*1 213 case Remp, below. Commonwealth v. 338 Pa.Superior 423, 436, 487 (1985) J., Ct. A.2d (Rowley, dissent- ing). A.2d 351 POST, Appellant,
Barton L. MENDEL, Appellee. M. Mark Pennsylvania. Supreme Court Argued Dec. 1985. 27, 1986. Decided March *2 Sullivan, Jr., F. Philadelphia, William for appellant. Mendel, Daniel E. M. for Murray, Mark Philadelphia, appellee. NIX, C.J., FLAHERTY, HUTCHINSON,
Before PAPADAKOS, ZAPPALA and JJ. THE
OPINION OF COURT FLAHERTY, Justice.
This is an
from
order
Court
appeal
Superior
an
part
by
Philadelphia
affirmed in
an
which
order entered
of Common Pleas in
in
response
complaint
plaintiff-appellant
Post, Esq.
filed
L.
trespass
Barton
Mendel,
(1984).
September Post, Esquire Barton L.
Post and Schell
12th Floor Washington Square 210 West Philadelphia, Pa. 19106 Trial. During
Re: the Course of This Your Conduct Dear Mr. Post: anger heat calm pass
I have the to and under allowed reflection, you during I did have re-assessed what insinu- you Beller course of the examination Dr. when different and that reports the doctor had two ated that to attempted convey to reports, two different there were had done an use that the doctor jury by reports when, in reports two different by writing unethical act one reports, fact, there were two different you knew that at requested to other. One was being supplement your Toensmeier, the insistence of Mr. partner, Arthur and Dr. Beller while was testifying, you objected my to straightening out, the matter stipulate refused to that the letters, (Nos. 1, three which are now Court exhibits 3) existed, stipulate, and refused to compounding your nefarious tactics in violation of the Canons that those Thus, letters your existed. refusal to acknowledge what had you patent, act, done was a deceptive, nefarious calculated to deceive Court and mislead the jury. There have since that occurrence five trial days you comported since in an yourself unlawyerlike manner compounded and have now the matter deceiv- only Court, ing the allowing expert but an himself perjure your assistance and aid. While Dr. Simon was on stand, upon inquiry you represented whether or not him, engaged and you give asked the Court to him certain instructions or that you wished to confer with him. Dr. elected, Simon after the him gave opportunity candidly him, indicate and reveal your representation of bias, fact effect prejudice which would his to deny when, fact, representation such you represented 5, 1981, him since March in the matter of Mildred Wilson ah, v. William H. Simon et Court of Pleas of Common Philadelphia County, Term No. February 4306. You stood idly by jury while and the Court were Court, an officer deceived. As that conduct is abhorrent and is a violation of four 1-101 Canons—D.R. —maintaining of integrity competence profes- *4 sion; conduct; D.R. 7-106—trial improprie- D.R. 9-101— 7-102, 5, D.R. ty; you Sections and wherein concealed failed to disclose knowingly you that which are required by you law reveal where used knowingly perjured testimony you false evidence and where in knowingly your presence allowed false statement of fact, and remained law silent. circumstances, I I hereby
Under the notice that you [sic] proceed intend to with this matter to the Disciplinary irrespective any Board outcome of this case. As an Court, I practice officer do not choose to with comport individuals who themselves this manner and are not fit to share a court room with you any lawyer who respect at least has sufficient for the law be at all times candid. lie,
You not like I may my style, but do not sir—some- thing trial, that you, throughout this have done. This serves notice on you. Since said I you “try by that intimidation,” I you intimidation; assure this is not this is an simply obligation I, Court, as an officer of the piranhas must fulfill so that like are from you removed practice of the law. Respectfully,
/s/ M. Mark Mendel M. Mark Mendel MMM/cb
cc: Disciplinary Board of the Supreme Court George Honorable T. Kelton William H. M.D.
In response complaint’s to the assertion of a claim based libel, on filed defendant in the nature preliminary objections of a demurrer asserting that “the alleged defamatory words absolutely privileged they were disclosed [were] connection a judicial proceeding.” The Court of Com- mon Pleas agreed that the remarks contained in the letter and, hence, absolutely privileged, were it dismissed with prejudice portion complaint setting forth a claim Superior for libel. Court affirmed the dismissal of that claim. primary issue to in the instant appeal be addressed is
whether
the courts below
determined that
properly
matters set
protected
forth in the
letter
subject
were
privilege,
absolute
under the
principle
judicial immunity.
long
It has
been established that statements contained
pleadings, as
well as statements made
the actual trial or
argument
case,
Fort,
of a
privileged.
Kemper
are
(1907),
Pa.
220
strates, long there has a realm recognized protected judicial communications in proceedings. Commonwealth, protection for such communica firmly
tions is established. As stated Greenberg Co., 511, 514, 576, Aetna Insurance 427 Pa. 235 A.2d 577 denied, (1967), cert. 392 U.S. 88 S.Ct. 20 L.Ed.2d (1968), matters, “When libelous or defamatory statements, or allegations and averments in pleadings or trial argument of a case are pertinent, relevant suit, and material to any issue a civil there is no civil liability making for of them.” any See also Kemper v. Fort, 85, 93, (1907) (statements 219 Pa. A. in plead ings privileged). The instant case differs from the bulk of *7 those heretofore by decided this Court that the defamation did not in this instance occur in the pleadings in the argument Rather, actual trial or of a case. defamation took the form of an extra-judicial communica tion which was issued the course of trial. during
In deciding whether the privilege
type
extends to the
extra-judicial communication which this case
it
presents,
is
necessary
policy underlying
first to consider the
the exist-
ence of the
privilege.
v.
Greenberg Aetna Insurance
Co.,
515-516,
578,
Pa. at
427
235 A.2d at
this Court noted
that the
is an
of a
privilege
integral part
public
policy
suitors,
permits
wicked,
all
however bold
however virtu-
timid,
ous and
to secure access to the
justice
courts of
claims,
false,
fictitious,
present whatever
true or
real or
seek to
To
they
adjudicate.
assure
such claims are
resolved,
justly
it is essential that pertinent issues be aired
by
a manner that is unfettered
the threat of libel or
slander
being
suits
filed. As stated
427 Pa.
Greenberg,
516,
Fort,
(quoting Kemper
at
“Justice can administered are only parties per- be when mitted to in the courts and to plead freely aver whatever fear of if a ought consequences, to be known without pertinent material and averment should be sustained. it is Wrong may party, at times be done to a defamed but absque injuria. damnum The inconvenience the indi- must yield good vidual to a rule for the of the general public.” for the justifications privilege explained were further Publications, Inc., 319, Triangle
Binder Pa. 323- (1971), stated, 275 A.2d where this Court The reasons privilege for the absolute are recog- well nized. A judge must be free to administer the law fear of consequences. without This independence would impaired were he to in daily apprehension privilege defamation suits. The is also extended par- courts, ties to afford freedom of access to the to witness- encourage complete es to their and unintimidated testimo- court, and to counsel to him ny represent enable to best Likewise, his client’s interests. the privilege exists be- cause the courts have other internal sanctions statements, defamatory such as perjury contempt pro- ceedings.
Thus, the privilege exists because there is a realm of
communication essential to the exploration
legal
claims
that would be hindered
there not the
afford-
protection
were
ed
privilege.
protected
The essential realm of
com-
not, however,
Rather,
munication is
without bounds.
protected realm has traditionally
regarded
as com-
posed only of those communications which are issued in the
*8
course
and
are
regular
judicial proceedings
per-
which
of
tinent and material
to the redress or
Kem-
sought.
relief
93,
994-95;
It is proceedings course of the judicial part published of the letter referred, publication letter then which other such proceedings, to other respect with privileged was in an brought might those being which proceedings with charging plaintiff Board Disciplinary action before might misconduct, proceedings other professional client, H. William charging plaintiffs brought (Sec- Restatement Citing the Simon, M.D., perjury. judicial (1977), asserts ond) defendant of Torts § *9 immunity applicable is to communications prelimi- which are nary proposed judicial proceedings. The Restatement (Second) Torts, states: §
An at law is attorney absolutely privileged to publish defamatory matter concerning another communications to a preliminary proposed judicial or in proceeding, of, institution during of, the course part and as a a judicial proceeding counsel, which he participates as if it has some relation to the proceeding. added).
(Emphasis Whether challenged communication published is to, prior during, a judicial proceeding, it must bear a certain relationship to the proceeding so as to it qualify as privileged. is, That relationship case, in either the same. As discussed supra, in reference to communications made during judicial proceedings, it is necessary that a protected communication have pertinent been and material to the sought redress and that the communication have been is regular sued course of the proceedings. Similarly, respect with to communications made prior to the institution of proceedings, the protected communication would need to pertinent and material and would need to have been issued in regular preparing course of for contem plated proceedings. standard, Evaluated the instant letter does not qualify privileged respect proceed ings which might brought against be plaintiffs alleged client, Simon, M.D., William H. or against plaintiff himself.
In any upon action based perjury might brought be against plaintiff’s client, it would not pertinent, material, and in regular course of procedure to send copies present letter to Kelton Judge and to the Disciplinary Further, characterizations, Board. as dis- tinguished alleged facts, from set forth the letter describ- ing plaintiff unprofessional as an and a nefarious attorney piranha and liar perjury proceed- would be relevant to a ing Similarly, William H. M.D. action any upon professional based might misconduct which brought against plaintiff proceeding Discipli- before the *10 material, in the Board, pertinent, not it would
nary a letter of copies to forward procedure course of regular H. Kelton and to William Judge one to present the such as the letter to short, published In defendant M.D. in of interest either had no direct who would persons have ensued. Publication might the which proceedings therefore, was, privileged. not persons letter to such the Pleas, defend- sustaining in Thus, the Court Common libel, sounding the count to objections preliminary ant’s immunity precluded judicial that erroneously determined dismissing that count. to that respect liability to plaintiff opportunity count, court did not afford the facts per- additional allege to certain complaint his amend that action, in the belief apparently to the libel taining was immunity since judicial futile would be amendment that suit. It is established any such barring as perceived there is some where should not be withheld to amend leave can be complaint in a that defects possibility reasonable Mutual v. American amendment. Otto through cured (1978). Accord- Co., 482 Pa. 393 A.2d Insurance insofar Superior of the Court the order we reverse ingly, to action, and remand the dismissal of libel it affirmed the consistent with proceedings for Pleas of Common the Court decision. our reversed, case remanded Court Superior
Order Pleas. the of Common to consideration LARSEN, J., participate did not this case. decision of in the consideration
McDERMOTT,J., participate did case. of this or decision dissenting opinion.
PAPADAKOS, J., filed a Justice, dissenting. PAPADAKOS, that conclusion Majority’s from the dissent I must course regular in the not sent was communication subject Appellant. proceedings contemplated for preparing clearest indicates, in the communication reading A that the letter itself language, Appel- was notice possible filing charges against Appellee was him with the lant The letter itself formal complaint Board. is the Disciplinary against Appellant which was forwarded to the Board. The judge of the letter the trial and Dr. Simon copies were material, regular procedure course of pertinent, these individuals were involved im- because of Appellant conduct and could well be called proper very upon Disciplinary investigation Appel- Board its complaint. Accordingly, they clearly lee’s had an interest might ensue proceedings Disciplinary before *11 I would hold this as made protected Board. communication (Restatement prior proceedings to the institution Torts, 586) Superior and would affirm the order of Court. §
Submitted Decided March 1986.
