52 W. Va. 252 | W. Va. | 1902
The Bridgewater Gas Company appeals from an order made by the circuit court of Wirt County, refusing to dissolve an
On the 1st day of June, 1901, Plon. Lewis F. Tavenner, judge of the circuit court of said county, granted an injunction upon a bill presented by Pope Bros. & Co., restraining the Bridge-water Company from placing, or causing to be placed, carried or brought^ within one hundred and fifty feet of the well, any fire by which the escaping gas might be ignited. Two days later, on motion of the defendants, after notice to dissolve, and after the filing of a joint and several demurrer, and answer, the court so modified the order “as to permit the said defendants to proceed with operations upon their said lease on the Swisher
The principles governing this case are found in Powell v. Bentley & Gerwig Co., 34 W. Va. 804, McGregor v. Camden, 47 W. Va. 193, and Chambers v. Cramer, 49 W. Va. 395. In view of the elaborate discussion of them found in these cases, it •is only necessary to advert to the facts disclosed by the record which clearly bring the case within the principles. In McGregor v. Camden, this Court held, that oil and gas wells are not nuisances per se, and that,, if there is any way that such well can.be operated so as not to make it a nuisance,. only the unlawful operation thereof will be enjoined. In Chambers v. Cramer, the general proposition is laid down that when a thing complained of is not a nuisance per se, but may become so, according to circumstances, and the injury apprehended is eventual or contingent, equity will not interfere; the presumption being that a person entering into a legitimate business will conduct it in a proper way, so that it will not constitute' a) nuisance. In that case, Judge McWitoetee has carefully reviewed a large number of cases illustrating the application of this principle. They show that it is firmly settled and universally recognized by the courts.
This injunction is not to prevent a trespass. The defendant was operating upon land upon which it held a lease for oil and gas purposes and, in erecting its structures and placing its machinery, it was doing what, ordinarily, it would have a right to do:, and acting at a place which, for the purposes of the business in which it was engaged, belonged to it. Hence, the only question is whether it was doing something upon its own premises which would injure the occupants or owners of adjoining property. The drilling and operating of an oil well being a legitimate business and lawful in its character, such acts can-' not be enjoined unless the circumstances under which they are
Upon the facts stated in the bill, the injunction would probably lie; for it is alleged that the plaintiffs had taken every precaution and made use of every appliance and method known to close in the well and prevent the escape of gas from it, but that these efforts had been unavailing and gas was constantly escaping and spreading in every direction around the well for a distance of at least one hundred and fifty feet, so permeating the air that fire, brought within that distance of the well, would ignite it and cause a Conflagration that would consume all the structures, stop the production of the well and necessitate cleaning it out. The bill further shows that the defendant had located its rig within about fifteen feet of the well and its boiler within about forty-five feet of it, and intended and was threatening to place fire in the boiler and begin the work of drilling a new well. v
But the facts shown by the evidence clearly negative material allegations of the bilk It is admitted by practically all the witnesses for the plaintiffs that the Pope well was thoroughly packed and closed in, at the time the injunction was awarded, and that gas was not escaping therefrom in such quantity as to make it in the least dangerous to carry on the operation undertaken by the defendant. The boiler of the defendant was shown to have been at a distance of seventy-seven and eight-tenths feet from plaintiff’s well, instead of forty-five feet. It' does appear from the testimony, however, that it would have been dangerous to have had fire in the boiler and rig of the defendant, at any time when the Pope well might have been open for the purpose of repairing the pump, tubing or other apparatus used in bringing up the oil. But it is not shown that the Bridgewater Gas Company ever refused, or expressed an intention to refuse, to put out its fire at any time that it might become necessary to open the Pope well. It is made clear by the evidence that it was perfectly practicable for the defendant to drill its well without injury or danger to the property of the plaintiffs, and without inconvenience other than a cessation of operations during such times as it might be necessary to have the Pope well open for the purpose of repairs. I-Iad it been shown that there was any purpose or intent on the part of the de
Mere possible, eventual or contingent danger is not enough. That injury will result must be shown beyond question. “In order for equity to enjoin a private nuisance the danger'must be impending and imminent and the effect certain, not resting on hypothesis or conjecture, but established by conclusive evidence. If the injury be doubtful, eventual, or contingent, or if the matter complained of is not per m a nuisance, an injunction will not be granted.” Hough v. Doyleston, 4 Brews. (Pa.) 333, approved in Chambers v. Cramer, 49 W. Va. 395, 400. Judge Holt very well expressed, in Powell v. Bentley & Gerwig Co., cited, a view which applies here, when he said, “According to our settled notions and habits there are convenient places — one for the home, one for the factory; but, Rs often happens, the two must be so' near each other as to cause some inconvenience. The law cannot take hold of such inconveniences, if slight or reasonable, all things considered, but applies the common sense doctrine that the parties must give and take, live and let live; for here extreme rights are not enforceable rights — at any rate, not by injunction.”
Por the reasons aforesaid, the order refusing to dissolve the injunction must be reversed, the injunction dissolved and the bill dismissed.
Reversed.