (1982). See also G. L. c. 123A, § 1, which defines a “sexually dangerous person.”
We would be doing less than our duty, however, if we failed to give voice to our unease about this case. Our concerns may assist in framing the agenda of subsequent § 9 proceedings, should they be brought forward. Poulin’s outbursts of sexual aggression occurred fifteen years ago, when Poulin was eighteen years old. There were three episodes of escalating severity. The last was a rape. Since then, so far as the record discloses, there has been no “misconduct in sexual matters” as a lay person would understand the phrase. See the definition of SDP contained in G. L. c. 123 A, § 1, as appearing in St. 1985, c. 752, § l.
It may be that a person trained to diagnose and predict abnormal behavior, such as a psychiatrist or psychologist, can fit the pieces together. Perhaps, as a clinical matter, past sexual misconduct, coupled with current manifestations of impulsive behavior, poor therapy response, and intellectual and emotional deficits add up to a prognosis of a person currently “likely to attack or otherwise inflict injury . . . because of his uncontrolled or uncontrollable desires.” G. L. c. 123A, § 1. If so, it would be helpful to trial judges and reviewing courts if the expert witnesses explained the clinical basis for linking past sexual misconduct with present behavior to produce a diagnosis of a currently sexually dangerous person. Our criticism is directed not to the judge in this case, but to the experts, who, we think, have done an unsatisfying job of making the necessary clinical connections.
The decision of the judge denying the petition for discharge from the treatment center is affirmed.
So ordered.
The statute was further amended by St. 1985, c. 752, § 1. The hearing in this case occurred, however, on July 31 and August 1, 1984. There is no suggestion that the 1985 amendment of § 9 has a bearing on the proceedings.
The assistant administrator was a clinical psychologist and held a doctorate in that discipline.
Section 1 was also amended by St. 1985, c. 752, § 1.
The same phrase appeared in the version of § 1 applicable at the time of the discharge hearing.