OPINION
§1 Appellant Gilbert Ray Postelle was tried by jury and convicted in the District Court of Oklahoma County, Case No. CF-2005-4759, of four counts of First Degree Murder (Counts 1-4), in violation of 21 O.S.Supp.2004, § 701.7, and one count of Conspiracy to Commit a Felony (Count 5), in violation of 21 O.S.2001 § 421.
BACKGROUND
2 On Memorial Day, 2005, James Donnie Swindle, Terry Smith, Amy Wright and James Alderson were shot to death outside Swindle's trailer located next to a salvage yard and alignment shop in an industrial area of Del City, Oklahoma.
13 Oklahoma City Police Officer Rocky Gregory was on traffic duty down the street from the salvage yard when two people approached him and reported hearing gunfire from the vicinity of the salvage yard. Gregory and his partner investigated and found Smith and Swindle, each dead from multiple gunshot wounds. The bodies of the two other victims, Alderson and Wright, were discovered further north after other officers arrived.
14 Several people who were at the Pos-telle home on Memorial Day testified at Gilbert Postelle's trial, including Crystal Bau-mann,
T5 Later that day, Gilbert, David and Brad Postelle, along with Wilder, Baumann and Randall Byus left in the Postelles' maroon Dodge Caravan. Baumann denied knowing about a plan to shoot Swindle at the time they left. She and Wilder were dropped off at the home of Wilder's brother. Wilder, however, testified that he had heard the Postelles talking about a plan to go to Swindle's house and shoot him. He was unsure they would go through with it, but their conversation worried Wilder enough to insist the Postelles take him and Baumann home. Hours later David Postelle returned Wilder's MAK-90 to him. Wilder and Bau-mann took the gun to their storage unit and hid it. Wilder heard about the murders from a friend, put "two-and-two together" and worried that the rifle he had left in the Postelles' minivan had been used in the murders. Wilder's fear that the Postelles had used his rifle to commit murder was confirmed when he saw the Postelles' minivan leaving Swindle's property on a surveillance camera video on the local news. A few days after the murders, Gilbert Postelle told Wilder how he had chased everyone outside after breaching the door of Swindle's trailer
T6 Jay Sanders testified that he had been living at the Postelle home the month before the murders.
T7 On Memorial Day, Sanders said he was in and out of the smoke room throughout the day, getting high and working on his broken-down van. Sanders was in the smoke room when he learned that the Postelles were going to go target shooting. Sanders said someone put the SKS rifle in the Postelles' minivan, and he helped Brad Postelle into the van. David, Gilbert and Brad Postelle left with Wilder and Byus, but only the Pos-telles returned.
1 8 Sanders testified that a couple of days after the murders, the Postelles were discussing different ideas about what to do with the minivan "since it might be the van on the news." It was decided that Sanders and Daniel Ashcraft would take the minivan to Indiana, set it on fire and ultimately put it in a lake.
T9 The State's firearm and toolmark examiner examined the many casings collected at the murder seene and determined that they were fired from two guns: Wilder's MAK-90 rifle and another rifle, possibly an SKS rifle. David Postelle's SKS rifle was never found. Law enforcement located the Postelles' van in Indiana and searched it. The alterations to the van observed by the investigators were consistent with Sanders's testimony about efforts to disguise it.
10 Randall Byus was with the Postelles when they shot the victims. According to Byus, he accompanied the Postelles, Wilder and Baumann, believing the Postelles were taking Baumann and Wilder home and then going target shooting. He saw Wilder's MAK-90 and David Postelle's SKS rifle in the Postelles' minivan. Nothing appeared unusual as they dropped off Baumann and Wilder. When David Postelle turned the van around and headed away from their normal place for target shooting, Byus asked where they were going, and was told that they were going to Swindle's house first, for some "shit," which Byus understood meant drugs. Byus first understood the Postelles' murderous plan when Gilbert Postelle asked his father a block from Swindle's trailer what to do if Donnie Swindle's father was there and Brad Postelle said to kill everybody there. Byus voiced disbelief and Brad Postelle responded that Donnie Swindle had tried to kill him. At the trailer, Byus witnessed Gilbert Postelle open the van door and shoot Terry Smith, who was near the minivan, in the face. Gilbert Postelle and his father then shot Donnie Swindle, causing him to fall to the ground. Swindle looked up and asked what
1. Sufficiency of the Evidence
1 11 Postelle argues that the only evidence putting him among the assailants at the murder scene and implicating him in these crimes was the trial testimony of accomplices, namely Randall Byus, Arthur Wilder, Crystal Baumann and Jay Sanders. The accomplice testimony, he contends, was not sufficiently corroborated resulting in insufficient evidence to support his convictions. Postelle filed a Motion to Quash and Dismiss prior to trial, arguing that the lack of corroborating evidence of accomplice testimony required dismissal. The district court denied the motion. Postelle demurred to the State's evidence during trial, renewing the argument that there was no corroboration of the accomplice testimony.
112 This Court will uphold a verdict of guilt if, after reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, any rational trier of fact could have found the elements of the charged crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Logsdon v. State,
113 Under Oklahoma law, a convietion cannot rest upon the testimony of an accomplice unless the accomplice's testimony is corroborated by other evidence that tends to connect the defendant with the commis-
sion of the offense. 22 O.S.2001, § 742. Accomplice testimony must be corroborated with evidence that, standing alone, tends to link the defendant to the commission of the crime charged. Pink v. State,
T14 Specifically, Postelle argues that Randall Byus was an accomplice and that Byus's testimony placing him at the murder seene was not corroborated by independent evidence. Postelle contends that the testimony of Baumann, Wilder and Sanders is insufficient to corroborate Byus's testimony because they are accomplices as well. Furthermore, Postelle argues that, even if the testimony of Baumann, Wilder and Sanders is sufficient to corroborate Byus's testimony that he was present during the murders, these witnesses cannot corroborate Byus's testimony that Postelle shot each victim and was responsible for all four murders.
115 A witness is an accomplice to the crime at trial if the witness could be charged with the same offense. Jones v. State,
T 16 Randall Byus admitted being present when the murders were committed and his DNA was found on one of the projectiles found at the murder seene. He was charged in the same Information as Postelle with four counts of First Degree Murder and one count of Conspiracy. Byus ultimately pled guilty before his scheduled trial to "accessory" as part of an agreement providing for his cooperation and testimony in this case. Regardless of the crime for which he was ultimately convieted, a rational jury could have rejected Byus's trial testimony minimizing his involvement and found that he participated in the murders and was properly charged with Postelle as an accomplice. Under the test for accomplice liability, the evidence was susceptible to a finding that Byus and Wilder were accomplices whose testimony required corroboration. There is no evidence, however, supporting a finding that either Baumann or Sanders were present during the murders or aided or encouraged the commission of the murders in any way beforehand. Hence, they could not be accomplices to the murders and their testimony could be considered without any need for corroborating evidence. Their testimony can also provide the necessary independent evidence to corroborate the testimony of Byus and Wilder. Cummings,
T 17 Sanders testified that he helped Brad Postelle into the Postelles® maroon Dodge Caravan to go target shooting with his sons, and Byus and Wilder in the late afternoon of Memorial Day 2005. He saw David Pos-telle's SKS rifle in the van; Wilder's MAK-90 was proven to be one of the two weapons used in the killings. Sanders recognized the Postelles' van entering and leaving Swindle's property on the surveillance videotape on the news because of a missing hubcap. Sanders testified about conversations with Gilbert Postelle and his family about concealing evidence and concocting a story to tell the police. Sanders also repeated an admission he heard Gilbert Postelle make about killing Amy Wright while he mimed shooting a rifle. Baumann heard Gilbert Postelle take responsibility for the murders on another occasion and observed him make a "spraying" motion as though he were shooting people. Postelle threatened Baumann, ordering her to say nothing about what she had heard. Bau-mann said that Gilbert Postelle mentioned his gun jamming when he switched clips. The State's firearms expert testified that a live round is often ejected to clear a gun jam and one live round was found at the crime scene. The discovery of the live round further corroborates Gilbert Postelle's confession and, in turn, Baumann's testimony repeating it.
118 If an accomplice's testimony is corroborated as to one material fact by independent evidence tending to connect the accused with the commission of the crime, the jury may infer that the accomplice speaks the truth as to all. Glossip,
T19 Postelle also claims the evidence was insufficient to prove he was part of a conspiracy to commit murder. He maintains that the evidence showed that he was not a party to a conspiracy to murder, but rather simply followed the order his father gave as they pulled into Swindle's driveway-to kill everyone at Swindle's trailer. We disagree. Gilbert Postelle's actions and statements prove otherwise.
120 The evidence showed that Postelle had gone to a friend's house for ammunition earlier that day. He and Wilder loaded and taped together two thirty-round clips for Wilder's MAK-90. According to Wilder, both Gilbert and David Postelle had discussed shooting Swindle in revenge for causing their father's motorcycle accident. When Byus voiced concern and objection to Brad Pos-telle's direction to kill everyone there, Gilbert Postelle told Byus that Swindle was the one responsible for his father's motorcycle wreck. This evidence tended to prove that Gilbert Postelle knew they were there to kill Swindle and that he was part of a conspiracy to murder him. The conspirators' plan included leaving no witnesses and Postelle simply hoped that he would not have to kill someone he liked. The evidence was sufficient for a rational jury to find Postelle guilty of conspiracy to commit murder beyond a reasonable doubt. Postelle's claims challenging the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions are denied.
2. Accomplice Instructions
121 Postelle argues that the district court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the need for corroboration of accomplice testimony. Postelle requested accomplice instructions and the court denied the request, finding that the evidence did not support a finding that Byus, Wilder, Sanders or Bau-mann were accomplices.
122 This Court has set forth rules for submitting accomplice instructions many times.
If the evidence is uncontroverted and it establishes that the witness is an accomplice, the trial judge must so rule as a matter of law and instruct the jury that his testimony requires corroboration. Like wise, if the undisputed evidence indicates that the connection of the witness with the crime was innocent and lacking in criminal intent, or that he merely had knowledge and therefore is not an accomplice, the trial judge must so rule. However, if evidence is susceptible to alternative findings that the witness is or is not an accomplice, then the issue is a question of fact to be submitted to the jury under proper instruction.
Nunley v. State, 1979 OKCR 107, ¶ 10,
123 As discussed above, there was evidence from which a jury could find that both Byus and Wilder were accomplices.
3. Jury View
¶ 24 Postelle argues that the district court abused its discretion by allowing the jury to view the crime scene and a firearms demonstration at the Oklahoma City Police Department gun range. See Suggs v. State,
T25 Defense counsel objected neither to the jury view and the manner in which it was conducted nor to the firearms demonstration. Review is for plain error only. See Simpson v. State,
4. Identification
126 Postelle argues that he was denied due process by the admission of a tainted eyewitness identification of his brother, David Postelle. Postelle did not object to bartender Sandra Frame's identification of David Postelle on this basis; review is for plain error only. See Harmon v. State,
T 27 Frame identified David Postelle's photograph from a six-man photo line-up assembled by a police detective. Frame indicated that she was 85% sure the photo of David Postelle was the man she saw in the front passenger seat of the minivan leaving the crime scene. Postelle complains that Frame's extra-judicial identification should have been excluded because the photographic identification procedure ~ was impermissibly suggestive. He contends Frame's identification of David Postelle was tainted because she did not view the photo lineup until after she saw David Postelle's booking photograph in a newspaper article about the murders and because the photograph of David Postelle in the lineup was the same booking photo featured in the newspaper article.
128 The rule governing an eyewitness's identification of a defendant at trial after a pretrial identification of that defendant by a photograph was set forth in Simmons v. United States,
1 29 We do not decide if Postelle's right to due process was violated by admission of Frame's possibly tainted identification of someone else because we are convinced that error, if any, was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The key, and most compelling, evidence against Postelle came from Randall Byus, who was present during the murders and gave an eyewitness account of Postelle's murderous actions. His identification of Gilbert Postelle was not based on any pretrial identification by photograph, but rather on his personal observation and familiarity with Postelle. The evidence showed that Postelle used Wilder's MAK-90 in a lethal rampage that left four people dead. Postelle participated in conversations about covering up the crime and made statements implicating himself in the murders, particularly in the murder of Amy Wright. We conclude that the minds of an average jury would not have found the State's case significantly less persuasive had Frame's identification of David Postelle been excluded. Our review of the record leaves us with no reasonable doubt that the jury would have reached a different verdict without the identification. We find any error in the admission of Frame's identification of David Postelle did not contribute
5. Evidentiary Issues
1830 Postelle argues that the district court erred in admitting Sandra Frame's identification of David Postelle and the testimony of Richard Vinson concerning a conversation he had with David Postelle about one of the victims. The purpose of this evidence, according to Postelle, was to establish his guilt by his association with his brother. Postelle contends that the testimony should have been excluded because it was irrelevant; and alternatively, if the evidence was somehow relevant, it should have been excluded because it was overly prejudicial. Postelle did not object to the testimony of either witness; review is for plain error only. See Simpson v. State,
131 Relevant evidence is evidence having any tendency to make the existence of a fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. Taylor v. State,
132 Sandra Frame's identification of David Postelle as the passenger in the maroon minivan that she observed leaving the crime seene was relevant to establishing the identity of the perpetrators of the murders. Other witness testimony placed Postelle and his brother in the same van shortly before and after the murders with the murder weapons. Frame's testimony tended to prove and partially corroborate Byus's testimony that it was Gilbert, David and Brad with him in the van at the crime scene. Frame's testimony was probative of the identity of the perpetrators and was more probative than prejudicial in this case. Postelle has not shown that its admission was plain error.
1 33 The testimony of Richard Vinson was properly admitted. Vinson testified that David Postelle came to his shop a month before the murders and that David said he was angry with Donnie Swindle because some car parts had been stolen from the Postelles' car while it was stored on Swindle's property. Although it appears Gilbert Postelle was not present during this conversation, other testimony from Sanders and Pino Georgio Amico confirmed that both of the Postelle brothers were angry with Swindle about the car being vandalized. Vinson's testimony was probative of motive for the killings and explained how the Postelle brothers' anger over the stripped car may have contributed to Swindle being targeted. The testimony was relevant and any danger of unfair prejudice was outweighed by its probative value. There was no error here.
6. Photographs
184 Postelle argues that the district court erred and denied him the right of confrontation by excluding the in-life photograph of Donnie Swindle offered by the defense during the first-stage of trial. The prosecution, without objection, called a relative of each of the victims in the first-stage of trial to sponsor an in-life photograph of their loved one (State's Exhibits 11-14). See 12 O.S.Supp.2003, § 2403 (in homicide prosecutions, prosecutor may admit "appropriate photograph of the victim while alive" to show the victim's "general appearance and condition" while alive). James Swindle, Donnie Swindle's father, identified a photograph of his son and stated that the photograph was eight to ten years old. He admitted that his son had an ongoing methamphetamine problem at the time of his death. Defense coun
¶ 35 We review a district court's decision to admit or exclude evidence for an abuse of discretion. See Underwood v. State,
1 36 The question presented is whether the photograph Postelle sought to admit of Swindle was relevant in first-stage. Evidence is relevant when it has "any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." 12 O.S.2001, § 2401. There was no dispute that Donnie Swindle was murdered. The disputed issue in the first-stage of trial was who committed the murder and it was of no consequence whether Swindle was a community leader of impeccable reputation or a methamphetamine addict. The in-life photograph Pos-telle sought to introduce had no tendency to shed any light on the real issue, namely the identity of Swindle's killer. Arguably, the photograph was relevant in second-stage and it and a photograph of Terry Smith were admitted depicting their appearance and condition near the time of their deaths. We find that the exclusion of the defense's photograph of Swindle in the first-stage of trial was neither an abuse of discretion nor a denial of Postelle's right of confrontation.
7. Instructional Errors
137 Postelle claims the district court erred in rejecting two of his proposed instructions in the first-stage of trial. First, he complains that the court erred in rejecting defense counsel's proposed instruction telling the jury that plea bargains involving the requirement of truthful testimony did not constitute vouching by the prosecution. This instruction was directed towards the testimony of Byus, Wilder, Sanders and Baumann.
¶ 38 Rulings on jury instructions are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See Harney v. State,
¶ 39 In Nickell v. State,
140 There was no improper vouching in this case. The prosecution elicited from each witness that the operative plea agreement was contingent upon full cooperation with the State and truthful testimony during the proceedings against Postelle. Nothing in the plea agreements or in the record indicates that the prosecutor explicitly or implicitly suggested that he had means to verify the truthfulness of the testimony of Byus, Wilder, Sanders or Baumann. The court properly instructed the jury on evaluating the credibility of witnesses. Because evidence of truthfulness provisions in a plea agreement does not constitute impermissible vouching and there was no impermissible vouching elsewhere in this trial, we find the court did not err in rejecting Postelle's proposed instruction on the subject.
§41 Postelle also argues that the court erred in rejecting his proffered jury instruction on reasonable doubt. We have consistently and repeatedly held that reasonable doubt is self-explanatory, and that rather than clarifying the meaning of the phrase, definitions of reasonable doubt tend to confuse the jury.
8. Jury Selection: Individual Questioning and Questionnaires
¶ 42 Postelle claims that the jury selection process in his case denied him due process. He complains about the "struck juror" method used in selecting jurors in this case.
148 The purpose of voir dire examination is to discover whether there are grounds to challenge prospective jurors for cause and to permit the intelligent use of peremptory challenges. Sanches v. State,
144 Nor do we find that jury selection was unfair because the trial court chose not to conduct individual sequestered voir dire. We have left the decision regarding individual voir dire to the discretion of the district court and have rejected requests for a mandatory rule requiring the use of individual sequestered voir dire in capital cases. See Cuesta-Rodriguez,
" 45 Postelle cites remarks from several potential jurors exposed to news stories about the murders to argue that it was error not to conduct individual voir dire and not to allow questionnaires. The district court judge questioned these panelists to ensure that no one had formed an opinion about Postelle's guilt based upon what they had seen on the news. We give great deference to the district court's opinion of the candor of potential jurors because the judge sees the potential jurors and hears their responses. Id. at ¶ 14,
146 Nor can we find that the district court's decision denying the use of a jury questionnaire in this case amounted to an abuse of discretion. While the use of jury
9. Jury Selection: Erroneous Removal of Panelists for Cause Based on Opposition to the Death Penalty
147 Postelle claims that the district court failed to follow the proper procedure in excusing eight panelists for cause based upon the panelists' views on the death penalty. He argues that the district court judge did not ask the proper questions of potential jurors and that the judge should have given his attorney a chance to question panelists before they were excused based upon their expressed opposition to the death penalty.
148 A prospective juror must be excused for cause in a capital case when the panelist's views on capital punishment would "prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath." Wainwright v. Witt,
149 Witt requires only that each juror be willing to consider each of the three statutory punishments: the death penalty, life imprisonment without the possibility of parole and life imprisonment with the possibility of parole. Hogan v. State,
1 50 The eight prospective jurors identified by Postelle were all examined by the district court judge. Each of them stated unequivocally that under no cireumstances could he or she give meaningful consideration to the three penalties provided by law. The district eourt followed up on any response that could be construed as equivocal for assurance that the prospective juror could not follow the law. In the end, each panelist informed the court that he or she would not consider all three penalties regardless of the law and evidence.
151 A review of voir dire shows that the district court neither erred in denying defense counsel's request to further question these panelists nor erred in its questioning. "Where the trial court has appropriately questioned prospective jurors regarding their eligibility to serve on a capital jury, it is not
{ 52 The district court judge used an older version of the qualifying question for a capital case juror with Panelist G. When the mistake was brought to his attention, he substituted the question prescribed by OUJI-CR(2d) 1-5 for qualifying capital case jurors. The judge informed the panelists of the jury's duty to assess guilt and, if necessary, punishment, the three punishment options, the meaning of aggravating and mitigating cireumstances, and the requirement of weighing aggravating and mitigating circumstances.
10. Jury Selection: Implied Bias and 22 O.S.2001 § 660(8)
153 Postelle claims that it is a violation of 22 O.S.2001, § 660 to remove a prospective juror for cause based on the panelist's opposition to the death penalty because Section 660(8) allows for the removal of only those panelists whose views on capital punishment would prevent them from finding the
11. Lecture
154 Postelle claims that the district court judge made numerous improper comments during a "lecture" in voir dire that denied him due process and a fundamentally fair trial. Among other things, Postelle complains that the trial court judge gave instructions during voir dire that were designed to encourage jurors to abandon their own beliefs to reach a verdict and that these instructions had a coercive effect on the jury. He argues that the court's remarks were often biased in favor of the prosecution, diminished his presumption of innocence and were confusing and prejudicial. Because Postelle did not object to the remarks, we review for plain error. See McElmurry v. State,
1 55 "An important aspect of voir dire is to educate prospective jurors on what will be asked of them under the law." Eizember,
{56 In Johnson,
157 The remarks in Postelle's case are nothing like those condemned in Johnson. The trial court judge discussed neither the costs of the proceedings nor the ramifications of failing to follow the court's instructions. The court's commentary that was in addition to the material in the uniform instructions focused on the presumption of innocence, the burden of proof and some procedural aspects of the deliberation process. Contrary to Postelle's claim, the court's remarks concerning deliberations-that the jury would not be allowed to communicate with outsiders or separate until a verdiet was reached-did not compel jurors to hastily return a guilty verdict.
12. Constitutionality of Death Penalty: Proportionality Review
158 Postelle contends that Oklahoma's capital sentencing scheme is unconstitutional because this Court's appellate review does not include proportionality review. He claims that his case shows that death sentences in Oklahoma are imposed arbitrarily and capriciously because his brother received a sentence less than death based on almost identical evidence in both stages of trial.
159 The Supreme Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence has required that a state's capital sentencing scheme channel the sentencer's discretion by clear and objective standards that provide specific, detailed guidance and make the death sentencing process rationally reviewable on appeal. Sanchez,
1 60 To ensure the reliability of death verdicts, this Court is charged with conducting a mandatory review of every death sentence imposed to determine: 1) whether the death sentence was imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice or any other arbitrary factor; and 2) whether sufficient evidence was presented to support the jury's finding of statutory aggravating circumstances. 21 O.S.2001. § 701.13(C). This mandatory sentence review, as well as other procedural safeguards, provides a mechanism for meaningful appellate review to ensure that death sentences are not a product of arbitrary sentencing. The record before us shows that Postelle's jury was properly instructed on the statutory aggravating cireumstances alleged in this case. The capital jury instructions provided that Postelle's jury could not consider the death penalty unless it unanimously found at least one aggravating cireumstance beyond a reasonable doubt. Postelle's jury was further instructed that a death penalty verdict is never required, even where the balance of aggravating and mitigating factors may fully justify it It is apparent that Postelle's jury understood and followed these instructions because, despite finding the existence of two aggravating cireumstances on each of the four murder counts, it imposed the death penalty on only two of those counts.
T61 Postelle was constitutionally entitled to a determination of his individual eulpability and he received that individualized consideration. The Constitution does not demand that he receive a review of his comparative responsibility as well. Accord United States v. Barrett,
13. Constitutionality of the Death Penalty: Furman v. Georgia
T62 Postelle continues his claim that his death sentences are unconstitutional and should be set aside. He maintains that his death sentences are disproportionate to those of his equally culpable co-defendants and that the disparity in the sentences of the co-defendants in his case shows that Oklahoma applies the death penalty in a manner that does not comport with the constitutional mandate of consistent, evenhanded application set out in Furman v. Georgia,
T 63 As discussed in Section 12 above, proportionality review is not constitutionally required. For the reasons explained in Section 12, the constitutionality of Postelle's death sentences is not in doubt given the safeguards in Oklahoma's capital sentencing scheme that were well observed in Postelle's case. We further note that the evidence presented against Postelle was different in significant ways from the evidence presented against his brother, David Postelle, the only other co-defendant to go to trial. Co-defendant Randall Byus did not testify at David Postelle's trial and it was not until after David's trial that Byus struck a deal with the State and agreed to cooperate. During Gilbert Postelle's trial, Byus supplied a firsthand account of the quadruple homicide for the jury that was not available to his brother's jury. Byus's testimony established that Postelle was more culpable than his brother or the other co-defendants in the commission of the murders. According to Byus, Postelle initiated the attack by opening the van door and immediately shooting Terry Smith in the head. Byus testified that Postelle participated in the murder of Donnie Swindle and then personally chased down and alone murdered James Alderson and Amy Wright as they attempted to flee. The testimony of Randall Byus provided a rational basis upon which Postelle's jury could find him more culpable than his co-defendants.
T64 Furthermore, this Court has found that an accomplice's lesser sentence or immunity from prosecution does not render a defendant's sentence excessive and is not proof of error. See Wackerly,
14. Mitigating Evidence: David Postelle's Sentence
165 Postelle argues that it was error to exelude David Postelle's Judgment and Sentence for the murders and to prevent the jury from considering, as a mitigating circumstance, the fact that David Postelle was sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. According to Postelle, the fact that other equally culpable co-defendants have not been sentenced to death falls within the purview of mitigating cireum-stances. That cireumstance, he claims, is one which in fairness, sympathy or merey may lead a jury to impose a sentence less than death.
166 The leading case from the United States Supreme Court on the issue of what constitutes mitigating evidence that the defense must be permitted to present to the jury in a death penalty case is Lockett v. Ohio,
1 67 In Harris, we explained:
A capital defendant "must be allowed to introduce any relevant mitigating evidence regarding his character or record and any of the cireumstances of the offense." "It is settled that a defendant may present in mitigation any aspect of his record or character, and any circumstances of the crime that could possibly convince a jury that he is entitled to a sentence less than death. Likewise, a defendant is also entitled to present any evidence that may assist in rebutting an aggravating cirenmstance." When considering whether to recommend the death penalty, jurors must look at both the circumstances of the crime and the personal characteristics and propensities of the defendant.
Harris,
T68 Courts are divided on whether the admission of evidence concerning the disposition of a co-defendant's case is relevant mitigating evidence. Compare Ex parte Burgess,
{69 We recognize that there is a "low threshold for relevance" applicable to mitigating evidence in capital cases. Tennard v. Dretke,
170 The district court found that the sentence received by David Postelle was not relevant and that there was evidence showing that Postelle was "by far the most culpable and participated to a larger degree than any of the other charged individuals." Postelle was permitted to present mitigating evidence concerning his character and record, as well as evidence rebutting the aggravating circumstances. The jury examined the evidence and sentenced Postelle to death on the two murder counts where the evidence showed Postelle pursued James Alderson and Amy Wright by himself and shot them as they tried to run away or seek cover. Although a trial court is not necessarily precluded from allowing consideration of co-defendant sentences, we find that the district court did not commit constitutional error under Lockett by refusing to allow evidence of David Postelle's sentence in this case.
15. Mitigating Evidence: Videotapes
171 Postelle argues that the district court erred in excluding three videotape clips that he sought to introduce as mitigating evidence during the penalty phase. The first video clip shows Postelle and his brother as children roller skating in front of their grandfather. The second video elip shows a "young," "healthy," "fit" Brad Postelle before his motorcycle accident "being silly for the camera." And the third video clip shows a frail and weak Brad Postelle after his motorcycle accident and the murders, stating that he loves and misses his sons. (Court's Exhibit 11) The State objected to the video clips on relevancy grounds, arguing that the clips did not extenuate or reduce the moral culpability of Postelle. The district court relied on Fox v. State,
172 "The sentencer in capital cases should not be precluded from considering any relevant mitigating evidence." Coddington v. State,
1 73 In Coddington,
¶ 74 This Court finds that this case is more like Fox than Coddington. Through live testimony, family members explained Postelle's relationships with his father and grandfather. They described the respect and admiration he had for both men and how he cared for his father after his motorcycle accident and for his grandfather after a stroke. Photographs of Postelle's grandfather before and after his stoke were admitted. Photographs of Postelle's father before the motorcycle accident were also admitted, and his condition after the accident was described by many. The proffered video clips do not show Postelle interacting with his father at all and show only momentary interaction with his grandfather. The substance of the mitigating evidence that Postelle sought to reinforce through the three to four minutes of video clips was separately presented to his jury. Hence, we find that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the video clips. See Underwood,
16. Victim Impact Evidence
175 Postelle challenges the victim impact testimony of John Alderson and Janet Wright. He claims that their testimony focused almost exclusively on the emotional impact of their loved one's death and that this is the kind of testimony that undermines the jury's ability to make a reasoned moral response in assessing the death penalty.
T76 The district court judge held a hearing outside the presence of the jury to consider the proposed victim impact evidence. The prosecutor informed the court that he had given copies of the proposed statements of these witnesses to defense counsel, that defense counsel had excised out objectionable material and that the State agreed with the redactions made by the defense. The prosecutor further advised that the redacted statements would be admitted without objection and defense counsel agreed. Postelle's failure to object limits our review to that of plain error only. Murphy v. State,
17. The Murder Was Especially Heinous, Atrocious or Cruel: Sufficiency of the Evidence
178 Postelle claims that the evidence was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the murders of James Alderson and Amy Wright were especially heinous, atrocious or eruel. This Court reviews the record to determine whether the evidence, considered in the light most favorable to the State, was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find the aggravating cireum-stance beyond a reasonable doubt. See Magman v. State, 2009 OKCR 16, ¶29,
179 A particular murder is especially heinous, atrocious or cruel where the evidence shows: (1) that the murder was preceded by either torture of the victim or serious physical abuse; and (2) that the facts and circumstances of the case establish that the murder was heinous, atrocious or eruel. DeRosa v. State,
180 Postelle focuses on the short time frame in which the murders were committed and the rapidly fatal nature of Alderson's and Wright's wounds to support his argument that these murders were not especially heinous, atrocious or cruel. We disagree. According to Randall Byus, after Donnie Swindle and Terry Smith were shot in a barrage of semi-automatic gunfire, Postelle ran inside the trailer firing the MAK-90. Byus heard gunshots coming from inside the trailer, a fact confirmed by technical investigators. Tom Bevel, the State's crime scene reconstruction expert, testified that based upon the physical evidence, six shots were fired inside the trailer, but there was no evidence of blood.
181 Byus testified that Postelle chased Alderson to a boat near the steel corrugated fence that outlined the outer boundary of the salvage yard. Byus witnessed Postelle shoot Alderson, as Alderson was trying to crawl underneath a parked boat. Alderson's hands and clothing revealed the presence of gravel and grass and he had chipped and damaged fingernails with dirt underneath them. This was consistent with Alderson trying to escape by digging underneath the boat before being shot twice in the head from behind.
182 Byus testified that after witnessing Alderson's murder, he returned to the van and heard additional gunfire behind him. As the van started down the driveway, Postelle got in and said, "The bitch almost got away." Byus had not seen Amy Wright, but concluded later that Postelle was obviously referring to her. Wright's body was found face down in front of a parked car not far from Alder-son's body. Her escape was cut off by the car and the corrugated metal boundary fence. Wright was barefoot, suggesting that she ran from the trailer in a desperate attempt to escape. Wright suffered three gun
183 The record evidence supports the inference that Postelle chased Ald-erson and Wright from the trailer outside to the places where their bodies were ultimately found. Bevel testified that, based upon the physical evidence, this appeared to be a blitz-style attack. That Wright was found without shoes, combined with the absence of blood inside the trailer, supports the theory of a sudden, surprise attack that sent both her and Alderson out the back of the trailer, fleeing from gunfire after hearing the flurry of gunfire (some twenty-four shots) that resulted in the deaths of Swindle and Smith moments before. The evidence supports the reasonable inference that Wright and Alder-son were aware of the attacks on Swindle and Smith and that they knew they were running for their lives when they were each shot and killed. "Evidence that the victim was conscious and aware of the attack supports a finding of torture." Pavatt v. State,
18. Constitutionality of Aggravating Circumstance
184 Postelle claims that the especially heinous, atrocious or cruel aggravating circumstance is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. He maintains that this Court's attempts to limit and narrow this aggravating cireumstance have been unsuccessful. This Court has rejected similar challenges to the constitutionality of this aggravating circumstance. See, eg., Harmon,
19. Reconsideration of Previously Decided Issues
$85 Postelle raises eight claims challenging various sentencing-phase jury instructions, the constitutionality of Oklahoma's death penalty scheme, and the manner in which the death penalty is carried out. All of these claims have been rejected by this Court.
186 Postelle first challenges the sentencing-phase jury Instruction No. 58, as taken from Instruction No. 4-78, OUJI-CR(2d)
T 87 Postelle argues that Instruction No 51, taken verbatim from Instruction No 4-76, OUJI-CR(2d), erroneously implies that a life sentence is appropriate only if the jury failed to find the existence of an aggravating cireumstance This exact claim was also rejected in Harmon,
188 Postelle also challenges Oklahoma's death penalty scheme in its entirety as unconstitutional for vagueness, over-breadth, abuse of prosecutorial discretion, arbitrariness and because it constitutes eruel and unusual punishment. His brief provides neither argument nor authority to support these sweeping allegations. He purports, however, to "incorporate by reference" into his brief the arguments and authorities on these issues as they were raised in pretrial motions in the trial court. This claim does not comport with Rule 3.5(A)(5), Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals, Title 22, Ch. 18, App. (2011), which requires an appellant's argument and authority to be contained within the pages of his brief, Failure to comply with the rule results in waiver of the issue on appeal. See Harmon,
189 Postelle further contends that the trial court erroneously denied his motion to strike Oklahoma's death penalty sentencing procedure as unconstitutional because it requires a jury to make special findings of fact prohibited by Okla. Const. art. VII, § 15.
190 Postelle claims that the district court erroneously denied his motion to allow
191 Like the defendants in Hormon and Cuesta-Rodriguez, Postelle claims that Oklahoma's use of lethal injection is cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Federal and Oklahoma Constitutions. See U.S. Const. amend. VIII; Okla. Const. art. II, § 9. Postelle makes the same argument based on the same authorities that we rejected in our previous cases. Harmon,
192 Postelle claims that victim impact evidence is not relevant to proving either the aggravating or mitigating factors necessary to perform the narrowing function for application of the death penalty. He argues that victim impact evidence acts instead as a "superaggravator" and skews the sentencing proceeding in violation of the Eighth Amendment. We have repeatedly rejected this argument in the past and the authority relied upon by Postelle fails to persuade us to reach a different result here. See Cuesta-Rodrigues,
T93 Postelle claims that the jury was improperly instructed as to the seope of victim impact evidence. Specifically, he argues that Instruction No. 9-45, OUJI-CR (2d), which the district court gave as Instruction No. 61 of the second-stage jury instructions, contained language permitting jurors to consider that the victims were "individuals whose death may represent a unique loss to society and their families." Postelle argues that the phrase "unique loss to society" improperly allowed jurors to consider the impact of the loss of the victims on society at large rather than simply the impact of the deaths on their immediate families. This identical claim was recently rejected in Cuesta-Rodrigues,
20. Cumulative Error
T94 Postelle asks this Court to consider the impact of the errors cumulatively, if no individual error warrants relief because of insufficient prejudice. "Cumulative error, however, does not deprive the defendant of a fair trial when the errors considered together do not affect the outcome of the proceedings." Hanson v. State,
21. Mandatory Sentence Review
¶ 95 Title 21 O.S.2001, § 701.13 requires this Court to determine "[wlhether the sentence of death was imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice or any other arbitrary factor" and "whether the evidence supports the jury's or judge's finding of a statutory aggravating cireumstance." After conducting this review, this Court may order any corrective relief that is warranted or affirm the sentence. 21 O.S.2001, § 701.13(E).
196 Having reviewed the record in this case, we find that Postelle's death sentences were not the result of trial error or improper evidence or witness testimony and that the death sentences were not imposed under the influence of any arbitrary factor, passion or prejudice.
197 The jury's finding that Postelle created a great risk of death to more than one person and that the murders were especially heinous, atrocious or cruel were amply supported by the evidence. Weighing the aggravating circumstances and evidence against the mitigating evidence presented, we find, as did the jury below, that the aggravating circumstances in this case outweigh the mitigating circumstances.
€98 The Judgment and Sentence of the District Court is AFFIRMED. Pursuant to Rule 3.15, Rules of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, Title 22, Ch.18, App. (2011), the MANDATE is ORDERED issued upon the delivery and filing of this decision.
Notes
. Count 1 charged Postelle with the murder of Amy Wright, Count 2 charged Postelle with the murder of Terry Smith, Count 3 charged Postelle with the murder of James Donnie Swindle and Count 4 charged Postelle with the murder of James Alderson. Postelle was charged jointly with his father, Earl Bradford Postelle, his brother, David Bradford Postelle, and Randall Wade Byus.
. James Donnie Swindle was known as and referred to throughout the record as Donnie Swindle.
. Baumann faced charges for several crimes related to this case. She entered into an immunity agreement in August 2005 providing for her full cooperation with the State to prosecute these murders in exchange for immunity from prosecution for any crimes she could be held liable for stemming from this incident, provided there would be no immunity from prosecution for any
. Wilder was charged with Accessory After the Fact, Unlawful Possession of a Firearm, Concealing Stolen Property and Possession of a Sawed-off Shotgun. Wilder entered a blind plea and was sentenced to 180 years imprisonment subject to one-year judicial review. On judicial review, Wilder agreed to testify and his sentence was vacated by the sentencing judge, who agreed to entertain a new recommendation following the trials related to this matter. Wilder signed an Agreement to Cooperate and Testify Truthfully that provided he would be allowed to withdraw his original plea and re-enter a new plea of nolo contendere to the previous charges, plus some drug charges, and receive five years on each count to be served concurrently and with credit for time served. Wilder testified that the acceptance by the court of this plea bargain would result in his release from prison because of his credit for time served. (Defendant's Exhibit 41)
. Sanders entered a guilty plea to Accessory After the Fact to the offense of First Degree Murder for his disposal of evidence after the murders. In exchange for his truthful testimony, the State recommended, and Sanders was given, a 12-year split sentence per his plea agreement of six years imprisonment with the remaining six years suspended. According to Sanders, he had discharged his sentence by the time of Postelle's trial. (Defendant's Exhibit 38)
. Byus was originally charged in the same Information with Postelle with four counts of First Degree Murder and one count of Conspiracy to Commit Murder. He pled guilty to Accessory to a Felony (First Degree Murder). In exchange for his truthful testimony, the State agreed to recommend a split sentence of six years imprisonment with the remaining fourteen years suspended. (Defendant's Exhibit 39)
. Gilbert Postelle's father, Earl Bradford Pos-telle, was referred to as "Brad" throughout the record.
. There was also testimony that David and Gilbert Postelle were angry with Swindle because Swindle allowed someone to steal parts off of one of their cars that was stored on Swindle's property.
. Wilder's rifle was referred to by several witnesses as an AK-47, but the State's firearm and toolmark examiner identified it as a MAK-90.
. Sanders's real name is Alvis Earl Sanders, Jr. but he was known as and referred to as "Jay."
. Sanders recalled that Baumann left in another vehicle with a friend.
. Sanders and Ashcraft did not follow through with burning the van and submerging it in a lake. The police later found the van.
. OUJI-CR(2d) 9-26 defines accomplice as:
An "accomplice" is one who, with criminal intent, is involved with others in the commission of a crime. A person becomes an accomplice either by being present and participating in a crime or, regardless of whether he/she is present during the commission of a crime, by aiding and abetting before or during its commission, or by having advised or encouraged its commission.
. The defense requested OUJI-CR(2d) 9-25 Use of Accomplice Testimony, 9-26 Accomplice Defined, 9-28 Corroborating Evidence Needed for Accomplice Testimony, 9-29 Determination of Accomplice Status by Jury for Alvis "Jay" Sanders, Arthur Wilder, Randall Byus, and Crystal Baumann, 9-31 When Corroboration by Accomplice is Insufficient and 9-32 Determining when Corroboration by Accomplice is Sufficient. Pos-telle asked the trial court to instruct the jury that Sanders, Byus and Baumann were accomplices as a matter of law and to have the jury decide Wilder's status.
. Title 22 O.S.2001, § 851 provides:
When, in the opinion of the court, it is proper that the jury should view the place in which the offense was charged to have been committed, or in which any other material fact occurred, it may order the jury to be conducted in a body, in the custody of proper officers, to the place, which must be shown to them by a person appointed by the court for that purpose, and the officers must be sworn to suffer no person to speak to or communicate with the jury, nor to do so themselves, on any subject connected with the trial, and to return them into court without unnecessary delay, or at a specified time.
. For instance, this Court considers several factors in determining whether a courtroom identification was tainted by a pre-trial confrontation, including (1) the prior opportunity of the witness to observe the defendant during the alleged criminal act; (2) the degree of attention of the witness; (3) the accuracy of the witness's prior identification; (4) the witness's level of certainty; and (5) the time between the crime and the confrontation. See Harmon,
. Postelle seems to argue that the district court also erred in denying defense counsel's request to introduce Defendant's Exhibit 23 during Arthur Wilder's testimony. The record shows that defense counsel withdrew Defendant's Exhibit 23 in response to the prosecutor's objection, noting "we just want to have it identified for potential admission in Stage Two." Postelle's withdrawal of the exhibit constitutes abandonment of that request and waiver of the issue for appellate review regarding admission of the exhibit during the first-stage of trial. See Johnson v. State,
. See Cuesta-Rodriguez,
. Under the district court's "struck juror" method, thirty prospective jurors were called to be questioned by the court and the attorneys. As potential jurors were removed for cause, they were replaced until there was a panel of thirty potential jurors who were passed for cause by the parties. The parties then utilized nine peremptory challenges each, leaving twelve jurors to hear the case.
. Postelle filed a pre-trial motion for the use of jury questionnaires with a proposed questionnaire, and for individual sequestered voir dire on the death penalty and pretrial publicity. The district court denied Postelle's motion to use questionnaires, but granted Postelle's request for individual voir dire on the death penalty and pretrial news coverage. On the first attempt to hold a trial in this case, the district court utilized individual voir dire during that portion of jury selection relating to death qualification and pretrial publicity. That trial ended in mistrial before a jury was impaneled. The district court decided not to utilize individual voir dire in this trial which resulted in the convictions and death sentences presently under review. Postelle states in his brief that the request for sequestered voir dire was renewed during jury selection, but the passage cited, as well as the overall record, does not show that trial counsel renewed objections to the absence of individual voir dire or jury questionnaires.
. See Notes on Use to OUJI-CR(2d) 1-10 (use of juror questionnaire is discretionary).
. OUJI-CR(2d) 1-5 provides:
The defendant is charged with murder in the first degree. It will be the duty of the jury to determine whether the defendant is guilty or not guilty after considering the evidence and instructions of law presented in court.
If the jury finds beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of murder in the first degree, the jury will then have the duty to assess punishment. The punishment for murder in the first degree is death, imprisonment for life without parole or imprisonment for life. You may not consider imposing the death penalty unless you find that one or more aggravating circumstances exist beyond a reasonable doubt. Aggravating circumstances are those which increase the defendant's guilt or enormity of the offense. You also may not consider imposing the death penalty unless you unanimously find that the aggravating circumstance or circumstances outweigh any mitigating circumstances which may be present. Mitigating circumstances are 1) circumstances that may extenuate or reduce the degree of moral culpability or blame, or 2) circumstances which in fairness, sympathy or mercy may lead you as jurors individually or collectively to decide against imposing the death penalty. Even if you find that the aggravating circumstance(s) outweigh(s) the mitigating circumstance(s), you may impose a sentence of imprisonment for life with the possibility of parole or imprisonment for life without the possibility of parole.
If you find the defendant guilty of murder in the first degree, can you consider all three of these legal punishments-death, imprisonment for life without parole or imprisonment for life-and weigh the aggravating circumstance(s) against the mitigating circumstances to impose the punishment warranted by the law and evidence? [If the answer to the preceding question is negative]
If you found beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty of murder in the first degree and if under the evidence, facts and circumstances of the case the law would permit you to consider a sentence of death/(imprisonment for life without parole)/(imprisonment for life), are your reservations about the penalty of death/(imprisonment for life without parole)/(imprisonment for life) so strong that regardless of the law, the facts and circumstances of the case, you would not consider the imposition of the penalty of death/(imprisonment for life without parole)/ (imprisonment for life)?
. Even though the court used a former version of OUJI-CR(2d) 1-5 in questioning Panelist G, the questioning sufficiently probed the issue of whether Panelist G was able to consider the three penalties provided by law. Panelist G was firm that he could not consider the death penalty and the judge found that further questioning was unnecessary because he was "pretty emphatic about it."
. Section 660 provides:
A challenge for implied bias may be taken for all or any of the following cases, and for no other ...
8. If the offense charged be punishable with death, the entertaining of such conscientious opinions as would preclude his finding the defendant guilty of, in which case he shall neither be permitted nor compelled to serve as a juror.
. The remarks in this case are also not like the ones that necessitated relief recently in Bills v. State, Case No. F-2009-404, unpublished (May 4, 2011). In Bills, the judge tried to instruct the jury on how to avoid deadlock during voir dire, similar to a so-called "Aller charge," known as
. This Court notes that the evidence admitted against Postelle was not "almost identical" to the evidence against his brother because co-defendant Randall Byus did not testify at David Pos-telle's trial.
. Postelle's reliance on the American Law Institute's stance on the death penalty is not unlike earlier arguments urging this Court to adopt the resolution of the American Bar Association recommending a moratorium on the imposition of the death penalty. We consistently rejected this position, noting that Oklahoma's death penalty statutes have been repeatedly upheld as constitutional. See Martinez v. State,
. We are aware that raising these settled issues will tend to prevent a finding of waiver in any subsequent state or federal proceedings in this case.
. OUJI-CR(2d) 4-78 provides:
Mitigating circumstances are 1) circumstances that may extenuate or reduce the degree of moral culpability or blame, or 2) circumstances which in fairness, sympathy or mercy may lead you as jurors individually or collectively to decide against imposing the death penalty. The determination of what circumstances are mitigating is for you to resolve under the facts and circumstances of this case. While all twelve jurors must unanimously agree that the State has established beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of at least*145 one aggravating circumstance prior to consideration of the death penalty, unanimous agreement of jurors concerning mitigating circumstances is not required. In addition, mitigating circumstances do not have to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt in order for you to consider them.
. Postelle asked the trial court to give a modified version of the instruction insofar as the instruction defined the term "mitigating circumstances," but he did not object to the permissive language and, in fact, used the same permissive language in his proposed instruction as well.
. Section 15 provides:
In all jury trials the jury shall return a general verdict, and no law in force nor any law hereafter enacted, shall require the court to direct the jury to make findings of particular questions of fact, but the court may, in its discretion, direct such special findings.