105 F.2d 94 | D.C. Cir. | 1939
In the evening of July 12, 1936, at about 10:45 o’clock, the motor launch “Seabird”, 39 feet 11 inches long, 11 feet 2 inches wide, in charge of her owner and with a party of his friends aboard, and with her regulation lights burning brightly, was proceeding up the Potomac River en route to Alexandria, Virginia.
The night was clear, and the tide was flood.
When about off Fort Washington some five or six miles below Alexandria, and when somewhat to the eastern or Maryland side of mid-channel, the navigator of the Seabird heard a two-blast whistle from an overtaking vessel, which turned out to be the side-wheeler “Potomac”, 327
At the time of the collision both steamer and launch were proceeding at full speed, the Potomac being the faster vessel by perhaps three or four miles an hour.
Libelant, a guest of the owner of the Seabird, was struck by the wreckage and seriously injured. The trial court found the Potomac solely at fault and awarded him damages in the sum of $3,750.
The single question on this appeal is whether the evidence required a finding that the Seabird, after agreeing to the starboard to port passing, turned suddenly to port and directly in the path of the Potomac, as is claimed by the respondent, so as to make a collision unavoidable. The trial court, after seeing and hearing the witnesses, found all the disputed facts in favor of libelant and, unless we are able to say as the result of our examination of the evidence that the findings are manifestly wrong, we ought not to disturb them. Norfolk Tidewater Terminals v. Wood Towing Corp., 4 Cir., 94 F.2d 164.
The evidence for both steamer and and launch definitely shows that the Potomac was the burdened vessel. As such she was in duty bound, in passing, to allow a sufficient distance between herself and the Seabird for a safe passage.
This view is strengthened by the evidence in relation to the damage sustained by the Seabird or, perhaps stated more accurately,- the lack of damage to that part of the launch which it is claimed first came into contact with the steamer. The respondent’s evidence in this respect is that, when the Seabird turned to port and up to the time of impact, she was running around nine or ten miles an hour and that at this speed her stem struck the starboard bow of the Potomac; and yet, when shortly after the collision the Seabird was surveyed, there was no indication of injury to her stem, nor were there any markings or scrapings which would indicate that any part of her hull forward of amidships had come into contact with the Potomac. And, in addition to that, there was no mark or indication of injury to the Potomac where the Seabird is said to have hit. It is going too far to ask us to believe the collision could have occurred without some indication of injury to one or the other or both of the vessels at the points of impact. The damage which did occur to the port quarter of the superstructure of the Seabird is, on the other hand, entirely consistent with the evidence of libelant’s witnesses, for if the Potomac attempted to pass the launch only a few feet away, the suction of her displacement wave would explain the collision exactly as they say it happened. The Robert Fulton, supra.
On the whole case, we think that there is substantial evidence to sustain the District Court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law, and the challenge to the amount of the award being unsupported by substantial evidence, the decree of the District Court should be, and is, affirmed.
Affirmed.
Article 24, Inland Rules, 33 U.S.C.A. § 209: Notwithstanding anything contained in these rules every vessel, overtaking any other, shall keep out of the way of the overtaken vessel.
Article 23, Inland Rules, 33 U.S.C.A. § 208: Every steam vessel which is directed by these rules to keep out of the way of another vessel shall, on approaching her, if necessary, slacken her speed or stop or reverse.
The Bermuda, D.C., 17 F. 397; The Brandon, D.C., 237 F. 252; The Merrill C. Hart, 2 Cir., 188 F. 49; The Georgia, 2 Cir., 18 F.2d 743.
The Carroll, 8 Wall. 302, 19 L.Ed. 392.
“It is always improbable, and generally false”. Haney et al. v. Baltimore Steam Packet Company, 23 How. 287, 291, 16 L.Ed. 562.