117 Wash. 150 | Wash. | 1921
These two actions were consolidated in the trial court and tried as one. The plaintiff Poole’s Seed & Implement Company, a corporation, was seeking damages for an injury done an automobile owned by it. The plaintiff J. W. Jones brought his action to recover for personal injuries. Both actions were based upon the charge of negligence on the part of the defendant. In his answer the defendant denied negligence on his part and pleaded affirmatively that the accident which caused the damage to the automobile and injury to Jones was the negligence of Jones himself. The cause was tried to the court and a jury, and resulted in a verdict of $129.37 on account of damages to the automobile, and $1,500 damages for personal injuries.
The defendant made a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and also for new trial, both of which were overruled. Judgment was entered upon the verdicts, and the defendant appeals.
The appellant’s first point is that the trial court erred in failing to sustain his motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. It is clear from the evidence, and we do not understand it to be contended to the contrary, that the question as to whether the appellant was guilty of negligence under the evidence was one for the jury. If we have gathered the argument correctly, the appellant’s position is that Jones was guilty of contributory negligence in failing to
The second point is that the court erred in refusing to strike the evidence relating to the injury to Jones’ back, for the reason that it is too remote. The doctors whom Jones consulted after the accident and prior to the trial were called and testified. In the course of their testimony a reference was made to the injury to the back. While the evidence is somewhat indefinite, yet it was not of that remote nature which made it error for the trial court to refuse to strike it. It was proper to submit the evidence to the jury.
The next point is that the court erred in admitting in evidence the costs of repairing the car as a measure of damages. The secretary of the Poole’s Seed & Implement Company testified in answer to a question, and over objection, that the cost of making the repairs was about $125. This evidence was not followed by other evidence showing that such cost was the reasonable
It is next claimed that the court erred in admitting in evidence certain correspondence because such correspondence showed an offer of comproqiise. The Poole’s Seed & Implement Company wrote the appellant that to repair the Ford would cost about $125. To this the appellant replied by stating that the estimate was much higher than he had expected and enclosed a check for the sum of $60 towards the repairs. This check was returned, and further correspondence ensued. The examination of the correspondence shows that impliedly the appellant recognized his liability for the repairs. In addition to this, there was testimony that he stated after the accident that he would pay the cost of the repairs. The correspondence does not show an offer of compromise under the rules stated in Moore v. Stetson Machine Works, 110 Wash. 649,188 Pac. 769, but under the rule of that case the evidence was admissible.
The next point is that the court committed error, not only in the instructions given, but in refusing certain requests. Without reviewing the instructions in detail it may be said that they have been examined
The last point is that the trial court erred in permitting the jury to separate after they had been instructed and after the completion of the argument of counsel. The argument was completed about six o’clock in the evening on the last day of the trial. The jury were by the court permitted to separate and return the following morning at nine o ’clock. The statute (Rem. 1915 Code, § 349; P. C. § 8513), provides:
“After hearing -the charge, the jury may either decide in the jury-box or retire for deliberation. If they retire they must be kept together in a room provided for them, or some other convenient place under the charge of one or more officers, until they agree upon their verdict, or are discharged by the court. ’ ’
By this statute it will be noted that, after the jury “retire”, they must be kept together, as therein provided. In this case the court did not finally submit
The judgments will he affirmed.
Parker, C. J., Fullerton, and Tolman, JJ., concur.