196 A. 837 | Pa. | 1938
Is the Act of June 24, 1937, P. L. 2017, valid and constitutional as regards the City of Philadelphia and certain independent poor districts therein? No. 116, January Term, 1938, is a proceeding within the original jurisdiction of this Court by the directors of the poor of the Townships of Oxford and Lower Dublin against the City of Philadelphia and its mayor, treasurer, receiver of taxes, and the director of its Department of Public Welfare to enjoin enforcement of the act. No. 363, January Term, 1937, is an appeal from a judgment sustaining the act in a proceeding for declaratory judgment had in the court below. No. 121, January Term, 1938, was begun by a bill filed in the court below to enjoin enforcement of the act and was removed to this court by special certiorari.
There are numerous allegations of unconstitutionality. Those that have not been answered in the preceding opinion will be taken up in order.
1. The application of the act to the poor district of the Townships of Oxford and Lower Dublin does not take property without due process of law or impair the obligation of contract in violation of the Constitution of the United States or that of Pennsylvania.
Section 201 of the act is under attack in this respect. It provides, "In every city of the first class, the offices of poor director and of poor auditor of each poor district created by local law or remaining in existence as a former borough or township poor district are hereby *414 abolished, except to the extent necessary to liquidate the affairs of the district. Title to the real and personal property of each such district is hereby transferred to and vested in the city, and its powers and obligations are hereby vested in and imposed on the city. Thereafter, the laws as to the care of dependents shall be administered throughout each city of the first class by the department of public welfare of the city, and each such city shall constitute an institution district for the purposes of this act. . . ." It is first claimed that the terms of this section are not applicable to the incorporated district of the Townships of Oxford and Lower Dublin, because the special Act of April 11, 1807, P. L. 259, 18 Statutes at Large 644, under which the district was created, is not expressly repealed. The purpose of the present act to comprehend every poor district in the city and to include them in a department of the city government is too clear to admit of any doubt. Under the circumstances it is unimportant that the special act was not expressly repealed.
This section of the act does not effect an unconstitutional deprivation of property or impair the obligation of contract. It is conceded that the district, being a governmental agency within the control of the legislature, has no rights to continued existence, although its charter is in terms perpetual. "Indeed, the legislature of this Commonwealth, under the Constitution, could not by contract invest any municipal corporation with an irrevocable franchise of government over any part of its territory. . . . If the legislature were to attempt to erect a municipality with a special provision that its charter should be unchangeable or irrevocable, such provision would be a nullity": Philadelphia v. Fox,
We detect no difference between this case and those involving the annexation of school districts, sanitary districts, or cities, and the transfer of their property, acquired with public funds, to other units of government that are not coterminous therewith. The decision in Hunter v. Pittsburgh is controlling here. In the instant case the complainant district is annexed to the institution district of the City of Philadelphia upon which its powers and duties are conferred. A similar disposition of its property "with or without the consent of the citizens, or even against their protest" (Hunterv. Pittsburgh, supra, p. 179) is constitutional.
Counsel cite for an opposite conclusion State of Wisconsin exrel. Board of Education of the City of Oshkosh v. Haben,
2. The act does not impair the contracts of the poor district of the Township of Bristol with its creditors, intervenors in No. 121, January Term.
It is contended that, inasmuch as Section 201 transfers these obligations to the city, the act forces upon the creditors a different debtor and for this reason is invalid. That such legislation, providing a "substantial equivalent" for the obligations of the extinguished district, does not impair the rights of its creditors is no longer open to serious question:Port of Mobile v. Watson,
3. The act does not violate the Amendment of 1922, Article XV, section 1 of the Constitution: "Cities may be chartered whenever a majority of the electors of any town or borough having a population of at least ten thousand shall vote at any general or municipal election in favor of the same. Cities, or cities of any particular class, may be given the right and power to frame and adopt their own charters and to exercise the powers and authority of local self-government, subject, however, to such restrictions, limitations, and regulations, as may be imposed by the Legislature. Laws also may be enacted *418 affecting the organization and government of cities andboroughs, which shall become effective in any city or boroughonly when submitted to the electors thereof, and approved by amajority of those voting thereon."
It is alleged the act is in particular violation of the portion we have italicized. The claim is that this local option provision of the amendment is mandatory and not permissive; in other words that legislation "affecting the organization and government of cities" can never be effective until a favorable referendum is had. Obviously the argument claims too much. The provision on its face is permissive only. That such was the intention of the framers appears from the Report of the Commission on Constitutional Amendment and Revision (1920) pages 322-323: "The third paragraph [the sentence italicized] is recommended to be inserted out of caution. The Commission believe that it should be possible to enact a law regulating the affairs of such municipalities as might adopt it by ordinance or by popular vote, and that such a law should not be open to the objection that it is special because of its tending to destroy uniformity or to the objection that it delegates legislative power; but unless the suggested sentence is incorporated in the constitution, it is doubtful whether such law would be sustained by the supreme court."
4. The act does not violate Article III, section 6, providing that, "No law shall be revived, amended, or the provisions thereof extended or conferred, by reference to its title only, but so much thereof as is revived, amended, extended or conferred shall be reënacted and published at length."
It is claimed that section 201 abolishing poor districts in first class cities and transferring their powers and duties to the city should have republished at length all the acts under which the districts were originally conferred their powers and duties. The constitution requires no such thing. In Cornman v.Hagginbotham, *419
5. The act does not constitute the Department of Welfare of Philadelphia a special commission in violation of Article III, section 20.
This case is entirely different from Perkins v. Philadelphia,
6. Section 201, in transferring the obligations of the extinguished districts to the city does not increase the city's debt to an amount in excess of the limit fixed by Article IX, section 8. *420
It is well settled such a constitutional limitation is not violated by the transfer of the debts of one public corporation to another in connection with an annexation or consolidation:Davidson v. Town of Kirkwood,
7. It is claimed the act does not apply to abolish the corporation entitled, The Managers for the Relief and Employment of the Poor of the Township of Germantown (No. 363, January Term, 1937). What is said above in connection with the same claim of the corporation of the Townships of Oxford and Lower Dublin likewise applies here. Whatever the name, and whether incorporated or not, every independent governmental agency that theretofore was charged with the care of the poor in Pennsylvania was a poor district within the meaning of the act, the terms and purposes of which are too comprehensive to admit of any other interpretation.
For these reasons, in addition to those already given in the preceding opinion, we are all agreed that no meritorious challenge to the act has been made. In Nos. 116 and 121, January Term, 1938, the bills are dismissed, and in No. 363, January Term, 1937, the judgment of the court below is affirmed. *421