137 Ga. 648 | Ga. | 1912
(After stating the foregoing facts.)
It must be conceded, of course, that the employment of legal proceedings for the collection of rentals that are due and unpaid, or for redress of breaches of the contract on the part of the tenant, will not necessarily affect the relation of landlord and tenant, or excuse the tenant from further performance of his obligations according to the contract under which he holds. A distraint for rent past due would not be a violation of the covenant for quiet enjoyment; nor would an action predicated upon a default or a violation of the contract by the tenant have that effect. In other words, it must be true, as a general rule, that a landlord may pursue the same legal remedies against his tenant, without prejudicing himself, as he could use if the relation of landlord and tenant did not exist. In Upton v. Townsend, 17 C. B. 51, it was said that the term “ eviction” “may now be taken to mean this — not a mere trespass and nothing more, but something of a grave and permanent character, done, by the landlord with the intention of depriving the tenant of the enjoyment of the demised premises.” Practically the same definition of “ eviction ” was adopted by this court in Fleming v. King, 100 Ga. 449 (28 S. E. 239). In the present case it .can not be said that there was an actual expulsion of the defendant from the rented premises by the plaintiff itself. Was the appointment of a
Judgment affirmed.