Aрpellant, Patricia Coates, appeals from a declaratory judgment entered in the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis declaring Missouri’s Uniform Parentage Act (UPA), RSMo §§ 210.817 through 210.852 (Supp. 1990) provided the exclusive means through which the issue of paternity may be determined in the State of Missouri. We affirm.
The record reveals that decedent, Lanny Eplin, drove a tractor trailer for respondent, Poоle Truck Lines, Inc. On July 9, 1989, the decedent was killed in a tractor trailer accident. Appellant, who allegedly lived with decedent and was 18 weeks pregnant, was a passenger in the tractor trailer driven by the decedent. Lanny Eplin, Jr. was born several months later.
On July 23, 1990, appellant, as mother and natural guardian of Lanny Eplin, Jr., filed a claim against respondent for workers’ compensatiоn death/survivor benefits. Respondent filed a motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, to stay the proceedings alleging the division of workers’ compensation lacked jurisdiction to determine pаternity in light of the UPA. On May 14, 1991, the Administrative Law Judge overruled respondent’s motion to dismiss, requiring appellant to proceed with the cause.
On June 11,1991, respondent filed a petition for writ of prohibition in this court contending the division of workers’ compensation had no jurisdiction to adjudicate the issue of paternity. This court denied the petition “without prejudice to the filing of a declaratory judgment action.”
On October 1, 1991, respondent filed a petition for declaratory judgment in the circuit court. The case was heard on December 18, 1991, and, on that same date, the circuit court issued its order declaring paternity had to be adjudicated in accordance with the UPA prior to the workers’ compensation action proceeding. This appeal followed.
Appellant first contends that the trial court erred in declaring the UPA is the exclusive means by which the issue of paternity may be determined. We disagree.
This court recognizes that, in the past, the division оf workers’ compensation was permitted to determine the issue of paternity.
See Henderson v. National Bearing Division,
*878
Eighteen states have adopted a form of the UPA as of the time of this opinion.
1
Five of these states have addressed questions similar to the ones before us. Of these five, two — Delаware and North Dakota — would seem to agree with appellant’s contentions.
See Division of Child Support Enforcement ex rel. Blake v. Myrks,
We find the cases holding the UPA constitutes an exclusive procedure for determining parentage to be persuasive. As noted аbove, the legislature’s purpose of providing a uniform procedure for determining paternity would not be well served by permitting paternity to be determined outside of the UPA. In addition, we find the two сases holding the UPA does not provide the exclusive means of determining paternity are clearly distinguishable.
In
S.W. v. North Dakota Department of Human Services,
Nor do we find Delaware precedent persuasive. In Myrks, a proceeding was held to determine paternity of Wendy Blake’s son. At the hearing, Myrks admitted paternity. Several years later, Myrks filed a petition contesting paternity, contending the doctrine of res judicata did not apрly because the prior hearing was not held in conformity with the Delaware Parentage Act. The Delaware Supreme Court disagreed, finding res judicata did apply because the act was not the exclusive means by which paternity could be determined. The Delaware Supreme Court found that the act, if found to be the exclusive means for adjudicating paternity, would result in a multiplicity of litigation. The court did note, however, that the Delaware Act was significantly different from the Uniform Parentage Act. We do not find similar problems with the Missouri Parentage Act. Under the Missouri Act, a paternity action may be joined with other actions. See RSMo § 210.829(a). In addition, the division of child support enforcement is entitled to bring an action under the statute. See RSMo § 210.826. Rather than spur a multiplicity of litigation, the propеr use of the UPA to determine paternity will limit actions to one judgment determining paternity “for all purposes.” RSMo § 210.841 (1990).
Appellant also contends that, by challenging the jurisdiction of the Division *879 of Workers’ Compensation to determine paternity, respondent forces an adjudication of paternity without having proper standing under RSMo § 210.826. We note that under RSMo § 210.826, respondent certainly would not hаve standing to bring a paternity action in the circuit court. We further note that, under RSMo § 210.830, respondent could not be a party to a paternity action. We must point out, however, that it is not respondent’s action in challenging the jurisdiction of the Division of Workers’ Compensation that makes a determination of paternity necessary, but appellant’s filing of the workers’ compensаtion action itself. As noted above, in order to determine whether or not Lanny Eplin,' Jr. is a “dependant” of the decedent, the workers’ compensation board would necessarily have to determine whether or not the decedent was the father of the child. While we would certainly hesitate to hold that the respondent could challenge paternity where there is a prеsumption of paternity under RSMo 210.822, no presumption exists in this case. Paternity could, thus, only be determined under the standards of the UPA. As a party to the workers’ compensation action, respondеnt certainly had standing to challenge the Division of Workers’ Compensation determination that it had the power to determine paternity.
Appellant also contends the trial court should nоt have heard the respondent’s declaratory judgment action because the trial court lacked jurisdiction to do so. Appellant presents several issues which it contends deny the trial court jurisdiction in the present case.
First, appellant contends this is not a proper issue for declaratory judgment. The trial court has a considerable measure of discretion in determining whether or not a declaratory judgment action should be entertained.
Millers Mut. Ins. Ass’n v. Babbitt,
Appellant also contends respondent has no legally protectable interest in the paternity adjudication. Once again, appellant ignores the trial court’s ordеr. The trial court did not hold respondent could be a party to the paternity action, but only that the Division of Workers’ Compensation could not determine paternity. Respondent certаinly had an interest in the workers’ compensation action.
Appellant also contends the issue of paternity is not ripe for declaration. We disagree. Where there is no presumеd paternity under the UPA, as in the present ease, we believe the issue of paternity is best decided prior to any workers’ compensation order. The decision of the trial court is affirmed.
Notes
. These states include, inter alia, Colorado, C.R.S.A. §§ 19-4-104 to 19-4-129; Delaware, 13 Del.C. §§ 801-819; Kansas K.S.A. 38-1110 to 38-1130; and Wyoming W.S.1977, §§ 14-2-101 to 14-2-120.