11 Mich. 20 | Mich. | 1862
This is an action of slander for words actionable in themselves. The declaration claimed general damages only, and the plea was the general issue. At the trial it appears that the utterance of the words charged to be slanderous was proven, and that the defendant (plaintiff in error) offered testimony in mitigation of damages, which the Court rejected; and upon the rulings-, and decisions of the Circuit Judge in rejecting • such testimony error is assigned: Birst, that the Court below “refused to allow evidence that during the six years prior to the trial inveterate feelings of hostility had existed between the plaintiff and defendant, and that the plaintiff had taken every opportunity to irritate the defendant.”
In this ruling there is no error. The declaration charges the defendant with the uttering of words imputing to the plaintiff perjury in testifying upon the trial of an indictment
It is secondly assigned as error that the Court refused to permit the defendant to prove, that on the occasion of a trial at Thornville, before a Justice of the Peace, the plaintiff called him a liar and perjured wretch. The foregoing reasons are equally applicable to show that there was no error in this ruling. But a further reason arises from the indefiniteness of the offer. The affair at Thornville is not shown to have any connection with the alleged grievance, or as having been any provocation to it. It appears to have been offered as evidence of hostility, or as a justification for retaliatory words, spoken, perhaps, long afterwards. In no light can I view the evidence as proper.
The last error assigned is upon the refusal of the Court to allow Townsend to testify that the plaintiff had stated that the statements of Porter did him no damage. I can see no error in this ruling. The elements of -redress in an action for slander are the wrong done to the plaintiff, and the malice or vicious intent of the defendant; and
The case of Evans and wife v. Smith, 5 T. B. Monr. 363, is referred to ag sustaining this allegation of 'error. But that decision rests upon a very different principle, and of its correctness I have no question. That was slander of the wife; and evidence showing that the husband had said he did not believe that the defendant oi’iginated the report against his wife, and that he had merely related what he had heard, but that it -was necessary to sue somebody to stop the report, was held admissible in mitigation of damages, as it went to the circumstances of the slander, and the motives of the defendant, and to the question of malicious intent; as well also as to the object in bringing the suit. But the effect of the slander was not involved in the admission, nor so considered by the Court. It introdrxced no new rule of damages; while the proposition of the defendant in this case, if allowed, would tend to establish this rule; The fairer the character of the plaintiff, the less the injux-y, and consequently the smaller the damages to be given. Such a rule can not be tolerated.
The judgment is affirmed.