102 Ga. 773 | Ga. | 1898
We think that the court below did not err in granting a nonsuit. When the loan was made, no time for its repayment ivas agreed upon by the parties, but in March, 1891, plaintiff wrote a letter which was in effect a demand, and which, therefore, fixed the maturity of the debt. Where a debt is not at once due and no time is specified for its payment, it is due and payable in a reasonable time or upon de
The debtor, the defendant in this suit, made several payments during the time intervening, between the demand and the filing of the suit, and subsequently to the demand plaintiff agreed to extend the time of payment until the fall of 1895, such promise not being in writing.. Section 3788 of our Civil Code provides that “A newT promise, in order to renew a right of action already barred, or .to constitute a point from which the limitation shall commence running on a right of action not yet barred, must be in- writing, either in the party’s own handwriting, or subscribed -by him or some one authorized by him. The several payments made and the new promise orally given were, therefore, ineffectual, to fix a new point from which the limitation should commence running. The statute of limitations commenced to run from-the time .the demand was made, and no new point was- ■ created by the subsequent payments or the promise made in parol.
Judgment affirmed.