22 A.2d 28 | Pa. Super. Ct. | 1941
Argued April 23, 1941. This is an action in trespass brought by plaintiff to recover damages for personal injuries which he claims were sustained when he fell on the floor of defendant's store. The jury returned a verdict for plaintiff. Defendant's motions for judgment n.o.v. and for a new trial were dismissed. From the judgment entered for plaintiff, defendant has appealed.
On April 6, 1937, about 11:40 A.M., appellee slipped and fell, injuring his right knee, while in appellant's store. Appellee ascribed the fall to the presence of oil on the floor. He did not see or discover the oil spot until he got up from the floor; it was about 18 inches long, and at its widest part about 12 inches in width, and was dusty and slippery. Appellee made no complaint to anyone at the store at the time of the accident, but, accompanied by his wife, he left the store in order to obtain medical attention. At 2 P.M. on the same afternoon he returned to appellant's store with his wife's brother-in-law, who at the trial was called as an expert witness. There was no testimony as to who was responsible for the oil being on the floor, or as to how it got there, or that appellant had any actual notice of the condition which appellee alleged caused his fall. The rule applicable to the facts in this case is given in the Restatement of the Law, Torts, § 343, as follows: "A possessor of land is subject to liability for bodily harm caused to business visitors by a natural or artificial condition thereon if, but only if, he (a) knows, or by the exercise of reasonable care could discover, the condition which, if known to him, he should realize as involving an unreasonable risk to them. . . . . ." See, also,Bell v. Great Atlantic Pacific Tea Co.,
In MacDonald v. Gimbel Brothers, Inc.,
Appellee endeavored to charge appellant with constructive notice of the oil spot, and for this purpose called his wife's brother-in-law to testify as an expert witness. The trial judge overruled an objection to the qualifications of this witness, and permitted him to testify that in his opinion the oil had been deposited on the floor 18 to 24 hours prior to the time he examined it. Although it is largely within the discretion of the trial judge to determine whether a witness shall be permitted to testify as an expert, and whether the qualifications with respect to his knowledge have been sufficiently established (Ryder v.Jacobs,
"An expert is a person experienced, trained, skilled in some particular business or subject. An expert witness is one who because of the possession of knowledge not within ordinary reach is specially qualified to speak upon the subject to which his attention is called. Thus, a chemist, a physician, a mechanic, an artist, has special knowledge of the things that fall within the range of his studies and his daily practice, and because of such special knowledge, not within ordinary reach, his testimony upon a subject relating to his particular line of study or research is regarded as more exact and entitled to more weight than that of witnesses not possessing the same opportunities for acquiring thorough knowledge of the subject. Many persons may know something about a given question and be competent as witnesses to tell what they know. A few may have an intimate, an exceptional, knowledge and be entitled to speak as expert witnesses":Struthers v. Philadelphia Delaware County Railroad Co.,
It is too obvious for discussion that the witness was not an expert. He disclosed no technical or scientific knowledge or qualifications whatever, and had a very *133
meager experience along the lines of the subject on which he sought to qualify as an expert. His opinion was valueless, and nothing could with certainty or safety be predicated on it. SeeSinkovich v. Bell Telephone Co. of Pennsylvania,
The testimony of this witness should not have been submitted to the jury to establish the length of time the oil was on the floor of appellant's store. The error of the trial court in admitting it necessitates a new trial. Stevenson v. Titus et al.,
Judgment is reversed, and a venire facias de novo awarded. *134