delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case, like Porter v. Lee, ante, р. 246, involves the jurisdiction of the Federal District Court to grant an injunction, sought by the Price Administrator under § 205 (a) of the Emergency Price Control Act, to restrain eviction of a tenant under an order of a state court where the Administrator alleges that eviction would violate the Act and valid regulatiоns promulgated pursuant to it. Briefly stated the circumstances of the controversy are these: B. M. Murray, as executor of an estate, pursuant to authority granted him by the Probate Court of Franklin County, Ohio, sold a house located within the Columbus Defense Rental Area. A writ of possession directing the sheriff of the County to evict the tenant and to place the respondent purchasers in рossession was obtained in the Probate Court. No certificate authorizing the eviction was sought or obtained from the Price Administrator as is required by § 6 of the Rent Regulation for Housing. 10 F. R. 3436, 13528. Before the sheriff executed the writ the Price Administrator brought this action for an injunction in the Federal District Court. The Distriсt Court issued a temporary restraining order but later dismissed the complaint on the ground that § 265 of the Judiсial Code, 28 U. S. C. 379, deprived the Federal District Court of jurisdiction to stay the proceedings in the state court. *254 This section provides that: “The writ of injunction shall not be granted by any court of the United States to stay proceedings in any court of a State, except in cases where such injunction may be authorized by any law relating to proceedings in bankruptcy.” The District Court in dismissing the cause еntered an order restraining respondents from evicting the tenant pending determination by the Circuit Cоurt of Appeals for an application for an injunction prohibiting the eviction pending аn appeal to that Court. The Administrator made this application in the Circuit Court of Appeals, but it was denied, thus removing all obstacles to eviction of the tenant. The Circuit Court of Appeals has not heard this case. In order to prevent eviction of the tenant, the Administrator sought аnd obtained from Mr. Justice Reed an injunction pending final disposition of this case in this Court and apрlied for certiorari directly to this Court under § 240 (a) of the Judicial Code, which authorizes us to grant cеrtiorari “either before or after a judgment or decree by such lower court . . .” We were prompted to bring the District Court’s judgment directly to this Court for review by reason of the close relatiоnship of the important question raised to the question presented in Porter v. Lee, ante, p. 246.
The District Court was of the oрinion that since § 205 (c) of the Act gave concurrent jurisdiction to state courts to grant relief by injunсtion, the policy of § 265 against federal injunctions of state proceedings should not be considered impaired by the Emergency Price Control Act. The District Court’s conclusion was that if the Administratоr wanted an injunction to restrain eviction under state court procedure he should have gone into some state court that had jurisdiction of the cause. The District Court erred in holding that the рolicy of § 265 of the Judicial Code should not be considered impaired by the Emergency Price Cоntrol Act. While we realize that § 265 embodies a long-standing governmental policy to
*255
prevent unnecessary friction between state and federal courts,
Toucey
v.
New York Life Insurance Co.,
The judgment of thе District Court is reversed and the case is remanded to that Court to exercise the jurisdiction cоnferred upon it by § 205 of the Emergency Price Control Act.
Reversed and remanded.
Notes
An alternative reason given for the decision in the Willingham case was that, since the state court thеre was attempting to enjoin the Administrator from performing his duties under the Act, the District Court had powеr both under §205 (a) of the Act and §24 (1) of the Judicial Code to protect the exclusive federal jurisdiction which Congress had granted. But our opinion did not, as the District Court thought, depend entirely on this alternative ground.