This is аn appeal from the granting of an instructed verdict. The suit is for damages arising out of a one car accident in which the driver, Walter C. Williams, was killed and the passenger, Lorene Brinegar, was injured. The trial court granted an instructed verdict for Janice Williams Porter-field, the Administratrix of the Estate of Walter C. Williams, Deceased. The court of appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court and remanded the cause for trial.
Brinegar and Williams were returning to Atlanta, Texas, from an evening of dancing in Texarkana, Arkansas. Brinegar was аsleep, Williams was killed upon impact, and there were no other witnesses to the accident.
Department of Public Safety Officer Larry Aycock testified his investigation of the accident revealed no skid marks, which indicated that Williams had not hit his brakes. Aycock fоund no indication that the automobile had made contact with any object other than the ground. He further testified there was heavy fоg, the road was' dry, and the auto had travelled approximately 100 feet after leaving the roadway, turning over as it did so.
*559 Brinegar testifiеd that: (1) Williams had been awake since 5:30 a.m. of the prior day, the accident occurred approximately 3:30 a.m.; (2) she had driven the automobile several times and it appeared to function properly; (3) Williams was 46 years old and in excellent health; and (4) Williаms was familiar with the road since he travelled it on a daily basis going to and from work.
The issue before us is whether the above testimony precludes an instructed verdict against Brinegar. On appeal from an instructed verdict the task of an appellate court is to dеtermine whether there is any evidence of probative force to raise a fact issue. The court must consider all of the еvidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom the verdict was instructed, discarding all the contrary evidence and inferences.
Collora v. Navarro,
Brinegar contends her testimony entitled her to a jury issue on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Mrs. Porterfield, as Admin-istratrix of the Estate of Williams, contends: (1) proof of an automobile accident is no proof of negligence; (2) the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur may be invoked only upon a showing of negligence coupled with the further showing that the instrument which caused the injury was within the control of the defendant; and (3) it was thе burden of Ms. Brinegar to negate all possible causes of the collision other than the negligence of Williams. At trial Mrs. Por-terfield suggestеd a number of causes of the accident, chief of which could have been an oncoming automobile or animal in Williams’ lane of traffic which caused him to swerve sharply to the right to avoid a collision. She correctly points out that the courts of this State have not previously applied the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in a fact situation like this.
Res ipsa loquitur
means simply that the nature of the occurrence itself furnishes circumstantiаl evidence of negligence. Porterfield’s contention that
res ipsa loqui-tur
applies only upon a showing of specific negligence would render the doctrine meaningless. The test to be applied was set out by this court in
Mobil Chemical Co. v. Bell,
Although an accident is no evidence of negligence, the character of the accident, and the circumstances and proof attending it, may reаsonably lead to the belief that without negligence the accident would not have occurred. Where the particular thing causing the injury is shown to be under the management of the defendant, or his servants, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have management use proper care, it affords reasonable inference, in the absence of explanation, that the accident arose from want of care.
Washington v. M.K. & T. Railway Co.,
Brinegar relies primarily on the case of
Texas & Pacific Coal Co. v. Kowsikowsiki,
*560 The record in this case reflects that at the time of the accident, Williams was driving and was in exclusive control of the car, which was in good mechanical condition. Williams, although generally in good health, had been awake for approximately 22 hours. The pavement was dry even though a heavy fog had developed, perhaps necessitating a reduced speed. The road was straight, and the view unobstructed. There were no skid marks on the pavement that would indicate Williams’ attention was •distracted by an animal or another vehicle. Finally, there was testimony that the car travelled approximately 100 feet after it left the road and there was no indication that it collided with another object. Brine-gar argues she has presented a situation which reasonable minds could infer would not ordinarily result in an accident in the normal сhain of events in the absence of negligence.
After carefully reviewing the cases from other states with similar facts, we are рersuaded the decisions upholding the application of res ipsa loquitur are better reasoned. As stated by the Supreme Court of North Carolina:
Defendant intestate was in control of the vehicle when it left the highway on a curve. It is unusual for an automobile to leave the highway. When it does so without apparent cause and inflicts the injury or damage, an inference of the driver’s actionable negligеnce arises, which will take the case to the jury. The inference of negligence does not arise from the mere fact of injury, it arises from the manner in which it occurred.
Greene v. Nichols,
Because Brinegar has presented some evidence of both elements of res ipsa lo-quiter, a faсt question was presented. It is the prerogative of the jury to determine whether a preponderance of the evidence points to negligence on the part of Williams.
We affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.