153 P. 786 | Or. | 1915
delivered the opinion of the court.
“Q. Do you remember stating to Mr. Krull that you were going to get-the sale of the electric apparatus for that job if Bradley got the job?
“A. No; not in those words; no.
“Q. But that was it, in substance, wasn’t it?
“A. No; when Mr. Bradley was to get his bond for the city, he went to Ted Langford, who was then a friend of Mr. Bradley, and I went down to the bonding company, down to Mr. Burgard’s office with him; and at the time they wanted me to go on the bond I told them that I had absolutely no authority to sign a bond.
“Q. Didn’t you call up Krull that day?
“A. Yes; I told Bradley and Krull that I didn’t have any authority to sign a bond, but that I would do this; that if they would get Mr. Bradley to go ahead and do that job, I would see that the electrical material would be furnished Mr. Bradley so that he wouldn’t be held up on the job. * *
“Q. What representation was made when this was signed?
“A. I made the statement to Mr. Krull that I would guarantee delivery of the material for the completion of job, and I specifically told Mr. Krull that I had-no authority for going on the bond, and that my signature on a bond, so. far as my company was concerned, wasn’t worth anything. Mr. Krull understood that at the time.”
“Q. Were you present, Mr. Bradley, at the time, that is, at the time Mr. Ryan just stated this bond was made?
“A. I was.
“Q. Tell the court what was the understanding or agreement, or what conversation was had at that time between Krull and Ryan in your presence as to the bond.
“A. At the time the conversation was between Krull and Ryan and me he says: ‘John, I can’t go ahead and issue this bond. I don’t know whether the party can furnish these goods. ’ And I asked Ryan to guarantee them, and so Jack says that as others were trying to get the contract: ‘I want to get the bond in. If Bradley gets his bond, I will guarantee that he will get his material on the job.’ ”
Neither Krull nor any other witness in any way disputed the testimony quoted. The excerpts set out above constitute all the evidence on the subject. Thus Krull, representing the Title Company, had actual knowledge of the limitations upon Ryan’s authority. According to the deposition of one of the principal officers of the Western, Ryan’s sole duty, except to accept service of process, was that of sales manager, and he had never been authorized in any manner whatever to execute any bond on behalf of his principal.
“The rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by the declaration, act, or omission of another, except by virtue of a particular relation between them”: Section 705, L. O. L.
It has often been held that a party deals at his own peril with one who professes to be the agent of another. In this case the character of sales manager does not give rise to the appearance that such an individual is also a bond giver. The mere fact that the Western had commissioned Ryan to sell its goods does not sanction the supposition that he was empowered to execute an indemnity bond binding his principal. Moreover, it was without any dispute whatever that at the time of signing the bond the representative who was acting in the matter for the Title Company was informed by Ryan that he had no authority to bind his own company in any way by such an instrument. The Title Company was thus forwarned against the liability of the Western, and took the instrument at its own peril.
An effort was made in argument to construe the furnishing of the electrical supplies to Bradley and the execution of the undertaking all as one transaction, but there is nothing in the evidence justifying any such conclusion. The dealing between the contractor and the Western covering the delivery of the electrical supplies was one performance. The execution of the contractor’s bond on February 27, 1913, was another, and it was a third affair when Ryan afterward signed the indemnity undertaking on March 6th. The Title Company is in the position of saying to the Western:
“The contractor whose bond we have underwritten may take your goods to the amount mentioned, and not*45 pay for them, but we will escape liability because we inveigled your salesman into executing an indemnity bond in our favor when we knew he had no authority to do so.”
The law does not sanction such a position.
It follows that the determination of the Circuit Court should be modified so as to allow the Western a decree, not only against Bradley, but also against the Title Company, with permission to share ratably with other established claims in the fund remaining in the hands of the city’.
The decree is changed accordingly Modified.
Motion to Modify Decree Denied.
Denied January 18, 1916.
Motion to Further Modify Decree.
(154 Pac. 121.)
Department 1. Mr. Justice Burnett delivered the opinion of the court.
Under a clause of the charter of the City of Portland the relator instituted a suit against a contractor
The principal dispute before us was between the Title Company and the Western company, wherein the latter contended for the allowance of its claim against the former which had been wholly denied by the Circuit Court. Having succeeded in establishing its entire demand against the Title Company, it would ill accord with equitable considerations, in the absence of any unusually different conditions, to deny costs in favor of the appellant and against the Title Company. In the adjustment of costs in this court the other claimants fared quite as well as they had any reason to expect and must be content.
The motion is overruled.
Motion to Modify Decree Denied.