Cross-appeals from summary judgment proceeding. Bill J. Pope and Linda Pope [hereinafter plaintiffs] appeal from a judgment for Farmers Insurance Company Inc., [hereinafter defendant] on issue of coverage of uninsured motorist provision on Granada automobile. Defendant cross-appeals from a judgment for plaintiff on issue of coverage of uninsured motorist provision on Mustang automobile. We affirm.
The cause was submitted to the trial court on a stipulation of facts. The pertinent facts are as follows: on the afternoon of January 2, 1984, Patty Barker’s Mustang broke down on the eastbound shoulder of Old Gravois Road, facing eastward. Summoned by his wife, Mark Barker arrived shortly thereafter and parked his Granada on the shoulder of eastbound Old Gravois Road facing westward with the front bumper of the automobile parallel to the front bumper of the Mustang — approximately three to four feet apart. Plaintiff, Billy J. Pope, a neighbor of the couple, came to assist them with the disabled car. He parked his Cordoba behind Patty Barker’s Mustang facing eastward.
Plaintiff was unable to locate the hood release on the Granada, so Mark Barker handed him the jumper cables and released the hood himself. At the time of the accident, plaintiff was leaning over the opened *436 hood of the Mustang with his stomach against the grill and his legs against the bumper, holding the jumper cable terminals in his hands. A car driven by David Stolts, an uninsured motorist, traveling in the westbound lane crossed into the eastbound lane and collided with the rear end of the Granada. As a result of the collision, plaintiff sustained personal injuries when he was propelled over the hood of the Mustang and onto an embankment next to the shoulder of the road.
The Barkers had separate insurance policies on the Mustang and Granada with defendant containing identical provisions regarding coverage for liability and uninsured motorists.
The court granted coverage on the Mustang and denied coverage on the Granada. Plaintiffs appeal and defendant’s cross appeal followed.
On appeal, plaintiff contends that he was an occupant insured of the Granada under defendant’s uninsured motorist coverage for the reason he was “upon” the Granada. Plaintiff principally relies upon
Robson v. Lightning Rod Mut. Co.,
Plaintiff next contends that he was “using” the Granada with the permission of the named insured as the term is employed in the liability provision of defendant’s policy.
Defendant’s liability provisions provide in relevant part as follows:
To pay all damages the insured becomes legally obligated to pay because of: (a) Bodily injury to any person, and/or (b) damage to property arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use, including loading or unloading, of the described automobile or a non-owned automobile.
The unqualified word “insured” includes: (a) With respect to the described automobile,
(1) the named insured, and
(2) any other person or organization legally responsible for its use, provided the actual use of such automobile is by the named insured or with his permission.
We have carefully examined the authorities cited to us by the parties and have independently researched the question of when injuries arise out of the “use” of the insured automobile for purposes of liability coverage. The cases addressing “use” have involved analytically distinct situations, and therefore, each case must be decided on its facts.
The words “arising out of” are ordinarily understood to mean “originating from,” or “having its origin in,” “growing out of” or “flowing from.”
Cameron Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ward,
Plaintiff argues that § 379.203 mandates that defendant’s uninsured motorist coverage be as broad as the coverage provided for bodily injury and property damage. Even assuming that this argument is correct, we conclude under the facts here that the causal connection between the plaintiff’s “use” of the Granada to jump start the Mustang and the injuries received insufficient to find that they arose out of his “use” of the Granada as the term is employed in the liability section of defendant’s policy. The point is denied.
Defendant cross-appeals from the judgment for plaintiff on the issue of uninsured motorist coverage on the Mustang automobile. The precise issue presented is whether plaintiff was “upon” the Mustang and thus covered as an occupant insured under the terms of defendant’s policy.
Defendant’s uninsured motorist coverage, Part II, C, provides in relevant part:
To pay all sums which the owner or operator of an insured motor vehicle would be legally responsible to pay as damages to the insured because of bodily injury sustained by the insured, caused by the accident, and arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of such insured vehicle.
The “insured” is defined therein as “the named insured or a relative, (2) any other person while occupying an insured motor vehicle.” It further provides, “Occupying means in or upon or entering in or alighting from.”
There is no Missouri case directly on point.
1
Defendant asks us to adopt the interpretation of the Virginia Supreme Court in
Pennsylvania National Mutual Ins. Co. v. Bristow,
The rules of construction applicable to insurance contracts require that the language used be given its plain meaning and if the language is unambiguous the policy should be enforced according to such language.
Robin v. Blue Cross Hosp. Service Inc.,
The judgment is affirmed.
Notes
. We are not unmindful of
Turner v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York,