171 Mass. 49 | Mass. | 1898
On March 27, 1891, the two defendants, Edward P. Bliss and Henry W. Bliss, who were partners under the firm name of Cushing and Bliss, entered into a written agreement with the Crompton Loom Works, by which the latter company was to construct for them a pile wire motion loom for weaving plush goods, in such a manner as to meet the approval of Poole, the present plaintiff, who was then in the employment of Cushing and Bliss, and when said loom should be declared correct and satisfactory by Poole the said company was to construct thirty-six more looms at a price to be determined by the parties. The written agreement then proceeded as follows: “ The said Crompton Loom Works cannot build said loom for weaving plush for other parties excepting as hereinafter provided. On or before the expiration of five (5) years from this date, said Cushing and Bliss shall formally notify said Crompton Loom Works of their intention to order to be built a second instalment of thirty-six or more of said looms on or before seven (7) years from this date, and when so ordered, said Crompton Loom Works shall not build said looms for weaving plush for any other party for a period of ten (10) years from this date. But in case said Cushing and Bliss fail to formally notify said Crompton Loom Works on or before the expiration of said five (5) years, said Crompton Loom Works shall have the privilege of building said looms for weaving plush for other parties after five (5) years from this date, and shall then be released wholly from the obligations of said ten (10) year term; also said Cushing and Bliss shall be released from their obligation to order said second instalment of thirty-six or more of said looms.”
On November 9, 1891, Cushing and Bliss entered into a written agreement with the plaintiff, by which they agreed to form a corporation to be known as the Massachusetts Mohair Plush Company, and to employ Poole as general superintendent, and to pay him a yearly salary at the rate of forty dollars a week, and as additional compensation during the time that he should remain in their employment one fifth of all the profits of the business, after a dividend of ten per c^nt upon the amount of money actually invested in the business; and he was to assign
The plaintiff was dismissed from his position as general superintendent on June 1, 1894; and none of the defendants gave notice to the Crompton Loom Works of an intention to order a second instalment of looms, and no second instalment was ever in fact ordered. The plaintiff was duly paid all sums due to him under the above agreement down to March 27,1896; and the defendants refused to pay anything afterwards.
The question is, What is the true meaning of the words in the agreement, “ to the full end of the term of the agreement made
We are of opinion that the latter is the true construction. The said parties of the first part, Cushing and Bliss, had an agreement which ran for their benefit for ten years, if they so desired. It was within their own power or option to have it so continue. The agreement was to last five years, or ten years, according as they themselves might elect or determine. It was therefore an agreement with them, at their election, for the term of ten years. There were two dates fixed at which the agreement might cease. This being so, the words “ the full end of the term of the agreement ” naturally signify the longer term, and the construction put upon them by the Superior Court was right.
This being the legal effect of the written agreement, parol evidence to show that the parties had a different intention was incompetent. Marr v. Washburn & Moen Manuf. Co. 167 Mass. 35.
Exceptions overruled.