280 Mass. 457 | Mass. | 1932
The plaintiff’s intestate was killed on or about May 19, 1929, in a collision between an automobile owned and operated by the defendant Sorell and a truck operated by an employee of the Mexican Petroleum Corporation. In separate suits brought under G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 229, § 5, by the plaintiff as administratrix against the defendant Sorell and the Mexican Petroleum Corporation for negligently causing the death of her intestate, she recovered verdicts of the same amount. Both cases went to judgment. The Mexican Petroleum Corporation paid the full amount of the execution which issued on the judgment against it, namely, $4,026.57 damages and $27.65 costs, and the execution was indorsed as "satisfied in full.” No part of the judgment for $4,026.57 damages and $23.25 costs which was entered in the suit against the defendant Sorell has been paid. The defendant Sorell at the time of the death of the plaintiff’s intestate held a policy of motor vehicle liability insurance issued by the defendant insurance company under the provisions of St. 1925, c. 346, insuring him against loss or damage by reason of liability on his part to pay damages on account of bodily injuries or
The plaintiff as administratrix has obtained the verdict of a jury against the defendant Sorell in an action brought under G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 229, § 5, to recover damages for the death of her intestate. That verdict represents a jury’s determination of the guilt of Sorell and also its determination of the amount of the penalty to be paid by Sorell for his wrongful act. The statute on which the suit against Sorell was grounded is one of many legislative enactments during a period of nearly two and a half centuries which have created in this Commonwealth what did not exist at common law, rights of action for negligence which causes the death of a human being. The history of this legislative system of death statutes is told with adequate detail in Hudson v. Lynn & Boston Railroad, 185 Mass. 510, and Brooks v. Fitchburg & Leominster Street Railway, 200 Mass. 8. In the various statutes there have been and are differences as to the grounds of liability and the procedure for the determination of liability, the burden of proof
“The guiding principle for the interpretation of a statute is that it must be construed, if reasonably possible, so as to effectuate the purpose of the framers.” Commonwealth v. S. S. Kresge Co. 267 Mass. 145, 148. The definite purpose of the death statutes to punish those who through negligence cause the death of a human being would be only partially accomplished if one of two persons wrongfully causing death escaped punishment. Like all punitive legislation the death statutes prescribe the extent of punishment. The statute on which the action against Sorell was based places a minimum limitation of $500 and a maximum limitation of $10,000, between which extremes the amount of the penalty is to be fixed with reference to the degree of culpability of the wrongdoer. Nugent v. Boston Consolidated Gas Co. 238 Mass. 221, 237. There was no
The imperative purpose of the death statutes that by means of an action of tort punishment shall be inflicted on a negligent causer of death, even though the negligence of others likewise played a part in such causation, does not permit the application in such actions of the long established common law rule that the satisfaction of a judgment against one of two joint or concurrent tortfeasors discharges the other. At common law the object of an action of tort for personal injuries is the indemnification of the person injured, by providing him with the monetary equivalent of the loss which he has sustained. The death statutes have no such purpose. In an action under those statutes the verdict of a jury for a plaintiff must be reached without the slightest consideration of any element of compensation, and the amount of the verdict represents simply the extent or quantity of the defendant’s blame. In separate actions' against two or more who have negligently caused death, the verdict in each case expresses only the individual liability of each particular defendant and if one pays the amount of a verdict against him he is paying only his individual penalty. It has been said that the common law rule that the satisfaction of a judgment against one of two joint- or concurrent tortfeasors bars recovery against the other “apparently is based upon the nature of their liability, which is one and indivisible. Accordingly, if one of them is discharged, or satisfies the cause of action, there remains no foundation for an action against any one.” Muse v. DeVito, 243 Mass. 384, 388. Matheson v. O’Kane, 211 Mass. 91, 94. The nature of the liability of two negligent slayers under the death statutes as expressed by the verdicts against them is not one and indivisible. It is just the opposite. In nature their liability necessarily, in view of the punitive purpose of the statutes, is divisible, since each is liable to the extent only of his individual culpa-' bility. The foundation of an action under the death
There are opinions in cases brought under the- death statutes where may be found statements to the effect that there can be but one satisfaction in damages or one satisfaction of a judgment. See Oulighan v. Butler, 189 Mass. 287, 293; D’Almeida v. Boston & Maine Railroad, 209 Mass. 81, 87; Brown v. Thayer, 212 Mass. 392, 397; Clark v. New England Telephone & Telegraph Co. 229 Mass. 1, 6. In none of these cases was the matter of the satisfaction of judgments or of a release before the court. In the first and last there was only one defendant. In the second there were counts for conscious suffering where the general common law rule that the satisfaction of a judgment against one joint or concurrent tortfeasor bars satisfaction of judgment against another was clearly applicable. In D’Almeida v. Boston & Maine Railroad, 209 Mass. 81, 87, Mr. Justice Braley, after stating that the plaintiff administrator was entitled to. maintain an action against all who contributed to the injury and death of his intestate, added,
Decree affirmed with costs.