This action was filed under the aegis of R.C. 3515.08 through 3515.16, but it lacks the substantive characteristics of an election contest. “ ‘An election contest, under the statute, is to ascertain and decide which candidate received the highest number of legal votes.’ ” State ex rel. Kirk v. Wheatley (1938),
Portis submitted records and testimony from the board of elections placing Tarle’s voting residence outside the Fifth Ward since the November 1992 general election. However, this evidence goes to Tarle’s qualifications, not the manner in which the primary election was conducted or the validity of votes cast for him. Evidence of nonresidency says nothing about whether the election accurately ascertained the will of the electorate. Indeed, Portis acknowledges that Tarle received the highest number of votes.
The vehicle for challenging a candidate’s qualifications, particularly allegations of nonresidency, is a protest. See, e.g., State ex rel. Brown v. Summit Cty. Bd. of Elections (1989),
Election contests may not be used as a vehicle for asserting an untimely protest. As we have said, election contests must raise questions as to “the number of ballots for or against any candidate, or in any respect as to the validity of the election other than the eligibility of the candidate who * * * received the larger number of votes in the election.” Kirk, supra,
Accordingly, we hold that Portis has not shown any irregularity or uncertainty in the primary election of September 7, 1993 that warrants the relief an election contest affords.
Based on the foregoing, the common pleas court’s judgment pronouncing Portis the Democratic nominee for the Fifth Ward seat on Akron City Council is reversed. In view of such reversal, Tarle is entitled to all that he lost by reason of the judgment below, Bickett v. Garner (1876),
Judgment reversed.
