*1 258
jurisdiction court. v. chancery Edgil Ragsdill, 256 Ark. 511 rendered (1974). judgment S.W.2d 625 Cloman, without is void. jurisdiction Cloman 229 447, 316 Rule states: (1958). S.W.2d 817 ARCP 58 “[a] or decree is when judgment only effective so set forth and entered as provided Rule The comment to this (a).” 79 out that rule the date of points entry, opposed to the date rendition, is the effective date for appeal purposes. However, the date of is not entry controlling present case because death of the court. extinguished jurisdiction It is not necessary to from a void order it appeal because never became effective. A void order is subject to collateral attack. Pendergist v. Pendergist, 593 S.W.2d and remanded with case is reversed trial court directions to a manner not inconsistent with proceed opinion. B. PORTER v.
Genevieve Ilfrey LINCOLN 83-309 Court of Arkansas
Supreme delivered Opinion April [Rehearing May denied 1984.] *3 Drew, Mazzanti, for appellant. by: W.H. Drew & Jr., for Johnson, appellee. Lloyd John Lincoln, appel- Dudley, Genevieve Robert H. Justice. husband, of her lee, affections filed suit that the alleging Porter, II, B. by had been alienated Lincoln Charles $100,000.00 in in an award of trial resulted jury $25,000.00 damages. in compensatory of appeal. in the eleven points find no reversible error We (o). in under Rule 29(1) is this court Jurisdiction have should that the trial court first contends failed to because the appellee in her favor a verdict directed The appellee to Lincoln. married validly she was prove in in Benton Lincoln were married that she and testified had the license. marriage but that she misplaced However, evidence of uncontroverted there deal good the of marriage at the to establish tending introduced trial lived in the had couple Charles and Genevieve Lincoln. 1980; they same home until their separation September, to married and themselves out continuously had held Lincoln; born children were know Mr. and Mrs. two were born to a child to and the couple adopted the couple; her prior marriage. appellee on the entirely based almost
Appellant’s argument the was married on couple failure of the prove appellee However, alleged complaint, date 1954. June We proof. is not held to such a strict standard of proof of the requisite addressed issue previously Scott, Roach in a case of this kind. marriage we stated: S.W. in actions for marriage as to proof The law declared Ency. is correctly of affections alienation Evidence, “In an action for as follows: vol. p. affections, of a formal direct proof alienating rule being is not necessary, general marriage cohabitation, reputation, acknowledg- evidence out to the holding themselves parties, ment by *4 wife, the and is a sufficient proof as husband world . .” fact of marriage. a to verdict refusal direct no trial court’s find error the
We on this issue. appellant the for flow of trial, steady to show sought
At the appellee officer and a A bank from Lincoln to appellant. cash Lincoln to checks were given by testified that bookkeeper to some regain that she hoped testified Appellee appellant. to appellant. had funneled that her husband of the money the “reason a directed verdict for moved for The appellant flowing proper of monies is evidence herein the that to the grant court refused The trial of damages.” measure 261-A as a the refusal assigns point verdict and appellant
directed
did not
in the point. Appellee
We find no merit
appeal.
her husband
"monies
solely
flowing”
seek
for
$250,000
and
for loss of consortium
to
She
sought
Gibson,
v.
loss of her husband’s affections. In Gibson
of an
"gist
we stated that the
(1968),
Ark.
Appellant made a motion in limine to exclude evidence 14, 1979, to prior Novemebr to November subsequent 14, 1980, the date the was filed. complaint appeal On she claims the trial court erred by evidence of events admitting which occurred after November The trial 1980. judge, motion, denying stated that “the evidence to subsequent period relevant to show a only course of conduct on behalf of the parties. But I think it is admissible so I’m going to deny motion on behalf of the defendant.”
In cases of this
we have
type,
approved
admissibility
of evidence subsequent
to the accrual of the cause of action
Raines,
for limited
In
purposes.
Hardy
494 (1958),
we held that
testimony
events subse
to the divorce
quent
and his wife was
appellee
admissible
to show the state of
between
feelings
appellant
divorce,
wife
to the
as
appellee’s
prior
such evidence may
on the
light
shed
conduct
causing
alienation of
alleged
Gibson,
affections. Gibson v.
In the case at was introduced testimony This complaint. to the of the subsequent filing events to the subsequent included evidence of acts testimony and Lincoln. The trial divorce of for only was admissible aware the evidence obviously *5 by admitting and did not commit error limited purposes been have proper instruction would limiting evidence. was sought. but one not the circumstances under
261-B
objections,
over
about
Appellee inquired,
appellant’s
stocks,
bank
records of
certificates of
deposit,
there
error in the
contends
wealth,
admission of this
or
testimony
appellant’s
because
wealth,
in
lack of
had no
worth
probative
determining
of the
whether
caused an alienation
affections of
appellant
appellee’s
following passage
husband. We find the
565, to be
Hardy, supra, citing
Am.
controlling:
§
Jur.
defendant,
Evidence of the
of
financial condition
has,
how much or how little
he
wealth
is
generally
admissible
an alienation
of affections
suit
...
to be
affecting
awarded
compensatory
damages
. . .
recoverable,
Where
are
exemplary
damages
punitive
evidence of the wealth or financial
condition of the
admissible,
defendant
is
and is a
element
proper
for the
jury to consider
such
for it
finding
damages,
is
obvious that what would be
noof
to a
consequence
rich
man
be
might
ruinous
to a
man.
poor
of the above
with
force
reasoning
passage applies
equal
is a
sought punitive
when the defendant
woman. Appellee
case,
circumstances,
and under
these
this
damages
financial
status of
is admissible. Our
on
appellant
holding
for, on
number
this
should be
read
narrowly
point
occasions,
we have held that where the issue
punitive
with
erroneously
jury,
together
submitted to
damages
condition,
award of
the defendant’s
financial
an
compen
is tainted and cannot stand. KARK-TV v.
satory damages
Smith,
Also,
Simon
The next dismissed. point may quickly Appellant’s Lincoln, asked Knox the son of attorney Charles Lincoln, how affections suits his alienation of many mother had filed. and the attorney objected Appellee’s asked witness and into chambers so attorneys go *6 261-C
he could hear some
arguments
counsel
testimony
before
Charles
ruling.
Knox Lincoln
were both
The
questioned.
court took the matter under advisement and
witnesses,
did
in
not rule while
The
the
chambers.
attorneys
and the
then
the courtroom with
returned to
the
still under
matter
counsel did
advisement.
Appellant’s
but, instead,
the line
pursue
called the next
questioning
witness. The assertion of error
not sufficiently preserved
Sanitation,
to makes it available in this court.
Inc. v.
Sunray
703,
Pet Incorporated,
Ark.
461
249
110 (1970).
S.W.2d
contends that instruction
No. 6 constituted a
comment on the evidence. The last
part
one sentence
instruction,
alone,
of the
can be
standing
construed to
assume a
erroneously
fact.
sentence
disputed
is: “You
are further instructed that if
find from
you
the evidence in
this cause that the home life of the
and her
plaintiff
husband
nevertheless,
was at times
unpleasant,
would not justify
in
defendant
voluntarily alienating
affections of
Charles Lincoln to either
or remain
separate
from
away
Genevieve Lincoln.” The
assumption of
fact in
disputed
an
Dove,
instruction is
601,
erroneous. Thiel v.
Ark.
229
317
However,
(1958).
S.W.2d 121
it was harmless error in this
case because the other instructions make it clear that the
but, instead,
fact
disputed
was not assumed
was for the jury
to decide. For
we
many years
have held that under these
circumstances we do not reverse.
Car
Brinkley
Works &Mfg.
325,
Co. v. Cooper, Ark.
(1905);
75
S.W. 645
St. Louis I.
87
M.
& S.
Co. v.
Ry.
105
Brogan,
Ark.
261-D If B. Porter induced Charles Lincoln to leave his wife, her, or encouraged him to remain from away her, harbored and him protected she did so at her and the peril burden is her to show upon good cause for her conduct and good faith it.
There was court to ample evidence for the submit instruction. that from testified bookkeeper through $18,073.05 Lincoln or an gave appellant average $2,259.13 Lincoln he per year. admitted that and appellant had sexual relations over the thirteen or fourteen past years; they traveled together to countries as well foreign various in the places United States. testified that Appellant she and Lincoln spent time at an together exclusive resort in Vedra, Florida, Ponte registered under the name together Mr. and Mrs. Lincoln. also admitted that Lincoln watch, her a gave gold Rolex a diamond and a pendant, gold addition, chain bracelet. In there was other disputed The lack testimony. of a statement specific by appellant Lincoln encouraging to from his wife separate does not mean that appellant did not alienate the affections of Lincoln. Her actions themselves. See for speak v. Hardy Raines, 494 (1958).
Appellant’s next objection to goes instruction No. 16. The instruction is as follows:
In addition to compensatory damages for actual any sustained, loss that Genevieve may Lincoln have she also asks for Punitive punitive damages. damages may in addition imposed to any compensatory damages awarded to punish and to deter wrongdoer others from similar conduct. you Before can impose punitive damages you must find that B. Porter knew or Jean to have ought known in the light surrounding circumstances, that her conduct would naturally result in probably and that she injury such engaged conduct or in wilfully, reckless or conscious disregard indifference to the from which malice consequences, addition, be inferred. may malice be inferred may 261-E Lincoln and Charles B. Porter a finding Jean are not You intercourse. in illicit sexual
engaged against to assess required the evi- by if justified so do Porter, may but you B. dence.
The
to the
instruction
appellant’s objection
giving
solely
was: “It permits wholly
on punitive damages
it
on sexual
intercourse. We
object
generally
finding
one,
sentence,
the next
to last
also.”
objectionable
Johnson,
to be taken from our case of Alexander
appears
we stated:
at
The appellant by requested two instructions refused to give to give is not required A trial court were repetitious. Both Gartman, Vanlandingham instructions. repetitious 111 (1963). 367 S.W.2d Affirmed. Hollingsworth, C.J.,
Adkisson, and Hickman JJ., dissent. The record dissenting. Justice, Hollingsworth,
P. A. Appellee alienation between the in this case shows the of duration. It long apparent her former husband was 261-F Appellee’s Appellee, husband between an encounter Appellant freight the first terminal at motor Appellee any affection. alienation disclosure to any existed, action, that time. Section accrued at if cause provides for alienation of action that a cause 37-201 year cause of one after shall commenced affections accrue, and not thereafter. action shall and dismiss. I reverse would C.J., dissent.
Adkisson, in this joins