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Porter v. Wilson
389 S.W.2d 650
Tex.
1965
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*1 plaintiff testimony have 'the of for a violation of the only could affected exclusion (1) testimony upon appears: one of that the excluded of the witness rule where points parties, testimony to the case of the com- in issue between the was vital testimony plaining party; (2) of this was that the excluded and the witness af- appellant upon possibly all been vitally testimony could not have material violated He alone the fact that rule was of the issues case. fected thereunder; placed transac- or the was not knew the exact details witness give complaining party did not investigation, (3) and could tion attempt, property for which the connive the violation the amounts sold, expense some gain in han- and thus items of “educate” witness -the advantage opinion the dling property making my the sales. at the trial. clearly Blakey’s testimony exclusion of was- being There no other source erroneous, reasonably supplied, and the error was this could which evidence probably testimony been ex- to and did cause the his should have calculated improper judgment. of an point, cluded on at The evi- rendition this least. judgment for affirm the of the Court dence as to the in the case amounts Appeals. sold, property ex- Civil and the penses sale, making such is of the character,

most indefinite and uncertain CALVERT, dissent. J., joins this C. testimony of this was exclusion manifestly appellant.” injurious to up-

Courts usually are more inclined to

hold action of the trial in exclud- court

ing testimony of a witness who has vio- party

lated the rule calling where permit-

witness was in causing at fault or ting the violation and the excluded evidence PORTER, Petitioner, Thomas W. party’s merely is not vital to such case already cumulative in been has nature. WILSON, Sr., ux., Respondents. P. et Frank pointed Blakey’s out testimony tape recording he would have identified No. A-9867. respondent’s crucial re- were case. If Supreme Texas. spondent attorney guilty or his April 7, 1965. indiscretion, in fail- their mistake was keep Blakey to swear as a witness out of when him the court room at a time as a appeared been called

Watson

witness, subpoena, was not under and there deny no he would reason to believe that tape.

his Unless statements recorded power testimony to exclude punitive may merely be used

witness penalize

weapon party lack fore- for basis

sight, it seems to me that is no there Blakey refusing -to allow

whatsoever recording.

identify tape determine, as I been able to

So far case condone is the first Texas

652 *2 trespass brought try

This title suit was Respondents, April Wilsons, against Porter Thomas W. possession to others to recover title and of land 11.37 acres out west *3 11, 6, I of Section Block & GN RR Com- pany survey, County, situated in Randall However, controversy present- Texas. Appeals ed the Court of Civil and solely this Wilsons between Porter, and and involves title twenty-one lots numbered and twen- Thirty- ty-four (24) in Numbered Block (36) six of the Randall Coun- Palisades ty, lie within the bound- Texas. Both lots aries described in the of the 11.37 acres petition. Wilsons’ pleaded The both the Five1 and Wilsons Limitations, Ten2 is- Year and Statutes sues as to both statutes were submitted to jury judgment The for determination. Wilsons, allowing court the trial for the Harris, Amarillo, for Clayton, & Martin acres, of title entire recovery 11.37 petitioner. 24, including is based on af- Lots and Chambers, Stone, Stone C. Ama- & John answers in favor firmative Wilsons rillo, respondents. for on Prior both Limitation issues. pertaining to submission of these issues 24, presented Lots filed and and Porter SMITH, Justice. which was a Motion for Instructed Verdict opinion delivered in heretofore Subsequently, Porter filed mo- overruled. 2, 1964, is withdrawn veredicto, cause December tion obstante judgment non following opinion and the is substituted for a trial. These mo- and a motion new therefor. tions overruled. were both thereof, cultivating, possession 1. Art. Vernon’s Ann.Civ.St.Tex. verse “Every enjoying same, using suit to recover real estate insti- or shall against person having peaceable years ad- within ten his suit therefor tute possession thereof, cultivating, verse his action have next after cause of shall using enjoying same, paying peace- accrued, or afterward. thereon, any, claiming taxes if possession under contem- able and adverse duly registered, against per- a deed plated article, or deeds shall be in this years right action, having instituted -within five next after son shall be con- accrued, of action shall cause not more than one strued embrace ap- including sixty acres, not afterward. This article shall not hundred and ply possession land, improvements one in who de- or number of acres raigns through forged enclosed, actually deed. And ex- should same claiming forged deed, sixty acres; no one under a one hundred ceed forged power possession under executed taken and held when such attorney title, shall allowed the benefits of some written memorandum of this article.” bound- other than a fixes the duly possessor’s claim and is aries person "Any registered, peaceable 2. Art. V.A.T.S. who such right recovery has the of action for the shall be co-extensive be construed lands, specified tenements hereditaments such in- with the boundaries against having peaceable and another ad- strument.” Appeals, appeal Appeals On to the Court Civil Court of Civil render Porter, Appellant, presented points judgment as- nothing that the Wilsons take erred in serting that the trial court overrul- their suit so as Lots and 24 are far ing the above-enumerated motions. Por- concerned. principal throughout was

ter’s contention probative that there was no evidence of YEAR STATUTE OF FIVE findings of the jury force to LIMITATIONS title under Wilsons held either The Court of virtue of statute. principal for the con- basis Wilsons’ Appeals, Civil affirmed 371 S.W.2d tention that of the courts judgments judgment ground court on the of the trial below should be affirmed is the title under had established Wilsons Cook, Rosborough announced in 108Tex. *4 the Five Year of Limitations. Statute 364, which is to S.W. Therefore, did not consider the the court support effect to a limitation that order points attacking court before it the trial title under the Year of Limita- Five Statute upon judgment insofar was based as it tions, necessary it un- is not that Ten Year Limitations. Statute of made, convey der which the claim grantor title. is that the The contention Porter did as error in his mo- assign may wholly any vestige of barren of rehearing tion for failure of the Court title, and, therefore, pass the deed no sem- upon Appeals pass points, Civil these of to title; yet, pur- blance if it of describes and application and his writ error fails for of ports to the land and is on its face present points. to such good requirements it meets of statute, and claimant under the deed to We have concluded sustain Por provided, course, would prevail, of that all ter’s contention that Wilsons have requirements other the statute have been failed to under the Five Year establish title met. Limitations, but the Statute Wilsons contend judgment support that of the trial cite in Wilsons also of their court must be affirmed because Porter contention the case of Benskin v. Barks assign as error failure of the inter dale, Tex.Com.App., 246 360 (1923), pass upon points mediate court to at held, part: wherein it tacking judgment of the trial court upon jury based finding support that “The deed is sufficient ad Wilsons established title under the Ten possession verse and set in motion Year Statute of Limitations. With five-year statute of limitation. agree. latter contention we do not Since Newberry, 428, Parker 18 S. we have judgment concluded to reverse the * * statute, W. 815 *. so Appeals, Court of Civil concerned, far as a deed demands the Wilsons have title under the Five Year only person having peaceable Limitations, dispose Statute we will and adverse real estate questions the law presented applica be ‘claiming duly under a deed or deeds error, for pertinent tion writ of registered.’ Art. 5674. Of Rev.St. questions law presented appeal course such deed must describe Appeals Court of Civil which were not ** land. think the instrument We considered McKelvy court. See Barber, opinion falls within the class Court, designated by this deliv 8, July 1964, ered 59. S.W.2d deeds.”

For stated, the reasons to be agree now re- judgments we We cannot judgments verse both the trial court reached in controlling. these cases are seek land will not deed,3 a claim to the the Wilsons en under which tire tract under the Year Statute Five title under the perfect operate H. will a claim the Limitations, interest was executed J. purports This which the instrument on its May 1956. face Bright and wife on Tex.Com.App. sell, convey. Bruni, “bargain, Martinez v. Brights deed recites that (1 921), unto the quit holdings ap 235 S.W. and forever release proved Court, wife, Supreme Iris Wilson, Sr., Frank P. said Tex.Jur.2d Possession, assigns, all Adverse An Wilson, instru heirs Kirk their § ment to that right, such right, our ”* * * interest as may of land. parcel certain tract or and no more not qualify follows: will as a deed reads as un The habendum der the statute purport does not HOLD AND TO HAVE “TO convey the specify nor itself does all together with premises, said any particular purportedly interest which is ap- rights, privileges singular the conveyed. Here the limitation claimants be- any manner purtenances thereto contend that the instrument under which P. Frank Wilson longing unto said they hold affords basis a limitation Wilson, heirs their wife, Kirk Iris claim all of Lots 21 and 24 under the we, forever, neither assigns so five-year statute. The circumstance that heirs, nor grantors, nor our the said words, employs “all our *5 claiming under persons any person or right, “quit title and interest” or the word have, hereafter, shall, any us at time claim” is not fatal to their contention itas to any right or title claim, or demand must be determined from instrument as appurtenanc- premises or the aforesaid a convey whole whether it to es, part thereof.” or land merely or itself such interest as the grantor may have therein. case is question in this controlling here involved the instrument whether example, Heath, For in Tex. Jackson the nature give of to notice sufficient Civ.App. 453, (1959), 325 no wr. S.W.2d so thereunder asserted the claim extent of hist., it was held that instrument which an five-year statute. qualify to as quitclaimed title right, all the and interest depend upon wheth- question does This of did not under the an interest grantors actually owned er the habendum statute. The in the instrument property in described contained in as fol such instrument was an ex- ascertain not, but we must or lows: “to hold the above re have pur- it instrument whether amination interests, titles, rights, leased claims and merely itself or the land ports to convey demands, in- [grantors] uncertain to the said their as wholly some undefined re- is a mere in effect terest therein and signs. correct. decision is forever.” This claim. or doubtful lease an of invalid it cannot From the face of instrument purported to con grantors said specified vey land a interest there or that a deed well settled It seems convey purporting to or interest in. Instruments convey undivided an purporting “ * * * Twenty-one (21) presents —, by Numbers “Lots these do (24) Twenty-four BARGAIN, SELL, RELEASE, Block Number in AND Palisades, Thirty-six (36) of The said unto the CLAIM QUIT FOREVER wife, No. of Section Kirk of Subdivision 11, Iris P. Frank Wilson 6, assigns, RR Co. Wilson, Block No. I&GN all our their heirs and County, Texas, as shown right, Randall and to title and interest map plat lying of record parcel or thereof in the land tract or of certain County, Randall, Texas, County Randall the Deed de Records State of follows, Texas.” to-wit: scribed as “ ‘ * * * right, release one’s or interest are and all other real estate commonly convey used to inter- possessed undivided I now and am own Paducah, unknown ests of an extent or claims hav- in the town coun- Cottle ing a ty, dubious basis. It be anomalous Texas. All of the town would above say property that a deed an one- undivided is situated the town Pa- ducah, Texas, support third to no county, Cottle plat an inter- original more than undivided one-third shown recorded town, 81, page est while a release of an un- or said of record in vol. specified right, give county, title or interest would in the deed records Cottle Texas; notice and hence a claim to the my here now it is intention entire of land. wherein the convey tract In cases said A. all the to the A. Neff em- courts construed I have an estate own in town of real said words, my right, county, Texas, “all ploying the Paducah in Cottle ” purporting interest” one not.’ whether is set out above or wording itself, they have found some then said: in- evidenced instrument which tention land itself rather instrument, “The of an character right, than title and interest constituting merely to land grantor. is to be determined according con- to whether it assumes to Smith, In Cook v. upon vey property described and its 3 A.L.R. con- effect, profess- merely has face strued an instrument which contained grantor’s title to the es following clauses: If, property. according face of instrument, operation is to con- ‘“ * * * Granting Clause: If, itself, property it is deed. vey bargained, sold, released and forever hand, purports to con- other *6 quitclaimed, presents and these do gran- the vey no the title of more than hereby bargain, sell, release and for- quitclaim tor, deed. Rich- it is * * * quitclaim, ever my right, all 364, 3 Levi, [359], ardson v. title and interest in and to that certain Bickerstaff, 444; Threadgill v. S.W. ” * * parcels tracts or of land 757.” Habendum Clause: ‘“To have and special reference made The Court then to premises, hold the said together with habendum and the granting the clause to all singular and rights, the privileges involved, conveyance clause appurtenances any thereto in man- out and have heretofore set clauses been belonging ner to the said A. Neff A. said: and his assigns forever, heirs and so “If character of the instrument I, Potts, that neither my R. said nor dependent, alone, upon were the con- person any persons heirs nor or claim- granting struction of and haben- [the me, any under shall at time hereaft- * * * could be dum there clauses] have, er or any right or demand * * * being simply doubt no ap- premises title to the aforesaid or ** ” purtenances or any thereof.’ It should be noted granting Intention Clause: This clause follows a words, clause contained the my right, “all description by large block and number of a interest,” title and. and that word's of number of lots including the lot in contro- habendum—“to and to hold the versy and also several small tracts metes premises,” said were not construed to make operate bounds. The reads as follows: convey instrument “to described,” convey instrument re- property purport statute must professing’ convey “merely grantor’s one merely mained the land and not inter- property.” grantor’s granting interest est in the land. The clause in “premises” was words, con- other the word Benskin v. Barksdale used words “bar- right, title applying sell, gain, strued release and forever * * * than grantor rather my interest right, all of title and interest in deed. tracts of land described property].” described to [the however, the in- held, that when It was The habendum clause read as follows: whole construed as a strument was “ prem- ‘To have and hold said weight given due “Intention Clause” together ises singular with all properly consideration, the instrument was appurtenances rights, privileges convey purporting construed as one any unto belonging, thereto manner grantor rather such interest than Benskin, the said M. his heirs and J. held that one might have It therein. forever, I, the assigns, so that neither holding under the instrument heirs, any my Ellis said nor nor J. J. purchas- protected innocent person persons me, claiming or five-year statute er for value. While the shall, have, hereafter, at time limitations was not involved Cook any right claim demand or or title Smith, supra, construction of proper premises appurtenanc- the aforesaid issue, e., conveyance at i. instrument of es, any part thereof. But it is ex- the land it- purport the deed pressly agreed, stipu- understood and merely self or interest there- grantor’s lated that a lien is vendor’s retained in, any? if premises on the aforesaid un- described pointed out that the til should be the aforementioned and described “quitclaim to describe used the word deed” note and all thereon has been fully paid more an instrument which does no than shall when this become ” right, purport to title and inter- absolute as a deed.’ grantor. est held that the wording Commission held pur- Cook Smith involved converted the in- habendum clause ported to the land and was not a purported strument into one which to con- words, quitclaim, despite the use of vey in- merely the land itself “ * ** ‘release and forever actually terest which the had there- ” my right, in and all and interest to’ *7 in. It said was that: the land involved. granting “The clause the above similarly It was held in Parker v. New my employs ‘all words [which 428, 18 berry, (1892), S.W. 815 that right, title and is indefinite interest’] “quit an instrument which used the word and uncertain as to the extent of releasing claim” a clause a 320-acre tract granted estate in the lands described. from the did not render warranty conveyance ineligible un “ the instrument of * * * habendum “right, der the statute. The words pliant, flexible, deed is not above so appear title and interest” in the the ex- adaptable in its revelation Newberry. deed involved in Parker v. land, estate, intended tent of sup- By most terms Perhaps parties passed. lends to be the case which position Benskin, assigns, to is Benskin v. his are port respondent’s to heirs Barksdale, premises, Tex.Com.App. (1923), together 246 hold S.W. have and to rights, priv- 360, singular mentioned. Benskin rec- with all and heretofore Cook, supra, appurtenances Rosborough ileges, thereto ognizes as does qualify belonging, for an to under the manner forever. instrument “ ** * in- language do not think the intends an “We [T]he really in fact strument which is merely the instrument shows an intent legal possessing all the essential to the leasehold interest of requisites * * * constitute it such law: to Ellis.” instrument, by ‘an its own terms, re- We have or with such aid as the law heretofore set out the clauses quires, op- assuming to purporting Smith, under consideration in Cook v. su- conveyance: erate as a not that it shall pra, wherein it said that the habendum title, proceed having from a party “right, clause would not convert a land; actually convey title must to purporting interest” instrument into one but it have all the constituent must convey itself, the land although it was parts, by itself, good tested held that the “Intention Clause” would have ” perfect (Emphasis deed.’ added.) opinion effect. In our Cook v. Smith sets forth the better rule insofar as the con- Thornton, In the case of Seemuller struction and effect of the habendum clause (1890), involving concerned. seems that a who tax after the above quoting words, deliberately chooses the “right, title McKinna, held that Wofford v. the Court and interest” destroy would not intend to instrument in the form of a deed the effect of such words using an ha- “professing” convey in contro- the land bendum clause using the phrase, common versy. purports Where the “To have and to hold the above described itself, convey though the in- even premises.” “right, uses the strument terms interest,” qualifies the instrument support a claim under Year the Five

TAX DEEDS Niday Statute of Limitations. See Coch- Tex.Civ.App. ran 93 S.W. Commonly phrase “right, title history. no writ and interest” deeds, is used in par sheriffs’ Bright- We conclude since the ticularly those place which take result pur of a deed Lots 24 did not tax lien Wilson 21 and foreclosure. sheriff ob viously land, Rosborough does property. port not own He is necessarily conveying Cook, supra, only conveyed Brights’ another’s interest therein, but if the taxing authorities have land, right, title and interest in said lots of performed respective their duties perfect could no title to the two Wilsons levy and assessment of taxes (and the law lots under the Five Year of Limita Statute presumes they op have) deed will tions. erate the interest of the true own er property, hence the sheriff’s deed YEAR LIM- TEN STATUTE OF following a tax lien foreclosure will ITATIONS as notice under the statute as it probative interest of the There no evidence true owner property. finding the ordinary “release of all force the record to *8 my right, instrument, title and interest” jury perfected title of the that the Wilsons purport does not to be the owner 5510, supra. provisions under the of Article of the land particular interest there grant failing The trial court erred in. The early Court in the case of Wofford Porter’s motions for an instructed verdict McKinna, 23 Tex. 36 (1859), had under veredicto. judgment and for non obstante question consideration the of whether a tax disposition Our of the claim of Wilsons’ deed would afford the basis establish under the Five Year of Limita title Statute title under the statute. The recog Brights tions it clear that the makes Court, in answering having nized 21 and 24 as the af the title to Lots firmative, been excluded from their deed. said: 658 something, [Bright]

Clearly, Brights entered into and he moved it straight, put posts.” possession expressly ex and in some One under a deed wit Therefore, cepted Bright’s ness testified [Bright] 21 and 24. that “He some Lots possession, any, ponies in there, is referable to the he on it." if and lived Some possession Bright presumed that conforms testified that made is witnesses is confined to the limits no distinction in the character use of deed and Company Pine the land within enclosure. Mr. Bright thereof. Lumber Southern Hart, 357, did not and we no evidence testify, 161 Tex. 340 S.W.2d that find Bright (1960). claimed the Lots 21 and adversely Therefore, 24. it is conclusive that no ad 1949, Brights In entered into 1948 or possession verse has been established that acres; possession they lived 11.37 compliance pro with constitute upon Lot within house situated 5510, the Ten Year visions Article Stat May the 11.37 acres. On boundaries of ute of Limitations. Wilson testified that 28, 1956, conveyed Bright Lots 21 and 24 to claimed bought he he and went land into 17, 1962, April On this suit Wilsons. possession immediately 1956; after June Thus, is seen that if the filed. Wil- However, that he lived on Lot he ad Year sons are to recover title under the Ten accept” mitted that he “offered to Mrs. Por Limitations, 5510, supra, Article Statute of proposition ter’s to sell Lots and 24. they rely upon possession, adverse must “get testified that Porter offered to Wilson any, by Bright if and themselves. title” from Mr. Simmons

title to The Wilson for Tax As $50.00. Canyon Independ prove must sessor Collector of The that Wilsons that they possession such School District testified Wilson have had actual ent paid lots, taxes beginning is “such a on Lots 21 and with and that the year his records give of an that showed character of itself will notice but the owner possession, mature to be B. Simmons. adverse W. exclusive statutory period,” in this into title after court judgments of the trial and of years. case Southern Pine Lumber ten Appeals awarding the Court of Civil Hart, supra. See Company McCall and 24 both to Wilsons to Lots 21 are Co., Grogan-Cochran Lumber reversed, here judgment rendered ex (1945). S.W.2d 677 We nothing by that Wilsons take their suit facts, including the amined the statement of far 24 are in so as Lots 21 and concerned. witnesses, and find no evi testimony of the respects, judgments all other both finding jury dence part, courts are Affirmed affirmed. title under the Ten Year the Wilsons have part. All costs reversed rendered of Limitations. evidence Statute respondents, adjudged against are 11.37 shows fence was “around” the that a Respondents’ motion for Wilsons. rehear- acres, 21 and 24 and that Lots were with ing is overruled. testi the fence. Some of witnesses he fied was around the land that the fence CALVERT, J., and GRIFFIN C. One of the witnesses tes (Bright) bought. WALKER, dissenting. JJ., impression tified that he was under bought lying “Mr. all the with Bright clear, The record fences.” (dissenting). CALVERT, Chief Justice acres some within 11.37 is a narrow this case issue in “strengthened” the Bright the fence. Mr. opinion tends to one which moving into the house Lot fences after “* * * only issue before obfuscate. So 14. As said: one witness *9 stated, it is well may clearly all, except us at changed at

fence wasn’t irrelevant it from outset disassociate tree or maybe it was nailed on to a where

659 stating is extent the claim by what nature and asserted. immaterial matters Admittedly, give not notice the deed does not1 in issue. of the exact extent of the claim nature and proper designation of an asserted. which, parts, purports considering all of its grantor's “right, foregoing If in matters are is- not in is in issue. Ad- and interest” land not here, sue what is the issue ? The issue true mittedly, quitclaim is a deed. Cook v. simple: is quitclaim this Does a deed 119, Smith, (1915). 107 174 1094 Tex. S.W. contemplation as a deed within meaning 5509, of Article Vernon’s a Whether deed Texas Civil Statutes ? “convey the land” not in issue. Admitted ly, Smith, it does not. v. 107 Cook Tex. STARE DECISIS 119, (1915); 174 S.W. 1094 Richardson v.

Levi, 359, (1887); 67 Tex. 3 S.W. 444 Harr If given the rule of stare decisis is to be Boring, ison (1875). & Co. v. 44 Tex. 255 weight controlling seeking in an answer issue, the answer be that a must “quitclaim” Whether use of the word qualify. deed does That answer in the granting clause will convert an in- compelled by our in decisions Parker v. strument purporting otnerwise Newberry, 428, 83 Tex. 18 S.W. 815 the land into a is not deed in Barksdale, Tex.Com.App., Benskin v. Admittedly, issue. it will not. Cook v. (1923, 246 holdings approved); S.W. 360 Smith, 119, 107 Tex. 174 (1915); S.W. 1094 by is reinforced our decisions in Levi, 359, Richardson v. 67 Tex. 3 S.W. Lee, Moseley (1872 73), v. Tex. 479 37 444 (1887). — McDonough County, v. Tex. 79 Jefferson Whether general use of the habendum 535, 15 S.W. 490 (1891) and Carleton v. clause, “to have and to hold the above de Lombardi, 355, 81 16 1081 Tex. S.W. premises, scribed etc.” will quit a convert (1891). claim deed into a purporting deed to con vey the land is not in Admittedly, issue. plea Newberry Parker involved a v. it will not. Smith, Cook 119, 107 Tex. five-year limitation under the statute 174 (1915); S.W. 1094 Hunter v. East in the first case was decided 1892. It was ham, 648, 95 Tex. 69 66 (1902); S.W. squarely in issue which Court met this Threadgill Bickerstaff, 87 Tex. voluntary quitclaim deed whether (1895). within the contem qualify as a deed would plation There statute. purporting Whether deed prior had cases which been in undivided prenicate can that such a indicated said or claim to the whole the land under the Lee, qualify. Moseley In five-year statute is not issue. Admitted- trespass (1872-73), defendant ly, Paschal, it cannot. Acklin v. 48 Tex. under a try title case held Bruni, (1877); 175-177 Martinez he could deed. The held Tex.Com.App., 235 (1921). S.W. 549 faith, rights purchaser good assert Brights that had the limitation Whether from the Wilsons, between suspended during been War is made claim case, States, [elapsed] time “abundant give “is sufficient to notice give appellee perfect title under nature extent five limitation, his deed years’ virtue thereunder” is not the issue asserted case, possession.” McDon majority, if and continuous stated County, ough the exact statement the means v. Jefferson Emphasis indicated. mine unless otherwise *10 (1891), certain of the defendants S.W. warrant and forever defend all and trespass try in a singular premises title suit who held the said unto the said quitclaim pleaded under Newberry except deed the five- D. L. —save year proof statute of limitation and made P. survey Smith 320 acre J. payment only deed, of taxes which I quitclaim make a years. judgment five The trial ran per court’s and for the consideration of $1 plaintiffs sought in their favor. acre—his against heirs assigns judgment ground any person reversal of on the lawfully whomsoever claim- admission of the deed evidence to claim the same or question, ruling In error. thereof.” quit Court said: “That deed in form a Parker, appellant, asserted in this and it is contended that it is parenthetical statement in Court that not for that reason a deed which under the instru- warranty clause converted acquired by title can be limitation. We quitclaim ment into a mere deed think that under facts of case tract, quitclaim deed 320 acre and that a objection to its introduction in evi support Newberry’s would not claim under properly making dence was overruled.” Newberry, ap- statute. ruling regarded must have Court pellee, argued only modi- that the statement quitclaim qualifying deed as as a warranty, fied the and that it was unneces- statute, deed under the else would sary quitclaim deed to decide whether a it admissible in evidence to es held support would his limitation claim. tablish the defendants’ The same title. controversy Court hot over resolve implicit Lombardi, holding is in Carleton v. parenthetical whether the statement modi- fied the entire as to the 320- instrument holding

which one under a deed tract, acre converting it into a urged purchaser defenses of innocent warranty. only In- modified five-years’ statute of limitation. The stead, problem with the dealt separately. Court dealt with the defenses following manner: It held that the character of the deed was' not changed by the recitation of has refer- “The first raised that, a valuable cash consideration and convey- sufficiency ence to the therefore, pur the defense of innocent Newberry claims ance under which chaser must fail. The same limitation, plea his have been sufficient to defeat the limitation possession. sufficiency of his also plea quit if the Court believed questions There are raised other claim deed did present- order will be considered statute. But rested its conclu mentioned, the first Recurring ed. sion that the limitation defense could not purchas- we think that the rule that be ground sustained on the that the deed er, interest as is takes such who required had not registered been conveyed techni- by a five-year statute. cannot, cally, character of under that purchas- conveyance, protected be Newberry In Parker etc., faith, applica- good no er has purported to under which claim was made such is made the basis tion where land, including a convey several tracts of five-years plea limitation. tract, usual 320-acre and contained the ** * The the instru- character of warranty habendum clause. unimportant would be ment if read as follows: valid, void, conveyance, and not written hereby myself, my belongs I to that class “And do bind heirs, requisites instruments. The esssential administrators executors

661 posed a deed the but necessary by as neither decided nor assumed of tion founda- plea by the the are that shall Court in 1892. terms, its or as own with such aids the carefully It would seem that the worded authorizes, purport or to law assume opinion Newberry v. Parker should have operate a conveyance. as Wofford question quitclaim settled the of whether a McKinna, 23 Tex. 46.” qualifies five-year deed as a deed the under statute. It differentiated between suf- the opinion necessary The effect of the Court’s quitclaim ficiency of a a muniment deed as was to that assume the was a instrument title as a deed for limita- quitclaim acres, and, deed to the purposes. tion It that for declared five- basis, that to that it was sufficient hold year purposes limitation the character plea. Otherwise, support to there was an unimportant instrument if it is valid no reason Court to be concerned as conveyance a belongs to the con- sufficiency quitclaim with the of a deed to veyance quitclaim class A instruments. plea; question could have belongs deed to the conveyance class of disposed simple been holding a that and, valid, convey- instruments when is a parenthetical statement did not con- ance of such title as the has. The quitclaim vert the instrument into a deed this knew when it wrote. Richard- tract, as to only the 320-acre but modified Levi, son v. (1887). warranty. The Court further that the es- declared requisites sential majority opinion to a The brushes aside Par- deed under statute are “that it Newberry ker that shall own with the statement terms, “right, such title interest” did with aids words law au- thorizes, deed, appear purport operate further assume or to not conveyance.” a quitclaim A all the was that deed has statement that Court held those requisites, essential and the Court ‘quitclaim’ word in a clause knew use of “the knew, it. also, quitclaim The Court that a releasing a the war- 320-acre tract from ranty only grantor’s not deed render the instrument did right, title interest in conveyance ineligible the five- land and does under purport not year suggest I the land. So statute.” that this short- know- ing, disposition carefully the Court Newberry handed refrained from Parker declaring requisite an justice that does not essential do record or qualify a deed under the was carefully opinion worded in the that case. it purport “right, It is true that words land. appear interest” do But put Parker v. Newberry did parenthetical statement is that issue at It again rest. was raised in this grantor “only deed” make[s] Barksdale, Court in Benskin v. Tex.Com. Considering 320-acre tract. App., 246 (1923). S.W. 360 history “right, is a and interest” title of that case is enlightening and should be opinion recognizes, as the important consideration our decision subject interpreta- statement to no of this case. tion other than as to 320-acre tract grantor “only right, title make[s] Barksdale, Miss owner of record Moreover, deed.” the Court land, trespass to certain sued Benskin in not make the holding attributed try title. Benskin was in majority. holding attributed as- a deed from Ellis. sumes, decides, paren- nozo plainly deed on its face. thetical statement the war- modified purported convey nothing more than ranty as to the 320-acre tract rather than “right, Ellis’ title and interest” in and to whole, directly land, provided

the deed as a when a note by citing Newberry Parker Mc- ed consideration by Benskin as executed paid, County, it Donough v. by a lien was secured vendor’s Jefferson plain enough quit seem that when shall become absolute “this deed executed, approved Commission’s we the deed claim deed.” When qualifies held that a title but held the record Ellis did not own *12 the But five-year Benskin deed under statute. the interest the land. leasehold a majority limitations five-year recognize does not that as a fact. pleaded the statute opinion the majority The Judgment the states: as defense to suit. instruct was for Benskin on an

trial court * * * recognizes "Benskin that for Appeals ed verdict. Civil an instrument to qualify under the five- only instrument the to be held year purport convey statute it must judg reversed trial court’s the 3 the grantor’s land and not merely the for Miss judgment ment and rendered * ** interest in the land. That court 194 Barksdale. S.W. 402. held recognized that McDonough Newberry, supra, v.

Parker v. “The Commissionheld that the word v. supra, and County, Wofford Jefferson McKinna, ing of the clause converted habendum quit that “a (1859), 23 Tex. 36 the instrument purporte into one which support of five- claim will a claim deed 2 convey d itself not the land authority limitation,” year but concluded merely the grantor interest which the cases that one of the undivided interest had therein.” support only such a extent will by gran actually interest of the owned opinion I have searched Benskin granted peti tor. This Court Benskin’s recognition holding vain for the tion for writ of error asserted which simply majority speaks. They which the Appeals “the of the decision Court of Civil opinion. In- are not to be in the found direct, phase ex on this of the is in case purport asmuch as instrument did not press, irreconcilable the deci conflict with convey only grantor’s land but Newberry, sion of this Court Parker v. right, in the land and 428, McDonough Tex. 83 Jefferson expressly was characterized very County, Citing 79 535.” those inasmuch as Stubbs, Ill. cases and Safford expressly instrument was the Court held authority, held: N.E. this Court Appeals only of Civil to be deed, it seems unreasonable conclude is sufficient “The deed purport- that this that it Court would hold mo- possession set in and to adverse ed to in the absence limita- itself tion opinion * * * of a statement in to that effect. statute, in far so tion. says holding majority which only concerned, as a deed is demands appears in- made be mere person peaceable and having drawn estate be of real adverse ference from the Court’s discussion duly ‘claiming under a or deeds in- granting and habendum clauses ** * think the registered.’ We strument, discussion, according to which set out falls within above Court, con- majority, indicates that the designated class deeds.” prior trary to the rule in our down laid Smith, holding 107Tex. Cook instrument, Considering form of the habendum treated Ap- holdings Court of Civil into converting clause as the instrument holding peals, foregoing Appeals support- purporting the land. The Commission which majority. Emphasis that of grant- parties gathered to be is no sound there record discloses vary “might from noth- alone it for the inference. basis thus and, inferentially, ing to the full fee” The Court was well aware of the hold- only a be limited to an intent to ing in Cook Smith opin- when wrote estate, but the habendum leasehold ion in Benskin. In holding the deed from adaptable pliable and clause was so Ellis to Benskin to only right, convey all an intent indicated deed, the Court of Appeals Civil premises title and interest in Smith, quoted cited Cook v. very grantor might That this is a correct own. quoted language opin- now interpretation of the discussion is Court’s grant- ion for that court’s doubly im- made conclusion clear ing and habendum clauses of the Benskin do mediately following the discussion: “We *13 deed change did not its character from that language not think the of the instrument quitclaim of a deed. is It unreasonable quitclaim the merely shows an intent being infer that thus the reminded of hold- of thus Having leasehold interest Ellis.” in by opinion Cook v. Smith the on concluded that the instrument evidenced Appeals, Court of Civil the Court would right, title convey its face an intent to all either overlook that holding or would make Ellis, premises and interest in the owned directly opposite and conflicting holding held, summary as the Court in fashion mentioning obviously without it. It indicated, deed heretofore that the neither. It must be admitted the that true support five-year the stat- claim under the meaning of the Court’s discussion ute. granting and the habendum clauses of Ellis- apparent foregoing It the should from Benskin deed is at reading first less than Newberry Ben analysis of clear. Parker v. by relating can be made clear it on skin Court has v. Barksdale that this with which the Court was prior the directly two occasions decided dealing light arguments in of the both, question in decision parties. this case. our briefs of the As stated the quitclaim opinion, in has been that a deed does Court the Benskin counsel for contemplation of Miss a deed within the argued Barksdale that the instrument only quitclaim Art. not meet purported 5509. The does deed and Instead, grantor’s right, of ma only title issue stare decisis. effect, says, jority interest in in had the a leasehold estate. for Counsel New- argued Benskin as now constituted decided Parker v. brief his deed purported paren berry, would only in- it have held not Benskin’s warranty terest in estate also thetical statement leasehold but modify right, all of deed did not other there considered title interest which might Benskin own With entire instrument as to 320-acre land. joined, sought only issue tract from the thus but released the tract warranty; parties. solution in the now intention of and that the Court as Barksdale, granting constituted decided Benskin v. Court’s discussion is, therefore, and habendum would not have clauses at considered whether parties all legal to their effect to the deed intended that it on char- related only acter of in a estate or an interest leasehold land, or a deed title conveying right, Cook intended that it all his as in Smith, premises, altogether is related to their interest but would legal con purported effect in the intention the held that the instrument disclosing parties quitclaim right, in- right, all grantor’s all vey was, terest or right, premises a limited title and interest. and that therefore, Court said that if intention deed. What €64 indi- majority’s held is not Another reason for the con-

majority would then have appears clusion to be except that a inference cated “give does not notice of the nature and in the case now before us. extent of the claim asserted thereunder.” rule of stare de- a slave to the I am not That urged reason was also this Court on time indicates that passage of cisis. When in Benskin the five- rejecting as basis grave injustice law results court-made year following limitation defense. The is willing justice, am to over- rather than in I excerpt argument from the written East prior Landers v. rule decisions. See counsel for Miss Barksdale: Co., Disposal Salt Texas Water “It definitely claim to be held and set- ought No such (1952). 248 S.W.2d 731 tled that where instrument of con- showing is here. made veyance only quit claim, pure majority’s conclusion reached technically employed, term is largely inasmuch reasoning quit is not face a on its claim to sup- will deed to an undivided interest quit itself but port an adverse under then claim such interest as the land, a statute to the whole a tract of more, had and no it is not sufficient unspecified deed to an indefinite and inter- prescription the 5 warrant he est should not held to a claim statute, year’s *14 rea- for fundamental under the statute to all or of give does that the son that it not notice tract, although is of the tract the whole itself, is owner’s the true adversely cultivated, openly held and used is land, passed sought is requisite period, for enjoyed or described.” is regularly paid taxes are thereon. That argument by precisely the was made rejected then, accepted The is argument, counsel for Miss in Benskin v. Barksdale treat- now. the ultimate effect of our Thus Barksdale, except Newberry that Parker v. only that ment Benskin v. Barksdale of McDonough County were v. Jefferson we think the Court should have decided recognized by him affirmed as sound differently. This and cus- case is the usual decisions to of the interest actu- extent tomary rule of stare situation which the ally grantor. following owned honoring applies. But decisis instead of excerpt argument is an from his written guided of being rule decisis and stare before this Court: decisions, majority re- prior our own misinterpre- jects through those decisions clearly “It is the settled holding of deciding correctly approves as tation and Court that for an our a deed undivided no-writ-history of case interest in land will not under the five Heath, Tex.Civ.App., 325 S.W.2d v. Jackson year’s protect grantee be (1959). 453 yond it on face convey. Bruni, 235 Martinez vs TAX DEEDS 551; Creason, 145 S.W. Clifton vs 323; Burke, Tex. S.W. Willis vs [7 “right, interest” A tax deed 218; Civ.App. Acklin 27 S.W. 239] deed, pure purport simple. not It does Paschall, 175; Kelly vs vs 48 Tex. quitclaim land. is a Medlin, 26 voluntary nothing more. Like Bickerstaff, deeds, Threadgill see v. clearly line authorities is “This will deed not (1895), a tax at bar.” conclusive the case purchaser. of innocent a defense Co., Hillyer-Deutsch-Jarratt Appeals See opinion of Civil Sanchez v. of the Court Tex.Civ.App., (1930), writ S.W.2d 634 argument. agreed reflects that with Ortiz, Compare: v. , Woodward refused. did not. This Court 75, 237 (1951). 150Tex. In this S.W.2d to render the conveyance. deed void as a area of types two requirement law of instru The deed fulfilled the that it ments convey are the same character purport operate conveyance, but ances operative legal and have the same requirement it did not fulfill the they are This parts deeds. have good all constituent of a effect— unchallenged by stands majority. Un early opportunity deed. This Court had an der the holdings Newberry in Parker v. in Parker Newberry, heretofore dis- Barksdale, Benskin types in the two cussed, distinguish Wofford McKinna struments are also the same very attempted character ground here conveyances operative the same majority. The Court could have said that legal effect pur for limitation apply the rule Wofford not because poses; they quitclaim deeds, are still the deed there was deed a tax and the deed qualify both as “deeds” within the con voluntary in Parker awas deed. templation Art. 5509. Their character so, doing Instead of rule announced thus consistent. remains Not so under the adopted in Wofford v. was McKinna majority in this applied case. voluntary to a quitclaim deed. qualifies that a concedes tax deed Neither is in Seemuller anything said as a “deed” under Art. 5509. The conces Thornton which indicates sion must be long made or a of de line distinguishing between tax deeds and cisions, beginning with v. Mc Wofford voluntary quitclaim The Court did deeds. Kinna, 23 Tex. 36 be over must case, majority points in that as the state ruled. In order to honor that line of long out, issue “was in tax deed at form yet voluntary quit decisions and hold land,” professing will under the stat record in the reveals that its but the case ute, majority declares that limitation conveyance character as purposes a tax deed is not deed. *15 “right, fact a that it in title attack and was authority Cited turning as for a tax thus Newberry v. and interest” deed. Parker Jekyll-Hyde deed into a instrument is Wof just years after Seemuller decided two was McKinna, ford supra, v. and Seemuller composed by of the v. Thornton a Court Thornton, (1890). McKinna three same Wofford Justices. Wofford v. McKinna not the does support of only authority cited in was the conclusion. The Court that a did not hold It in both cases. the conclusion reached qualified tax deed under the because statute credulity that the three suggest to taxes the purported officer title of to the Henry— and Stayton, Gaines Justices — the true did an- owner. But the Court forgotten that the would so soon have nounce a determining rule for a whether between the had made a distinction Court qualify. deed would The Court said Thorn- types of in two deeds Seemuller for qualify an instrument to the under five- appears thus that what the Court ton. It year statute, it must be put joined together 1892, it has now in “ years seventy-three after of mar- asunder instrument, terms, by 'an or its own rule, riage; contrary settled the requires, with the as- such aid as law grounds granted which has been on divorce suming operate as a to purporting existed, unhidden, marriage cere- when the

conveyance: proceed that it not shall performed. mony party title, actu- a or must having ally land; to title the THE ON MERITS parts, must have all the constituent itself, perfect tested by good a of recognize I conflicting there are de- ” deed.’ of the Appeals cisions Courts of Civil The holding in the case question was that the de- issue, the arguments and that scription of the land was so indefinite as of some cogency can be made on both statute, question. Baylor Law in prescribing registry deed, of the See 9 of sides the prior of this necessary possessor 338. All decisions as Review to enable the avail question, years’ limitation, is, the with the himself of which have dealt five Court indirectly, point give directly to a con notice to either the owner the defendant possession deed does is claiming clusion that under deed.” possession, All It enjoyment under Art. 5509.3 is as a deed use by arguments majority premises apparent by stranger, now advanced deed, qualify were of a holding for that one does not the record which alerts the true in Benskin v. Barks owner for action rejected need lest lose advanced he rejected They dale. were there because his land. He knows that under years he lose title in regarded as foreclosed can his five McDonough possession if Newberry paying Parker v. one the taxes claiming pos- rea County. right There is also sound on the land and is Jefferson them session under When he investi- rejecting son now. a deed. records, gates the he finds that the one in convey what does declare Art. 5509 possession paying they taxes as be- therein as “deeds.” ances are referred to registered come due and has albeit v. Mc said in Wofford 1859 this Court nature While the exact deed. Legis enacting the statute Kinna that claimed and extent the interest word intended the use of lature possessor is not evident from valid instrument “deed” to refer prudent he know landowner should operate conveyance purported registered by not have been parts of a of the constituent and had all title, Baylor claiming no Law Review one interpretation reaf good deed. That possessor may be claim- in Parker v. by this in 1892 firmed he can ac- greatest interest which meaning the word Newberry. quire entire fee title. statute—the changed in the mean “deed” cannot have possessor inquiry as to the If an deed, other voluntary quitclaim time. A of the interest claimed nature extent It valid, test laid down. wise meets answer, simple satisfactory yield a fails to conveyance. operate filing suit diligence should dictate good parts of a all has the constituent interrupt statute. running writing, has a deed—it is in this Under premises, contains grantee, describes regu- case, who is of land *16 one signed by the conveyance, words of claim- larly paying thereon and is the taxes requirements, grantor. Meeting those no more enjoys under a conveyance is made valid limi- position the laws of favorable by Art. 1288. pays trespasser who no a naked tation than no instrument of registered taxes and has But what of the lack of notice true this was the conveyance. I do not believe speaks? which the owner of those laws. intent of Aside the fact that this reason for quitclaim deed does not that a judgments the courts I would affirmthe rejected in Benskin v. Barks below. dale, saying that reason for there sound gives ample notice. WALKER, 113, 136, JJ., join Kilpatrick Sisneros, GRIFFIN this dissent. object “The declared that approved v. Larson in 18 Southwestern Law Jour- Professor Lennart 3. conclusion is nal

Case Details

Case Name: Porter v. Wilson
Court Name: Texas Supreme Court
Date Published: Apr 7, 1965
Citation: 389 S.W.2d 650
Docket Number: A-9867
Court Abbreviation: Tex.
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