Potomac Passengers Association v. Chesapeake and Ohio Railway Company, a Corporation

course, on remand the Com- Of dard. full discretion to have re- will mission herein, raised only issues solve relevant issues it may other also We are confident appropriate. deem expertise, once ap- the Commission’s articulated, allay any trep- will plied expressed. have

idation

Remanded.

POTOMAC PASSENGERS ASSOCIATION,

Appellant, AND OHIO

CHESAPEAKE RAILWAY COMPANY, corporation, et al.

No. 73-2015. Appeals,

United States Court of of Columbia Circuit. Nov.,

Argued 6 Sept.,

Decided 25

Rehearing Rehearing En Banc

Denied Nov. C., Dostert, Washington, D. E.

Pierre appellant. for Jr., Washington, D. Pipkin, H. James Miller, C., E. Mi- with whom William C., Wyatt, Washington, D. and K. chael Baltimore, Smith, Jr., Md., O. Robert appellees. for the brief were on FAHY, Judge, Circuit Before Senior WILKEY, and Circuit ROBINSON and Judges. by for the Court filed Circuit

Opinion Wilkey. Judge Concurring filed Senior Cir- Judge FAHY. cuit WILKEY, Judge: Circuit April Passengers 1971 Potomac On (“Association”) Association filed suit in against the District Court the Chesa Railway peake Company Ohio Compa Baltimore and Ohio Railroad O”) (“C enjoin & O/B & ny the dis of nine passenger pro trains continuance viding service Cumberland, between Washington, Maryland D. C. The as one suit was characterized for viola Passenger the Rail tion of Service Act of (“Amtrak Act”).1 The District held the Association had no stand ing to sue under section 307 of the Act2 complaint.3 and dismissed that, appeal this while On court found admittedly sought suit Association’s interpretation of the judicial properly be it could not considered a a violation of and there- for standing controlled was not fore We reversed requirement of section 307. or, seq. (1970). torney of the United in a 1. 45 U.S.C. 501 et General States involving agreement, upon peti- a labor provides: any employee thereby, in- tion of affected any (a) Corporation or railroad en- If the duly cluding employee represent- authorized action, any practice, gages in or adheres to atives, grant equitable may such relief as policy policies or inconsistent with the necessary prevent or or chapter, purposes of this obstructs or inter- violation, conduct, any or threat. terminate any activities authorized feres with (b) Nothing contained in this section shall refuses, fails, neglects chapter, to dis- relieving any person any be construed as responsibilities charge its duties and liability, may punishment, or sanction which violation, chapter, such or threatens this obstruction, imposed chap- otherwise than under this interference, refusal, failure, or ter. neglect, court of the United the district Corpora- States for district in which the Railway Hodgson, Unions v. person may resides or be found tion or other (D.D.C.1971). F.Supp. jurisdiction, except shall have as otherwise prohibited by law, upon petition the At- Court, holding that the Asso uneconomic operations, train standing however, Congress had under 28 ciation in 1958 enacted sec to sue a declaratory judg 13a of the Interstate Commerce as to gives ment This section involved Act.9 railroads seek provided “intercity” particular or “commuter terminate a interstate option short-haul” service service the other meaning within the train of bypassing the agencies of the Act.5 by filing a notice of dis continuance with the Interstate Com judge remand the trial referred On merce Commission. Unless the Commis question to the Interstate Commerce finds the sion contrary is advisory opinion.6 for an Commission public interest, the railroad may Commission’s of 25 June halt service thirty days filing.10 after none of the trains in held that 1973 13a entirely permissive. Section is “commuter If provided and other volved service”; railroad does not choose to therefore, file with the C & O/B short-haul Commission, jurisdiction is retained was free to discontinue the trains. O& agencies.11 the state August of 3 By order 1973 the District adopted findings of fact and The Amtrak Act was enacted in 1970 of law of the Commission.7 conclusions order ensure the maintenance of a is the instant order This national intercity rail passenger service appeal. network. The more efficient elimination of uneconomic routes among AND LEGAL I. FACTUAL BACK- Congress means selected to achieve this GROUND goal.12 Since the Amtrak applies Prior to 1958 the discontinuance aof “intercity rail passenger train, regardless type of service it service,”13 provisions its do not affect required provided, approval of the the discontinuance of commuter trains. regulatory agency in each of For commuter train discontinuance the through states the train discretionary approval of regula In an effort to reduce passed.8 losses on tory agencies (at the railroad’s option) provides: 4. 28 1337 U.S.C. properly can Passenger Corp. be inferred.” National Railroad original juris- district v. courts shall have National Association of any Passengers, 453, proceeding 465, diction of civil action or Railroad 414 aris- 94 690, any 696, Act of regulating (1974) 38 L.Ed.2d 646 protecting commerce or against [hereinafter trade and referred to commerce N.R.P.C. v. N.A.R.P.]. monopolies. restraints and April 1973, App. Order of 25 Passengers Chesapeake 5. Potomac Ass’n v. App. 24. Co., Ry. U.S.App.D.C. 214, 229-33, Ohio (1973). 475 F.2d This case was City Chicago, 8. See United States v. consolidated with another before the U.S. (1970). 91 S.Ct. n. L.Ed.2d 9 Passengers National Association of Railroad v. Georgia Co., Railway Central whose com clearly plaint (1970). made 9. 49 out 13a violation of the Am trak Act and which had also been dismissed generally P., 10. See N. R. P. C. v. N. A. R. standing. Reversing judge, for lack of the trial (1974). U.S. at 462 n. 94 S.Ct. 690 held that section 307 did not constitute a Kennedy Co., 11. See Baltimore & Ohio R. private bar to maintenance of such a suit (1972). 342 I.C.C. organization and that in the Dis grounded trict Court could be on 28 U.S.C. P., 12. See N. R. P. C. v. N. A. R. 414 U.S. at 217-29, § 1337. 475 F.2d 94 S.Ct. 690 ap at 328-40. Our decision in that case was 13. Such service is defined in the Act as “all pealed (No appeal, Court. on passenger (A) rail service other than commut- hand, ruling the other was taken from our metropolitan er and other short-haul service in bar.) January the case at preme On 9 1974 the Su areas, usually and suburban characterized decision, Court overturned this court’s fare, multiple-ride reduced and commutation ground 307-provides on the that “§ the exclu tickets, by morning evening peak peri- any sive remedies for breaches of obligations imposed by duties or ” operations od . . 502(5). U.S.C. § that no additional cause of action to compliance provisions with enforce the Act’s admittedly not has approval been required. still is I.C.C. regula the state either however, sought from authorizes Act,14 the I.C.C.17 agencies or tory into a con has entered railroad Corporation to tract that the District Court had It followed intercity passenger train discontinue enjoin the discontinuance of simply notifying the I.C.C. right by trains. April intercity on rail to section they provide Pursuant If into a contract with is coneed service, entered B & O their discontinuance its re- Amtrak, relieving the railroad of commut provide If lawful. edly intercity service. service, continue since no notice of discontin sponsibility er advantage of the contract to yet O took has invoked B & uance ICC, involved in nine trains their discontinuance discontinue state, conten- the Association’s law. case. It is violation however, provided tion, these trains has no to Court The District enforcing other service” state injunction and short-haul law “commuter an issue instance, meaning of Act. do so the for to would within They in this therefore, not, jurisdiction be discontin- of primary the usurp the procedure set agencies abbreviated regulatory the would under ued state only through but procedure established the forth circumvent petitioning ap- the of its own laws. process to enforce regular the the or, agencies under section approval of the seek propriate B & O Should ICC, the an in 13a, I.C.C. from the discontinuances inconsistent with would junction last case was before this this When jurisdiction.18 primary ICC’s the seeking was both a Association the court question that the trains in determination was, is, Thus, it clear that commuter service15 and an in provided upon Act does not confer against their discontinuance.16 junction any special passengers railroad claimed the elimination Association operation of continued commuter in viola service would be commuter of that the To the extent Associa trains. responded: the Act. We tion complaint premised upon was tion’s assumption nothing to do with com- that the discontinuance of The Act has Act, at If the trains issue train would violate trains. it muter commuter intercity rail serv- as a matter of law to state a provide failed cause contends, this, there is no ice, previous as B & In view of O of action.19 but that their discontinuance question which included author of the panel, Act. If the trains opinion, examined the lawful under Associa is complaint closely other short-haul provide commuter and determine if it tion’s alleges, there is service, appellant read otherwise to state a could be viable their but that discontin- claim. We found such a claim in question prayer under unlawful —not the District Association’s uance referring the laws of the an order issue inter Court they pass, since issue I.C.C. for an through city-commuter states Ibid, (footnotes omitted). 561. 18. 14. Specifically, requested the Association an Moreover, request if the Association’s referring order this to the I.C.C. upon injunctive alleged relief was based Initially, only trains six were involved. On duty breach of the railroad’s under the Amtrak from this the District remand Court al- 307 of the Act would bar petition Association to amend lowed the its duty. to enforce the Association See note alleged nine the number of trains it increase to 5, supra. wrongfully discontinued. had been 475 F.2d at 343 (footnotes omitted) added). (emphasis all We determined found nine provided opinion.20 trains advisory “in- tercity” an asser service tantamount within the meaning was request this Amtrak Act. The in the District Court ap- Association jurisdiction declaratory judgment peals declaratory as to this judgment. render question provided trains whether QUESTION II. THE OF JURISDIC- service or “commuter “intercity” TION UNDER 28 U.S.C. §§ within service” short-haul other concluded that the Act. We meaning of the District Both decision the Association and de power. fendants C & have O/B & O briefed Court’s us, first, argued meaning may decide whether dis [T]he “intercity” terms and “commuter is still these sub continuance short-haul” other the Amtrak Act the state ject and, application second their to the facts agencies and the ICC or regulatory approach case. Their of this was to be exempted from are such expected, in view of this court’s earlier by the Amtrak Act. The ordering the District Court interpretation in this case is issue sole the merits reach controversy. regulating law of a rail merits, own review however, Our roads, and the case is therefore one led us to jurisdictional has reassess meeting require foundation suit. fully While of 28 U.S.C. ments court’s, respect aware due this pri- grants jurisdiction of civil actions aris regretful or of the expendi any Act of Congress under regu of tures time energy which have lating commerce. The to con gone litigation, into the after a the Amtrak Act strue and declare the searching inquiry we have come to the of nature these trains is subsumed reluctant conclusion that our prior deci power granted the De respect with sion to the District Court’s claratory Judgment 28 U.S.C. subject jurisdiction matter was incorrect (1970).21 § a matter of as law.22 We therefore remanded the case to the with adju- District Court instructions The Association invoked the Dis controversy. dicate the merits of authority trict Court’s under 28 U.S.C. Following decision, the ICC’s the District “original which jurisdic- § confers omy generally 20. 154 at 233 n. forecloses on a 475 F.2d at second —which appeal n. 27. reconsideration of an issue decided appeal (see during Appeal first 5B C.J.S. & Id. at 475 F.2d at 344. (Cum.Supp.1975) Error ap §§ 1821-34 —can ply question subject jurisdic to the matter commonplace procedural It is a of federal powerless adjudi tion. If a federal court is appellate, trial law that or controversy, duty-bound recog cate a it is duty subject has a to notice a failure of matter fact, nize that however belated its realization. jurisdiction on its own motion at time place In the second the doctrine is discretion during proceedings. generally See “merely ary. expresses practice It Miller, Wright & Federal Practice and Proce generally reopen courts refuse what has dure, (Cum.Supp.1974). at 545-46 decided, power.” been not a limit to their suit, parties That both and the trial Messenger Anderson, 436, 444, 225 U.S. proceeded assumption judge, on the 739, 740, (1912). L.Ed. 1152 S.ct. When an properly before the District case Court appellate court makes so fundamental an error responsibility. our not alter Federal sub does sustaining as that of federal matter ject matter cannot be created exists, where none we think the waiver, consent, estoppel. Mansfield, or even court must exercise its discretion to correct Swan, 379, 382, Ry. M. Co. v. C. & L. See, g., that mistake. e. Lebold v. Inland Steel generally L.Ed. 462 See Co., (7th 1943); 136 F.2d Cir. Miller, supra, Moreover, Wright & Brown Telegra v. Gesellschaft Fur Drahtlose of “law of the case” does not bar our doctrine H., phic, U.S.App.D.C. 94, 95, M. B. place, the first it is of the issue. In review (1939) F.2d and cases cited therein. judicial problematic whether this rule of econ- claim, though this even to a state proceeding action or any civil tion de anticipate plaintiff tries Congress regu any Act of arising under complaint.26 in his The .23 fense . lating commerce juris Court’s crucial quiry application of A classic this doctrine Association’s suit to whether diction Court, was made regu statute a federal under” “aris[es] R. Co. v. Louisville Nashville question is much commerce.24 The lating Mottley.27 plaintiffs The in that case 1331(a),25 same performance specific for brought suit the action latter under the except for free passes life-time contract or the Constitution may arise given the railroad had them in 1871 in so States the United treaty of law damage of a They settlement claim. al controversy ex amount in as the long ground leged upon sole law that case $10,000. It follows ceeds based its comply the railroad refusal to an action question whether on the contract was a 1906 amendment of section purposes under” “arises prohibit to the Interstate Commerce Act ing important to considera 1331(a) highly passes free amendment —which question under the same argued applied was unconstitutional as held to them. that since question as arise difficulty with this court’s specific perform suit for defense lies in conclusion our earlier might' ance, though it even be the sole of com though the discontinuance even case, it was an issue in ineffectual approval without the muter jurisdiction. for federal basis agencies is a “violation law,” the state, not Although has been criti an Act of this doctrine “arises under” nevertheless advancing form over sub often It has commerce. cized stance, regulating firmly it is established. The Su action that an does long been settled repeatedly resisted Court has ef preme if the federal federal law under” “arise particular it.28 Of to undermine only by way of defense forts enters element, one, pursuant an essential of invoked was also an the Jurisdiction right appear (1970), plaintiffs or it would not cause of action. The im- U.S.C. 20§ 49 help munity sup- that must be such it will be the Association’s cause. this can that jurisdiction 20(9) ported on district if the or laws of Constitution confers given courts, application Attorney one construction upon States are or Gen- United effect, eral, request if of the Interstate Commerce and defeated receive another. at the Commission, alleging present controversy, Chapter genuine a 1 of violation A merely not conjectural one, possibility or Interstate Commerce a Part I of the must of thereto, commanding mandamus a com- with reference and the contro- a writ of exist issue provisions comply upon versy of be disclosed the face of carrier must mon apparently complaint, chapter. The effort unaided answer that Indeed,- complaint itself 13a of the Act as a will not avail section utilize base; as 307(a) jurisdiction goes insofar more than from of of as it but no a basis be- appear plaintiff’s yond that Act does it a a statement of cause of replies anticipates proba- provi- or can be to a of action derived from the cause action 2, supra. 20(9). See notes 5 of ble defense. sions Bank, Gully 299 v. First Nat’l 3], 112- Moore, at Practice 110.60[8. 24. 1. Federal — 96, 97, (1936) (cita- L.Ed. S.ct. 1948). (2d ed. omitted, emphasis supplied). tions See also 1331(a) provides: 25. Section Moore, collected at Federal cases Practice original juris- courts shall have The district 2.07, (2d 1948). at 400 nn. 20-24 ed. H wherein civil actions the matter diction of all controversy 211 U.S. 29 S.Ct. the sum or value in exceeds L.Ed. 126 costs, $10,000, of interest and exclusive Constitution, laws, trea- or arises under Significantly, the rule extends even to those United States. ties of the cases, bar, such as the case at where state 1331(a) (1970). jurisdiction agencies or courts retain over a subject particular only immunity matter [A] or created the Consti- the suffer- Congress. generally See tution States ance or laws United must Hart & regulatory only agency, a or a to the instant case is relevance court, enjoin railroads’ Skelly court’s Oil Co. v. Phil By coming Co.,29 to Federal lips Petroleum where action. it made clear anticipated Association effect has C & passage that the Federal Declara defense, & federal O’s which could tory Judgment Act30 O/B change did not only proceedings, be raised in state anticipated based rule federal defense exemption upon regula- from state plaintiff be used gain cannot tion contained in the Amtrak Act for the access federal courts. of “intercity” trains. Declaratory Judgment Act al- ' given by way relief lowed clear, then, It seems plaintiff’s right even recognizing the has never subject had though enforcement no immediate jurisdiction to matter entertain this suit. requirements But the it was asked. suit does not so arise “[A] [under limited mat- —the laws of the United unless it real States] Congress has which alone autho- ters substantially ly dispute involves a or adjudi- Courts rized the District controversy respecting validity, con repealed impliedly cate —were not law, or effect of such struction upon modified. the determination of which the result de 32 The pends.” construction of the words

“intercity” and “commuter” cannot be a dispute arising under here, statute plaintiff’s claim itself must for, pointed above, as out whichever a federal “unaided by properly applicable term is to each of alleged anticipation anything services, these railroad the plaintiff can avoidance of defenses which it prevail thereby. litigant A cannot thought may interpose.” the defendant invoke federal merely to de Anderson, Taylor 234 U.S. by which termine rationale he loses.33 S.Ct. L.Ed. Louisville Even if sole issue in this “[t]he case is Mottley, & Nashville R. Co. v. 211 U.S. interpretation of a federal regulat law 149, 152, 42, 43, L.Ed. 126.31 railroads,” issue properly arises defense to an action under state law. As emphasized above, point can to no The Association fact the Declaratory Judgment imposes law in this party enables a anticipate a de duty on C & O/B O to continue the in advance of seeking fense a remedy question. of the nine trains in operation not mean he does can avoid juris character, “intercity” they were If requirements. dictional discontinued; lawfully if “commuter” trains, only Moreover, can their discontinuance it is misleading say that latter, law. violated state If sole issue in the have case is the Wechsler, The Federal Courts and Federal 31. 339 U.S. at 70 S.Ct. at 879. (1973). System Under its commerce easily placed power, Congress could have all McDougal, 561, Shulthis v. 225 U.S. 32 704, 706, train discontinuances control over commuter (1912). S.Ct. 56 L.Ed. 1205 Instead, jurisdic- it left in the federal courts. immunity “The must be such that it regulatory agencies, except tion in the state supported will be if the Constitution or laws railroad files notice of those cases where given of the United States are one construc- ICC effect, tion or and defeated if receive only the 13a. In the latter situation ICC has Gully Bank, another.” v. First Nat’l note jurisdiction. supra. 667, 70 L.Ed. U.S. S.Ct. 94 1194 29. 339 U.S.App.D.C. 34. 154 475 F.2d at 344. (1950). (1970). 28 U.S.C. validity of the discontinuance exemption. Ultimately, trains, issue, if important the Associa another prevail, must tois aas properly be characterized cannot “public meet the conve discontinuances of the Amtrak for a violation necessity” requirements nience therefore not controlled it is law. Under state statutory standing requirement of Section scheme, if a state elected to suit, properly this under- Instead 307. stood, railroads discontinue commuter allow declaratory judgment seeks all, approval at without by B & trains discontinued O acting preroga within its would be and are “commuter” service provide aggrieved party would have An tive. coverage outside therefore either a court or the recourse is, Act—that that their discon- ju (Only a railroad can invoke the ICC nor is neither authorized tinuance 13a, under section of the ICC risdiction subject by the Act but is barred obviously unlikely the railroad is which regu- jurisdiction of state pre-existing ruling gets a favorable from a if it to do agencies and the ICC. We hold latory case, agency.) In the instant how the District Court has ever, Maryland West Virginia have declaratory the merits of hear require the railroads to secure chosen reverse and therefore judgment and their approval for discontinuance official remand. approval, to obtain such Failure s.35 federal, law.36 Association, situation in is a violation of it can state, help ^{[*] [*] [*] [*]} sf: $ interpre- The sole issue in this case is up- sum, reluctant while we are In law regulating of a federal tation decision, are of the we prior own our set railroads, and the case is therefore one has the court view no federal-

firm meeting require- entertain this suit. Because power ments of U.S.C. jurisdic- matter failure this tion, jurisdiction of civil actions aris- grants must reverse District Court regu- Act of with instructions to dismiss remand lating commerce. The to con- case. the Amtrak Act and strue declare the of these trains is subsumed nature FAHY, Judge (concur- Senior Circuit power granted by the De- ring): Judgment claratory in the in the result reached I concur Wilkey, for reasons Judge subsequently decided case of Na- explained. now Passenger Corp. Railroad v. Na- tional before, Passengers, litigation tional Ass’n of Railroad When was here v. Chesa- L.Ed.2d Passengers in Potomac Ass’n (1974) (NARP), is I think inconsistent Co., Ry.

peake & Ohio 325, 341, position (1973), the with above controls this 475 F.2d association, the issue as to case. In NARP decided Assuming standing, Md., such the state court or (1969); 35. 7A Ann.Code of Art. 72 § juris- might primary agency still defer to the Ann. § W.Va.Code 24-3-1 question of the char- diction of the ICC on express question 36. We no on the “intercity” in the Amtrak Act. acterization standing the Association has however, not, request They a federal could state law to file suit in state or a com- advisory opinion the is- to issue on plaint regulatory agency with the sue. (see, Md., g., e. 7A Ann.Code of Art. 99§ (1969)), enjoin of a discontinuance train. purposes ap- all relevant for PPA, similar under section 307 of the Amtrak sued in District Court pellant only the Attorney Act General had a discontinuance of prevent pas- certain to senger in cause of action presente situation trains, not, here, as because they d,2 distinguish which I cannot legally, instead of intercity commuter were of a insofar as the existence cause of trains, parent because the railroad concerned, is action from our case. If in (Southern) subsidiary of- the railroad case the trains were our commuter (Central Georgia), proposed which validly be not by ap could discontinued trains, had discontinue not entered appellees were pellees, for under con with into a contract Amtrak. The Court In that tract with Amtrak. ap situation out, pointed validly could discontinue pellees only in tercity question trains.3 The to be decid 401(a)(1) § Since Amtrak [of Act] accordingly is whether the ed discontin only a contract authorizes for Amtrak uances constituted violations of the Act to undertake a respon- railroad’s entire by appellees on the ground the intercity for sibility service, passenger rail commuter. If in parent were NARP the respondent contends that required itself was railroad have had cannot only Southern relieve itself of contract with Amtrak trains would part responsibility of this by allowing discontinued in Act, violation of the subsidiary to contract with Amtrak only the subsidiary proposed for declining itself while to do so. Ac- them discontinue had such a contract. cordingly, the respondent argues that Supreme Court Central, The held the resolu having Southern entered question, light of the of section statutorily authorized contract with Amtrak, only 404(a), litigated prohibited by are 45 307 Attorney of the 564(a), Thus, the suit General. from discontinuing when, there, NARP holds that as any passenger January train before and as me, our case it seems to question is to be decided whether not the rail n.3, Id. at 455 at 692. S.Ct. has violated the road cause The Court stated: question action to determine the resides gravamen respondent’s Attorney in the General. Accord was that these discontin- complaint ingly, no cause of action arose in the are not by, uances authorized and in case which had standing PPA prohibited by, the fact are litigate. omitted.) (Footnote Act. As possibility aof different con- Id. at at 691. clusion virtue of our gravamen our case the In PPA’s court in Passengers, Potomac supra, as complaint properly is stated in similar out, pointed considered the ease when it terms, that the discontinuances “are not was here before to be one meeting the by, prohibited authorized and in fact are jurisdictional requirements of provi- Act,” by, is, they are Code, sion the Judicial grants by a prohibited railroad under contract “jurisdiction of civil actions arising un- Amtrak, as is the with situation with der Act of regulating com- appellees.1 respect Douglas merce.” Mr. Justice in his dis- heavily upon legislative histo- Relying possible sent called attention to this ba- in NARP ry the held NARP, sis stating, respect 1. The permits a railroad passenger of commuter rail which has a contract with Amtrak to be re- responsibility a railroad not pro- service under contract with lieved entire “of its for the necessary intercity to be decided. passenger vision of rail service.” “Intercity rail service” is defined in only exception is the (5), passen- subsection “all rail involving agreements. gives labor in cases ger (A) service other than commuter and other short-haul . .” service . . untouched left “Congress at (NARP, supra, . . . AVRECH, Appellant, Mark otherwise. decided 468.) But the Court v. to Indeed, 1337 available were judg declaratory PPA to obtain the enable OF NAVY. SECRETARY Act of the Amtrak ment, section 307 No. 71-1841. by indirection stripped would Appeals, Court of United States held it was Supreme Court purpose District of Columbia Circuit. serve, manner sole furnish obligations the rail duties 6 Feb. 1975. Reargued Act Amtrak arising under roads Sept., Decided his con And in be determined.4 were curring rec opinion Mr. Justice Brennan availa remedy saw no this. He ognized would have under ble only, open left private suit for

mandamus against be maintained the At

might his refusal to act

torney General if though 307—even authority “beyond of his

letter —went discretion.” any rational exercise of rel. States ex Schonbrun United Officer, Forces, Commanding Armed ,5 (CA2 1968) F.2d . .

NARP, supra, 414 U.S. at 94 S.Ct. foregoing I the inter- think

From Supreme Court

vening decision of that no requires that hold'

NARP accrued PPA to chal- of action

cause lenge Court the discontin- trains. As I read the of these

uance holds that NARP Court operation successful part placed upon Act

Amtrak Attorney responsibility General by railroads with

seeking compliance responsibilities under the Act.

their decision of the District

Accordingly, the the. reversed and should be enable dismiss

remanded complaint. Attorney analogous pointed General is not It in footnote without out 9 of opinion predating precedent. that under laws Court’s Act, Congress had reme- also excluded Judge 5. The Wilkey is based on aggrieved by parties discontinuance of dies unavailability additional reasons for the of sec- Accordingly, restriction in service. train remedy precludes through parties unless obtained

Case Details

Case Name: Potomac Passengers Association v. Chesapeake and Ohio Railway Company, a Corporation

Court Name: Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit

Date Published: Sep 25, 1975

Citation: 520 F.2d 91

Docket Number: 73-2015

Court Abbreviation: D.C. Cir.