Case Information
*1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT CO URT SO UTHERN DISTRICT O F FLO RIDA CASE NO. 17- 22008-C1V-W ILLIAM S G ISELA PO NS,
Plaintiff,
VS.
ARUBM NSE LUCHW M RT
MM TSCHAPPIJ., dba Aruba
Airlines,
Defendant.
/
O RDER
THIS MATTER is before the Coud on a m otion to dism iss filed by Defendant Arubaanse Luchtvaart Maatschappij N.V. (''Aruba Air''). (DE 15). Plaintiff Gisela Pons, filed a response in opposition (DE 18) and Aruba Air filed a reply (DE 22). For the reasons set fodh below, the motion (DE 15) is GRANTED.
1. BACKG RO UND
Plaintifffiled this action, on behalf of herself and others sim ilarly situated asserting a claim of breach of contract against Aruba Air. The Com plaint alleges that Plaintiff bought Aruba Air tickets to fIy from M iam i to Venezuela on M ay 25, 2013 and Septem ber 19, 2014. (DE 1 $25). Plaintiff bought her tickets directly with the airline. (DE 1 $24). On both occasions, right before boarding the plane, Plaintiff was required to pay an $80 dollar exit fee ('$Exit Fee'') even though Plaintiff had already paid for the tickets and aII associated fees in full. (DE 1 $25-26). The Exit Fee was not contained in the Aruba Airlines Condition of Carriage (dlcontract of Carriage'') and was not disclosed to Plaintiff prior to the day of depadure. (DE 1 $27). Plaintiff alleges that the Exit Fee is pad of a
broaderprogram by w hich all passengers depading from M iam i are required to pay ''additional, extra-contractual Exit Fees . . . before being allowed to board their flights '' (DE 1 $17). On these facts, Plaintiff advances one cause of action for breach of contract
II. LEGAL STANDARD
To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must plead sufficient facts to state a claim that is Slplausible on its face '' Ashcroft v'. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. ?. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)) . The Coud's consideration is Iim ited to the allegations presented See GSA Inc. e. Long Cty., 999 F.2d 1508, 1510 (1 1th Cir. 1993). AII factual allegations are accepted as true and aII reasonable inferences are drawn in the plaintiff's favor See Speaker v. U.S. Dep'f of HeaIth & Hum an Sew s. Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention 623 F.3d 1371 , 1379 (1 1th Cir. 2010)., see also Roberts v. Fla. Power & Light Co., 146 F.3d 1305, 1307 (1 1th Cir. 1998). Nevedheless, while a plaintiff need not provide ''detailed factual allegations '' the allegations m ust consist of m ore than ''a form ulaic recitation of the elem ents of a cause of action.'' Twom bly, 550 U.S at 555 (internal citations and quotations om itted). ''lclonclusory allegations, unwarranted factual deductions or Iegal conclusions m asquerading as facts will not prevent dism issal.''' Davila 7 Delta Air Lines, Inc. , 326 F.3d 1183, 1185 (1 1th Cir. 2003).The d'lqactual allegations must be enough to raise a right of relief above the speculative Ievel '' N affs v. Fla. lnt'l Univ. , 495 F.3d 1289 1295 (1 1th Cir. 2007) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 545).
111. DISCUSSION
Aruba Air m oves to dism iss on several grounds First, it contends that Plaintiff has failed to allege enough facts to suppod subject-matter jurisdiction under the Class Action
Fairness Act (''CAFA''). Second, it contends that Plaintiff's claim is tim e barred by the two-year statute of Iim itations contained in the Contract of Carriage Third, Aruba Air argues that Plaintiff has no standing to represent the putative class Foudh, Aruba Air argues that Plaintiff's breach of contract claim is preempted by the Airline Deregulation Act ($$ADA''), Finally, Aruba Air argues that Plaintiff fails to state a claim because , under the plain term s of the contract , Air Aruba gave notice that departure taxes were not included in the airfare Since the Coud finds that Plaintiff's breach of contract claim is tim e-barred, the Court declines to address Aruba Air's rem aining argum ents See Kaviany v. Bank of Am ., N.A., No. 13-CV-81073 , 2015W L 12781033 , at *2 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 29, 2015).
Air Aruba argues that Plaintiff's breach of contract claim is barred by the incorporated term s in the Contract of Carriage , which state in Article 15 2 that
(alny right to damages shall be extinguished if an action is not brought within two years of the date of arrival at destination , or the date on w hich the aircraft was scheduled to arrive or the date on which the carriage stopped . The method of calculating the period of Iim itation shall be determ ined by the Iaw of the court w here the case is heard
Plaintis responds that her claim is timely because (1) the time Iimitation in the Contract of Carriage requires application of Florida Iaw and (2) l'Florida Iaw does not allow Defendant to contractually shorten the five-year tim e period . . . under 595.03, Fla. Stat'' (DE 18 at 13). Plaintiff argues that the time Iimitation on the Contract of Carriage requires application of Florida Iaw because the second sentence of Adicle 15 2 states that 'sltlhe method of calculating the period of Iimitations shall be determined by the Iaw of the court where the case is heard '' Plaintiff reads that sentence to m ean that the applicable statute of lim itations should be five years under Florida Iaw Defendant argues
that the second sentence of Adicle 15 . 2 sim ply states that Florida law would apply ''in calculating'' the Iim itations period and thus would trigger Fla . Stat. j 95.031 which relates to ''Com putation of Time'' w ith respect to statutes of Iim itations . (DE 22 at 5). The Court agrees w ith Defendant. The Contract of Carriage clearly sets fodh a two - year statute of lim itations, and that tim e Iim itation is not displaced because Florida law determ ines how that tim e-period is to be calculated
Plaintiff's second argum ent is also unpersuasive Under C.F.R. j 253.5, air carriers are allowed to include Iim its on Iiability in their incorporated term s This Iim iting term governs, notwithstanding any longer statutory period granted under state law See Miller v. De/la Air Lines Inc., 2012 U,S. Dist LEXIS 48294, 8-10 (S.D. Fla. 2012) (dism issing action as time-barred under the one-year Iimitation period set forth in airline's contract of carriage, notwithstanding Florida's five year statute of Iim itations for breach of contractl; see also Banga ?. Gundumolgula, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1 30766 (E . D. Cal. 2013) (finding contract of carriage statute of Iim itations governed despite Ionger time period established under California Iaw), 'd-rhe case Iaw is clear that Section 95 03 of the Florida Statutes does not apply to extend statutes of Iim itation set fodh in federally regulated contracts or transactions '' M iller, at *6. lndeed in a case very sim ilar to this a Florida appellate coud held that Florida Iaw did not invalidate the Iim itations period established in an air freight contract subject to the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 Life Sciences, Inc., v. Em ery Air Freight Corp ., 341 So. 2d 272, (FIa.2d DCA 1977). The court explained that the regulation of shipm ent of goods in interstate com merce was preem pted by federal Iaw , therefore, the contract of carriage ''conclusively and exclusively governed the rights and Iiabilities of the parties w ith respect to the shipm ent '' Id. at 273.
Here, too, the Contract of Carriage is a federally regulated contract that governs the rights of the padies And federal law specifically allows air carriers to include lim itations of Iiability on their contracts of carriage See C.F.R. j 253.5. Indeed, as stated by the Suprem e Coud in Am erican Airlines Inc ?.Wollens, 513 U.S. 219, 230 (1995):
The FAA's text, we note, vitality of contracts governing the presupposes transpodation by air carriers. Section 411(b), 49 U.S.C.APP. j 1381(b) , thus authorizes airlines to incorporate by reference in any ticket or other w ritten instrum ent any of the term s of the contract of carriage to the extent authorized by the DOT. And the DOT's regulations contem plate that th , upon e January 1, 1983, term ination of dom estic tariffs , ''ticket contracts'' ordinarily would be enforceable under the contract Iaw of the States . Correspondingly, the DOT requires carriers to give passengers w ritten notice of the tim e period within which they m ay bring an action against the carrier for its acts.
(internal citations omitted). Thus, the contractual statute of Iimitations survives , even if the breach of contract claim is not preem pted by the ADA I Id. at 233 ( ''This distinction between what the State dictates and what the airline itself undertakes confines couds , in breach-of-contract actions, to the padies' bargain with no enlargem ent or enhancem ent based on state laws or policies external to the agreem ent '') Under the Contract of Carriage, Plaintiff had two years from the date of arrival to her destination to bring her breach of contract claim . Plaintiff's date of arrival to her destination on her Iatest scheduled flight was September 19, 2014. (DE 1 N25). Yet, Plaintiff failed to bring her claim until M ay 30, 2017. For this reason , Plaintiff's claim is tim e-barred IV. CO NCLUSION
For the reasons set fodh above Defendants' motion (DE 15) is GRANTED and Plaintiff's Com plaint is DISM ISSED W ITH PREJUDIC E . Plaintifrs l'M otion for Coud to 1 The Coud does not reach the question of whether this breach of contract claim is in fact, preem pted by the ADA or not.
Consider Order Denying Motion to Dismiss in Related Action'' (DE 24) is DENIED AS M OO T.
DO NE AND O RDERED in cham bers in M iam i Florida, this day of M arch 20 1 8 .
KATHL N M . W ILLIAM S UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE