165 Iowa 745 | Iowa | 1914
Plaintiff and Pauline Dutton were married on July 30, 1910. Pauline is the daughter of the defendants, O. J. Dutton and wife, and up to the time of her marriage lived with her parents at their home in Grand Junction, Iowa. Plaintiff began paying some attention to Pauline in the year 1909, and at first her parents do not seem to have opposed it, but later, apparently becoming convinced that he was not a suitable person, they discouraged the intimacy between the young people; and used their influence with their daughter to dissuade her from marriage. As usual in such cases, this advice seems to have had little effect, and on the date named plaintiff and Pauline clandestinely met in Des Moines, where the marriage ceremony was performed. On the evening of that day they called up the Dutton home by telephone and reported their marriage- The precise conversation thus had between plaintiff and his wife, on the one hand and defendants, on the other, is a matter of dispute, but it is reasonably clear that Mrs. Dutton became much excited, upbraided the- young people for their conduct, and probably demanded that her daughter come home, which she declined to do. Plaintiff and Pauline spent several weeks in various hotels at different places, after which Pauline returned to her parents. Plaintiff also soon came back to Grand Junction or vicinity, calling frequently on his wife. They went out together and visited various towns, plaintiff’s ostensible purpose being to find suitable employment or to find a location for establishing himself in business as a pharmacist, an object he did not succeed in accomplishing. From an early date in their married life differences arose between the young husband and wife, and these gradually assumed greater proportions, until the separation became complete, and on April 27, 1911, a little less than nine months after their marriage, this action was begun against the wife’s parents.
The petition is unnecessarily prolix, much of the matter set out being allegations of evidence, rather than ultimate facts. The substance of the complaint is that defendants,
The defendants answered separately denying all plaintiff’s allegations of wrong on their part, and saying that, if plaintiff’s wife had ceased to love and care for him, it was because of his own misconduct and maltreatment of her.
The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff in the sum of $11,000, of which sum he was required by the trial court to remit one-half, or $5,500, as a condition of avoiding a new trial. The defendant O. J. Dutton alone appeals.
The record -of testimony is voluminous, and we shall make no attempt at its recital, except so far as it may appear necessary for the proper disposal of the principal assignments of error on which a reversal is sought. Of these the following appear to be the most material :
All these exceptions may be considered together. We are of the opinion that all the testimony thus excluded was both competent and material. Indeed, the rule making it admissible is too well settled to admit of serious doubt. It has not often arisen in this state upon precisely similar facts, but the principle here approved has been often recognized. Stated generally, the rule is that, whenever it becomes material, in determining rights involved in litigation, to show the motive, intent, or other mental operation of any person, or to ascertain the reasons or influences which have induced certain action or conduct on his part, such person may testify directly thereto, even though such testimony may partake in some degree of the
It is true the intent or motive or the reasons influencing a person to any given act may be, and often are, shown by the circumstances attending and characterizing the act itself; but, if the fact be material upon the issues joined, it may also be established by the direct testimony of such person. He alone knows the truth with respect to such matter, and to refuse his testimony is to reject the only direct proof available, and decide the fact solely as a matter of inference from extraneous circumstances. The excluded testimony was not only competent, but very material also. That plaintiff’s wife had ceased to hold him in affectionate regard is quite evident, but proof of this fact alone is manifestly insufficient to entitle him to a verdict. The defendants can be made liable only upon a showing that this result has been caused by wrongful and malicious interference on defendants’ part. It was their right in defense to show, if they could, not only that plaintiff had ill-used his wife, but also that such treatment had caused a withdrawal of her trust, confidence and love. The effect of the ruling complained of was to admit evidence of the alleged facts of ill treatment, but to exclude proof of the more important fact as to the effect of such treatment upon the attitude of the wife toward her husband. The error must be presumed to have been prejudicial to the defense.
III. Appellant further excepts to the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the verdict against him. It being necessary, for reasons already given, to order a new trial, and as the testimony on another hearing may vary materially from that which is presented by this record, we shall not discuss the merits of the showing in this respect, except as it may seem advisable to indicate our view upon the nature of the issue which is to be considered and the law applicable thereto on another trial, assuming, of course, that the issues are unchanged.
It is to be borne in mind that the mother has not ap
For the purposes of this appeal, it may be conceded that there was evidence for the jury upon the issues submitted, but it is equally true that very much of the matter introduced into the record by plaintiff as to the conduct of the appellant is wholly consistent with perfect good faith on the part of the latter. The court properly instructed the jury that the defendants, as parents, had a right to give advice and counsel to their daughter concerning her relations with her husband, and to furnish her a home and shelter, even though their influence so exerted had the effect to cause a separation, and that no damages were recoverable against them, unless it should be affirmatively found that they acted in bad faith and with malice. It is difficult, however, to avoid the impression from a reading of the record that this rule failed to attract the attention of the jurors. This impression is emphasized by the return of a verdict of $11,0000, which is so out of proportion
A father’s house is always open to his children; and, whether they be married or unmarried, it is still to them a refuge from evil and a consolation in distress. Natural affection establishes and consecrates this asylum. The father is under even a legal obligation to maintain his children and grandchildren, if he be competent, and they unable to maintain themselves; and, according to Lord Coke, it is ‘nature’s profession to assist, maintain, and console the child. ’ I should require, therefore, more proof to sustain the action against the father than against a stranger. It ought to appear either that he detains the wife against her will, or that he entices her away from her husband, from improper motives. Bad or unworthy motives cannot be presumed. They ought to be positively shown, or necessarily deduced from the facts and circumstances detailed.
In the same case it was also said by Spencer, J., that, even though the amount of the verdict returned might not be held excessive, as a matter of law, it was still within the province of the court, under the peculiar circumstances, to re
Upon the same subject the Indiana court has said:
All legitimate presumptions, in such cases, must be that the parent will act only for the best interests of the child. The law recognizes the right of the parent, in such cases, to advise the son or daughter; and, when such advice is given in good faith, and results in a separation, the act does not give the injured party a right of action. . . . The motives of the parent are presumed good until the contrary is made to appear. (Reed v. Reed, 6 Ind. App. 317, 33 N. E. 638, 51 Am. St. Rep. 310.)
It has also been held that the use of violent language and denunciation on'the part of a parent upon learning of the clandestine marriage of his child to a person of whom he disapproved is not of itself sufficient to sustain a charge of malice in an action of this nature.’ Rubenstein v. Rubenstein, 60 App. Div. 238 (69 N. Y. Supp. 1067); White v. Ross, 47 Mich. 172 (10 N. W. 188).
In Okman v. Belden, 94 Me. 280 (47 Atl. 553, 80 Am. St. Rep. 396), after stating the right of a parent to urge the daughter to leave her husband if he believes it necessary to her health, happiness or peace of mind, the court adds: “Whether the persuasion or the argument is proper and reasonable, under the conditions presented to the parent’s mind, is also always to be considered. It may turn out that the parent acted upon mistaken premises, or upon false information, or his advice and his interference may have been unfortunate ; still, we repeat, if he acts in good faith for the daughter’s good, upon reasonable grounds of belief, he is not liable to the husband. ’ ’
The foregoing precedents fairly indicate the trend of the authorities. See, also, Heisler v. Heisler, 151 Iowa, 503; Busenbark v. Busenbark, 150 Iowa, 7; Miller v. Miller, 154 Iowa, 344; Beisel v. Gerlach, 221 Pa. 232 (70 Atl. 721, 18 L. R. A. [N. S.] 516).
With these suggestions as to the general principles which should govern the trial, submission, and determination of issues such as are here presented, we think it unnecessary to discuss other questions argued by counsel. For the reasons stated, the judgment below against the appellant O. J.- Dutton is reversed,, and the cause is remanded for a new trial. — Reversed. ,